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MATERIAL REALISM: A SYSTEMS THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
by Paul Burton
May 2018
Traditionally power has played a dominant role in all realist theories of international politics
and little if any room was left for actor agency. Systemic outcomes were a function of
system structure. System structure was the result of the positioning of states in the system
according to their power. Conflict resulted from system structure. Actor agency was not
a relevant consideration because system structure was deterministic. This paper presents
a new theorization of realism that it calls material realism. Material realism hypothesizes
globalization as a second independent variable alongside power. A longitudinal network
model using all conflict events since 1992 is constructed that hypothesizes globalization
as acting to mitigate the effect of power and reduce the probability of conflict initiation.
Because globalization is at root a system of resource allocation, material realism theorizes
that as resources are more adequately allocated globally, scarcity is reduced. As scarcity
is reduced, man (and states) fear less for their survival. When survival is not at risk the
probability of conflict abates because the cost-to-benefit ratio swings decisively against
conflict initiation. By using a longitudinal network model, actor agency is accounted for
because conflict events are not assumed to be independent as is the case with more traditional
models like logit or OLS regression. Additionally, the use of a longitudinal network model
allows for the isolation of the impact of system structure versus actor behavior, thus thwarting
charges of reductionism. By using a longitudinal network model to characterize the system
of international politics, a true systems theory of international politics is presented. Previous
attempts at presenting a systems theory of international politics fell short because they did
not account for the impact of actor behavior on system behavior and vice-a-versa. Material
realism represents a paradigm shift for realist thinkers because it opens the door for explicit
consideration of the effect of actor agency and the undeniable effects of globalization on
international political outcomes, especially conflict initiation. Ultimately the conclusion
is reached that technology and innovation must continue to advance in order to achieve
continuing reductions in conflict initiation over the long term.
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Both Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer put forward a theory of international politics
which they claim to be a systems theory. Waltz claims that a state’s capabilities or power
position it relative to other states, and it is the distribution of capabilities among states that
determine international political outcomes. A balance of power among the great powers is a
common recurring outcome according to Waltz. A stable balance of power is a desirable
outcome because it implies that no state is power-maximizing. According to Waltz’s theory
the security dilemma can be avoided by a state taking care to modulate its power in relation to
other states so as not to provoke their insecurity. In this way the status quo is maintained and
the potential for conflict is reduced. Waltz’s theory stands in contrast to that of Mearsheimer
who asserts that the distribution of power among states determines international political
outcomes and all great powers are power-maximizing. According to Mearsheimer, a great
power is always power-maximizing because it strives to be a hegemon in its region (and
indeed, the world). A great power will balance as a tactic to prevent a hegemon from arising,
thus enabling it to maintain, if not increase, its relative power. According to Mearsheimer,
since all great powers are power-maximizing the security dilemma is omnipresent. Both
Waltz and Mearsheimer define the structure of the system of international politics in terms of
the number of great powers and both find the cause of war to be the structure of the system
itself. Consequently, the structure of the system of international politics is deterministic
and little regard for actor agency exists. Power is the explanatory variable that allows each
theory to operate.
A system is a “set of elements or parts that is coherently organized and interconnected in
a pattern or structure that produces a characteristic set of behaviors” that serve to fulfill the
purpose of the system itself (Meadows 2008, loc3398). All systems exist to fulfill a specific
purpose. So a systems theory must identify the system’s purpose and then state how the
behaviors of the system operate to fulfill it.
If the system of international politics is to be analyzed as a system, its purpose must
be defined. What is its purpose? What behaviors operate to fulfill its purpose? Waltz
and Mearsheimer assert that the cause of war can be found in the structure of the system
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of international politics. Because war or conflict has been a quite common occurrence
throughout history, are we therefore to conclude that war is an inevitable consequence of the
operation of the system of international politics? Is the purpose of the system to produce
war between states? What are the manifest behaviors of the system that make this so? If the
purpose of the system of international politics is not to produce war or conflict, then how
should war as a recurring behavior be explained? What purpose does war serve? Systems,
after all, operate to produce recurrent, predictable outcomes (and behaviors). Consequently,
any outcome repeatedly produced can only be properly understood in the context of the
purpose of the system and the system’s behaviors that produce it. The purpose of the system
necessarily provides meaning for all that is observed within its delineated domain.
What is the purpose of the system of international politics? If we take its purpose to be
what we observe as a recurrent outcome, then we may assess the purpose of the system is to
produce war or conflict; or, we may assess the purpose of the system is to produce a balance
of power among the great powers. Both of these conclusions are problematic. If the purpose
of the system is to produce war, then we need to explain how the balancing behavior of
states, which has typically been theorized as a deterrent, produces war. If the purpose of the
system is to produce a balance of power among the great powers, then we need to explain
how war results in a parity of states evidenced by a balance of power. If the purpose of the
system of international politics is something else, then we need to explain how war and the
balancing behavior of states, both of which we observe recurrently, promote that particular
purpose.
When we observe a system we discover regularities. The regularities must be reconciled
with the fulfillment of the purpose of the system. War, a balance of power, or perhaps
something else, must be reconciled with the purpose of the system of international politics.
Moreover, behaviors must be distinguished from outcomes. If observed regularities cannot
be reconciled with the theorized purpose of the system, or its behaviors, then the system is
mis-theorized, which is to say the purpose of the system is not truly understood. The theory
collapses. It explains nothing.
This paper presents a systems theory of international politics called material realism.
Material realism asserts that the purpose of the international system of states is to allocate
resources so that scarcity is ameliorated and fear, which results from scarcity, abates. It is
theorized that fear is the driving force behind all conflict. Consequently, as fear abates, the
odds of conflict among states reduce accordingly.
Material realism hypothesizes that globalization operates to increase collaboration
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among states resulting in the reduction of scarcity as resources are allocated liberally. As a
consequence, the odds of conflict initiation decrease because fear abates. Material realism
also hypothesizes that power operates to reduce collaboration among states as powerful
states are more likely to use coercion, in some form or fashion, to achieve the outcome they
desire. As a consequence, the odds of conflict initiation increase because fear is stoked
in those states that are subjected to the coercion. The key finding of this paper is that
globalization is significant and it operates to offset the contribution of power to the odds of
conflict initiation thereby reducing conflict generally. In short, material realism provides a
theoretical foundation for understanding and anticipating a reduction in instances of conflict
initiation as globalization takes ever deeper root. Of course, the converse is also true. If the
system of globalization is interrupted or its effects reversed, incidents of conflict initiation
should be anticipated to increase.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows:
Chapter 2 will establish the theoretical foundations for material realism through a review
and analysis of the pertinent literature on realism and power. Chapter 3 establishes the
requirements for a systems theory and puts forward an appropriate quantitative method to
evaluate material realism as a systems theory. Power and globalization, respectively, are
hypothesized to decrease and increase the odds of conflict initiation. The results are reported.
Chapter 4 fully expounds material realism and then applies it to explain the behavior of the




This paper proposes a systems theory of international politics that stands in contradistinction
to Kenneth Waltz’s defensive realism and John Mearsheimer’s offensive realism. Both Waltz
and Mearsheimer explain international political outcomes as the result of behavior that is
the product of a single system attribute. Waltz finds the system’s distribution of capabilities
drives behavior that determines system outcomes, while Mearsheimer finds that the system’s
distribution of power drives behavior which determines system outcomes. Each of these
concepts is explored in this chapter. However, for reasons that will become clear, this chapter
starts with a theorization of fear and why it is important.
In section 1 the concept of fear is introduced. Fear is an important concept because
it triggers man to act for his own survival. When man fears for his survival he becomes
capable of anything. Like man, states will act to ensure their survival, and they are capable
of anything when they fear for their survival. Consequently, any theorization of international
politics must account for fear.
In section 2 Waltz’s defensive realism and Mearsheimer’s offensive realism are reviewed
in relevant part. As will be made clear, both theories purport to transform power, a state
attribute, into a system level attribute and use it to explain international political outcomes.
In so doing, both Waltz and Mearsheimer fall short because their theorization of power is
inadequate.
In section 3 power is introduced in two forms. First, a conception of power is borrowed
from Power Transition Theory. Power Transition Theory’s conception of power is robust
because it accounts not only for the wealth of a state, which is the indispensable ingredient
of national power, but also because it accounts for the ability of the state’s government to
extract the wealth from the people so it may be transformed into national power and directed
toward a national purpose. Second, the concept of Network Power is introduced. Network
Power represents a non sovereign power that emerges through the coaction of many actors.
As theorized, Network Power explains the development of standards and conventions that
influence and ultimately cause actor behavior to come into conformance with them. Network
Power is important because it is theorized as the practical result of globalization. Network
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Power is the phenomenon that drives cooperation, which is the indispensable element for
any social system to scale. See also (Turchin 2016).
Chapter 2 starts to lay the theoretical foundation for a systems theory of international
politics. The foundation is completed with Chapter 3. A systems theory of international
politics will be articulated in full color in Chapter 4.
2.1 Fear as the Cause of War
In his Discourse on the Origins and Foundation of Inequality among Mankind Jean-Jaques
Rousseau stated his belief that man, prior to civilization, lived harmoniously with nature. It
was “[o]nly with the coming of agriculture, demographic growth, private property, division
of class, and state coercion . . . did war, and all the other ills of civilization, spring up” (Gat
2006, p38). For Rousseau the state of nature was peaceful. For Thomas Hobbes, however,
the state of nature was “one of endemic ‘warre’, murderous feuds for gain, safety, and
reputation, a war of every man against every man, which made life ‘poore, nasty, brutish,
and short’” (Gat 2006, p37). Who was correct, Hobbes or Rousseau? Why does it matter?
To determine who was correct one must examine the behavior of man in the state of
nature. A state of nature exists when there is no agriculture, private property, division of
class, or state coercion. For this reason, “simple hunter–gatherers, who were thinly dispersed
and nomadic, and had no substantial possessions, are at the centre of the Rousseauite claim”
(Gat 2006, p62). Consequently, if these hunter-gatherers fought, the scales would tip in
favor of a Hobbesian view of the state of nature.
According to Azar Gat, “during most of the two million years of the Pleistocene
and until about 35,000 years ago (the Upper Palaeolithic), all humans were apparently
hunter–gatherers of the simple sort. . . . [Moreover,] the evidence from historical simple
hunter–gatherers is that they fought, and with substantial casualties” (Gat 2006, p63). Never-
theless, Gat admits that it is difficult to determine with certainty the behavior of humans that
far back for lack of written record and other documentary evidence. Consequently, Gat relies
on the behavior of simple hunter-gatherers, such as the aboriginal peoples of Australia, that
was observed and recounted by Europeans who arrived in Australia as recently as 1788. The
strength of this record strongly suggests that even the most simple hunter-gatherers engaged
regularly in fighting and “lived under constant fear of violent conflict, which shaped their
ordinary daily life” (Gat 2006, p83). It appears, therefore, Rousseau was not correct. Man
clearly fought enough such that the state of nature can not be described as peaceful. But
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more is needed to determine whether Hobbes was correct. After all, the picture Hobbes
paints is one of endemic “warre,” not one of occasional conflict. To distinguish between
occasional conflict and endemic “warre,” the motivation of the actors is important. What is
it that produces war with such frequency as to support Hobbes’ claim?
Why did man fight? Gat describes it this way. “An anthropological model sensibly
suggests that defended territoriality and violent competition will increase in ratio to the
growing predictability and density of the resources, which make the effort to monopolize
them worthwhile” (Gat 2006, p69). A primary motivation for conflict, therefore, was
resource scarcity. Groups would increase in size commensurate with the ability of the land
they controlled to support them, or they would move to find suitable land.
Pleistocene man was nomadic and territorial within a circumscribed area. Land, or a
defined territory, was jealously guarded for its life-giving resources. Violent competition
ensued as different groups came into contact over the same resources. Indigenous groups
would fight to keep alien groups from taking resources because their life depended on the
very same resources. For them, it was a zero sum game. Fear of death from a lack of
resources was the ultimate motivator.
Pleistocene man in the state of nature was violent because his fear of death made him
so. Increases in population would push groups to expand their territory, bringing them into
violent contact with other groups over the same resources; seasonal or other natural food
supply shortages would cause migration, again bringing groups into violent contact with
other groups over the same resources (Gat 2006, p98). Differences in resources between
groups caused violent conflict as each group sought to survive. This was the lot of man
in the state of nature (Gat 2006, p84). But when man exited the state of nature, did things
change?
If a state of nature was associated with no agriculture, no private property, no division
of class, and no state coercion, then as these things came about did man stop fighting? Of
course the answer is well known: man continues to fight to this day. Notwithstanding the
sophistication and advancement of man, and the society of his creation, he continues to
fight and kill his fellow man, even if in decreasing numbers (Morris 2014, p21-2); (Harari
2017). Over the last two million years, the evidence clearly supports Hobbes’ view of
“endemic warre.” But compare (Tang 2013, p64). In fact, it appears human conflict is a
reliable constant.
Rousseau’s conception of the state of nature has never been supported by the reality of
the facts on the ground. The reason, as alluded to above, is because it fails to understand
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mans’ social behavior in the context of the primary source of all of mans’ behavior: the
primordial desire for survival is the source of all of mans’ behavior. Indeed, “[t]here is
no [evolutionary] ’reason’ for the existence of either competition or conflict, other than
that they both proved successful techniques in the struggle for survival” (Gat 2006, p122).
Survival is the one primary biologic need and man is designed and engineered to pursue it.
(Reproduction is also viewed as a primary biologic need, but, alternatively, is either omitted
or subsumed by the drive for survival as discussed here) (Gat 2006). See also (Lisle and
Goldhamer 2003, loc261).
“The bodies and minds of all creatures are designed for the same purpose—for survival.
. .” (Lisle and Goldhamer 2003, loc258). Consequently, if survival is the “one” primary
biologic need and objective, then all human behaviors can be viewed as tactics and measured
by their usefulness in contributing to its fulfillment. Further, if this is true, it follows that
humans must be equipped with a set of tools to assist them; to let them know that their
behavior is contributing to this end. Otherwise, how would they know?
Every human (and complex animal) that has ever lived has had engineered into them a
specialized set of neural circuits that produce feedback by means of good or bad feelings.
These feelings signal the utility of their behavior, thus directing its continuation or cessation
(Lisle and Goldhamer 2003, loc-299-301). This circuitry allows for the modulation of
behavior by encouraging behaviors that produce pleasure, discouraging behaviors that
produce pain, and encouraging the conservation of energy. Consequently, this neural
circuitry forms the basis of a motivational triad that motivates man to act because of how he
expects to feel (Lisle and Goldhamer 2003, loc302). For example, according to Douglas
Lisle, “[p]leasure . . . is an intense event designed to last for a few precious moments each
day. The experience is limited, as the pleasure system quickly becomes exhausted. Pleasure
was designed as the unmistakable signal of success for reaching survival and/or reproductive
goals” (Lisle and Goldhamer 2003, loc398-400). Conversely, pain was designed as an
unmistakeable signal of failure, which in this context means death.
Related to the concept of feelings is the concept of moods. Moods signal the expectation
of pleasure or pain in the future and have their own neurochemistry and mechanics. Whereas
acts of pleasure, such as sexual intercourse, cause the release of dopamine concurrent with
the act itself, a positive mood such as happiness causes the release of serotonin. Pleasure
responses signal ultimate success at reaching a primary biologic end point and, hence,
are more intense, even if much shorter in duration than moods. Positive mood responses,
on the other hand, signal that the right behaviors are being exhibited and, therefore, a
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primary biologic end point, such as survival (or reproduction, in the example used) is being
approached (Lisle and Goldhamer 2003, loc403-03). Consequently, moods, particularly
happiness, are important because they reinforce positive behavior that leads to a primary
biologic end point. Conversely, unhappiness, as a mood sustained over time, signals poor
behavior and the approach of a feeling of pain, the avoidance of which is a primary motivator
of man because it directly, negatively impacts his primary objective of survival. Moods,
seen as such, are a tool that guide man toward survival.
Fear in human beings is a primary emotion provoked in response to a stimulus presently
occurring, or anticipated to occur, that presents a risk to body or life. Fear punctuates
unhappiness and, following the discussion from immediately above, signals the eventuality,
if not imminence, of pain. Because pain directly implicates mans’ primary biologic need
for survival, fear consumes and controls him to the exclusion of all else. “As Edmund
Burke observed a century and a half ago, ‘[n]o passion so effectively robs the mind of all
its powers of acting and reasoning as fear’” (Fettweis 2013, loc654). Consequently, in this
sense fear constrains mans’ volition. Fear is evolutionarily useful because it directs man
toward activities intended to mitigate or reduce it. Fear directs man toward survival.
Pleistocene man was a simple hunter-gatherer. It is a small, perhaps even inconsequential,
simplification to assume he led a basic life whose only significant activities were foraging,
hunting, and reproduction. To the extent he was aggressive and engaged in violence against
others, it can be assumed he did so only to survive. Man is programmed to avoid pain,
because pain signals death. Consequently, man will generally fight only to survive. Fighting
for other reasons, especially when the outcome is uncertain, will generally be prevented by
mans’ fear of death. This is not to suggest that man is not violent and will not fight for a
reason other than survival. Rather, it is to suggest that if man does fight for a reason other
than survival, it will be with a favorable view toward the risk of failure, thus mitigating the
fear that will prevent him from engaging in the activity in the first place (Gat 2006, p114).
In this light, aggression, or fighting, or “warre,” should be seen as an evolutionarily useful
tactic employed by man because of his fear of death. It follows, therefore, if man does not
fear death, he will not fight.
Hobbes understood mans’ fear of death was strong enough to cause him to risk death in
order to survive. This explains war in the state of nature. When Pleistocene man could not
acquire sufficient food from his land to ensure his survival, he would risk his life to take
it from the land of another. He did this knowingly. Hence, knowledge of an undesirable
anticipated outcome produces fear that inspires action intended to redress the fear. But
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knowledge also produces security because it motivates and focuses the action of man,
allowing him to modulate his conduct in relation to the object of his fear, thus giving
him control over his well-being. See (Blits 1989). This idea of knowledge and control is
important because it broadens the definition of fear beyond the known, bringing into its orbit
the unknown.
According to Hobbes, man will fear undesirable outcomes his knowledge tells him to
anticipate. However, he will also have an “indeterminate fear of the unknown” (Blits 1989,
p418). “Fear is a pain, and men naturally avoid pain. Men therefore seek to avoid not only
the object of fear, but fear itself. But an objectless fear is an unresolvable fear. No one
can fight or flee what he cannot identify or know” (Blits 1989, p425). For Hobbes, fear
of fear itself, or of the unknown, was the greatest fear because lacking knowledge, man
lacked control over his well-being and was, therefore, helplessly insecure. An insecure man
lives in constant fear and, therefore, pain. It follows from this that man will constantly seek
knowledge as a means to gain control over his well-being. Until man gains total control
over his well-being, he will be insecure and live in fear and he should be expected to act
accordingly.
Hobbes’ political philosophy rests on the proposition that fear must be mitigated so
man can feel secure; so he can be removed from the state of nature. Hobbes’ solution is
the imposition of “a common power to keep them all in awe” (Hobbes 1651, ch. 13). His
Leviathan does this at the level of the state. But what performs this function at the level of
the system of states? Hobbesian logic suggests man will remain insecure and live in fear,
and act out of fear, until such time as a common power exists at the level of the system of
states to keep all of man in awe. Is this conclusion supported by what is observed today?
Fear causes war. Mitigate fear and the occurrence of war will reduce in proportion. “If
man’s evil qualities lead to wars, then one has to worry about ways to repress his evilness or
to compensate for it” (Waltz 2001, p40). So if war is less frequent, as Ian Morris asserts,
if violence is truly declining, is it because man is less fearful, or because his evilness has
been repressed or compensated for? A first image analysis reveals fear as the root cause
of the problem. It does not reveal the solution. The solution is not completely revealed
by the second image, because we know war still recurs with an all too often frequency. A
reduction in war, if it exists, must be explained at least in part by reference to the third image.
Moreover, whatever explanation is found must operate in the context of the root cause. The
two are not independent. They are interdependent. A systems theory of international politics
must account for both.
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2.2 Two Systems Views of Realism
Realism has been a dominant theory of international politics since the beginning of the 20th
century. Two relatively recent realist theories that are particularly prominent and purport
to offer a systems view of international politics are Kenneth Waltz’s defensive realism and
John Mearsheimer’s offensive realism. Both theories suggest that international political
outcomes result from the structure of the international system. According to these theories,
it is the structure of the International system that drives state behavior.
Both theories view the system of international politics as anarchic. As a consequence,
both give state power primacy since it is ultimately the only thing a state can rely on to
secure its own survival in a world of potentially predatory states. Both theories ultimately
rely on power directly, or indirectly, to explain the structure of the international system.
Beyond this, however, the theories differ.
Because of the assumptions that offensive realism makes, it finds that states engage in
patterns of behavior that give rise to a security dilemma and make escape from it impossible.
Defensive realism also theorizes the existence of a security dilemma but finds that states can
escape it through cooperation, a possibility that offensive realism does not allow. This is the
main difference between the two theories and it makes clear the implication that offensive
realist states are power maximizers while defensive realist states are not.
Neither theory is a true systems theory as contemplated here (see chapter 3). As will
be shown later, a systems theory theorizes how the coaction of the actors generates system
structure and how system structure then affects actor behavior. Actor behavior and system
structure coevolve. The synergy of the two is what produces the outcomes of the system.
Consequently, a third image analysis can never offer a complete answer. The agency of
states matters.
This next two subsections will review in relevant part each theory to set the stage for a
more complete systems theory of international politics to be proposed in the penultimate
chapter of this paper.
2.2.1 Defensive Structural Realism
In his Theory of International Politics Kenneth Waltz put forward his structural theory
of international politics. A structural theory of international politics is one that omits the
attributes and the relations of the interacting states and focuses only on the structure of
the system, which is to say the placement of the states within the system itself (Waltz
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2010, p39). Waltz believes this to be necessary because of the repeated failure to explain
international political outcomes by the examination of interacting states. According to Waltz,
“[i]f the same effects follow from different causes, then constraints must be operating on the
independent variables in ways that affect outcomes” (Waltz 2010, p68). These constraints
are found above the level of the state: they are found at the level of the system of states
and are given expression by the structure of the system itself. For Waltz, therefore, system
structure is a constraint that works to keep outcomes within specified ranges despite the
variety of behaviors, strategies, or interactions of the states in the system (Waltz 2010, pp69,
72). Seen in this way, system structure explains, at least in part, the recurrence of familiar
outcomes in international politics, even outcomes that are not desired (Waltz 2010, p69).
Waltz finds that the structure of the system of international politics is defined by three
phenomenon. First is anarchy, the ordering principle of the system. International politics is
not an hierarchically ordered realm. Each of the states interacting in the system stands equal
to each of the other states, with no power over them. No state is superordinate or subordinate
relative to another and there is no power to keep them in awe. Second, the interacting states
are not functionally differentiated. Each state is alike in that it must perform the same
functions as every other; there is no specialization that causes one state to perform one
function to the exclusion of another performing the same function. Finally, third, how states
are placed in the system relative to each other depends on each state’s relative capabilities.
Thus, while states perform the same functions, particular states can stand apart from others
by their ability to perform the same functions better. For a complete discussion on system
structure, see (Waltz 2010, Ch. 5).
So for Waltz, system structure is defined by three phenomenon. But two of the three
phenomenon are constant. Anarchy, the ordering principle of the system, is a constant. It
is also a constant that the system is composed exclusively of functionally undifferentiated
states. These two things do not change. The only variation occurring in the system is with
the distribution of capabilities among the otherwise undifferentiated states. Consequently,
this particular phenomenon seizes the lion’s share of the explanatory power of his theory.
To the extent system structure explains anything, it is the distribution of capabilities within
the system that explains it. Distribution of capabilities, therefore, must become the focus of
analysis and as such requires further definition and discussion.
Waltz asserts that power is what positions states differently in the system (Waltz 2010,
p97). Power is not a system level attribute. It is clearly an attribute of the state. So is Waltz
failing to heed his own admonition to omit unit level attributes from system level definitions
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(Waltz 2010, p97)? If power is what determines the placement of a state in the system,
how does this relate to distribution of capabilities? The following thought experiment will
elucidate an answer to these questions.
To understand how power positions a state in the international system and how it relates
to distribution of capabilities, it is useful to think of power as being a statistic calculated
from the relevant attributes of a state, with all such statistics calculated from all states
being observations from a normally distributed population. This population distribution can
then be described exclusively by its mean and standard deviation and can be represented
graphically by a Gaussian curve. The calculated statistic will summarize the unit level
attributes of the particular state and it will precisely determine the placement of the state on
the Gaussian curve - in Waltzian terms, the value of the statistic determines the placement
of the state in the system of states. (It also appears Waltz would equate the value of this
statistic with the capability of the state). See (Waltz 2010, p131).
When Waltz refers to the distribution of capabilities, however, he is no longer referring
to where the state is placed on the Gaussian curve. He is referring to the curve itself.
The attributes of the curve clearly and precisely describe the distribution of capabilities
in the system. The distribution of capabilities can be fully understood by referring to two
population parameters: the mean and the standard deviation. Different distributions of
capabilities will be represented by different Gaussian curves, with different means and/or
different standard deviations. This means states can increase or decrease their power, thus
changing their position on the curve. But unless the mean and standard deviation of the
curve change, the distribution of capabilities remains the same. This is straightforward and
is consonant with Waltz’s assertion that inconsequential changes in the number of great
powers, or the replacement of one great power by another, do not result in a change in the
structure of the system (Waltz 2010, p162).
For reasons that will become clear later, Waltz is not concerned with the absolute power
of a state. He is concerned with how states stand in relation to one another. His concern
is one of relative position, not absolute position. Indeed, if Waltz were concerned with
absolute position, he would run afoul of his own admonition to pay no heed to unit level
attributes. In the thought experiment above, Waltz can fully describe a state’s position in
the system and its position relative to any other, without reference to unit level attributes,
by specifying its distance from the mean in units of standard deviation. When this is done
not only is the relative position of the state defined, but the stage is set for the grouping of
relatively comparable states. This is important because it leads nicely to a discussion of
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great powers.
For clarity, the above point warrants an illustration. If we assume a distribution of
capabilities has the characteristics of a normal distribution with a mean of zero and a
standard deviation of one, then a state that is 1.96 units of standard deviation to the right
of the mean will register in the 97.5 percentile of the distribution. Putting this in Waltzian
terms, this means that a state so situated, which performs the same functions as every other
state (because all states are functionally undifferentiated), performs the functions better than
97.5% of the states in the population. It would be logical to group this state with others
located nearby and to call them great powers. Why is this important?
“In international politics . . . the units of greatest capability set the scene of action for
others as well as for themselves” (Waltz 2010, p72). “A general theory of international
politics is necessarily based on the great powers” (Waltz 2010, p73). These statements are
not objectionable. Indeed, the strong have always set the conditions of survival for the weak.
Gat and Hobbes remind us of this. But because these statements ring true, we find it even
more urgent to define what a great power is and Waltz’s guidance in this respect seems
lacking.
According to Waltz, the question “what is a great power” is an empirical one that
common sense can answer (Waltz 2010, p131). Waltz suggests one need only rank the states
according to their capabilities and despite difficulties in comparison, general agreement will
result, “with occasional doubt about marginal cases” (Waltz 2010, p131). The difficulty
here lies in defining capabilities. In this regard Waltz states one must look at the combined
capabilities of the state. “Their rank depends on how they score on all of the following
items : size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military
strength, political stability and competence[,]” probably among others not mentioned (Waltz
2010, p131). This may be true, but even if it is true, it results in an ordinal ranking of states
arrived at subjectively. This is because the same ranking exercise performed by different
people, each rationally emphasizing different items, will no doubt produce different results.
Nevertheless, ignoring this difficulty, with such a ranking in hand where is one to draw the
line that separates the great powers from the not great powers? There is no way to draw the
line, except by subjective inclination, confirmed and comforted by “general agreement.”
As a theoretical concept, distribution of capabilities makes perfect sense as articulated in
the thought experiment above. It is parsimonious and clear in its definition, it is theoretically
rigorous, and it is repeatable. But the thought experiment above assumed power (or “capa-
bility,” which Waltz seems to use from time to time in its stead) was a statistic that could be
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calculated from the relevant attributes of a state. It was this power statistic that provided a
foundation from which all else was constructed. Indeed, distribution of capabilities derives
directly from this statistic and, therefore, necessarily relies on it. If this statistic cannot be
adequately calculated, no abstraction is possible. A distribution of capabilities does not exist,
and we are left to make unit level comparisons based on our subjective, ordinal ranking of
states. There is no structural theory.
This is where Waltz’s realism falls short. Power as a concept is under theorized by Waltz
in his Theory of International Politics for this reason alone. But there is additional reason
for concern.
For Waltz, and all realists, power is the currency states use to pay for self-help in an
anarchic international system where there is no one to receive a “911” call. Power is what
ensures the survival of the state, so logically a state may equate more power with more
security and, therefore, seek more of it. This, as pointed out by John Herz, results in a
security dilemma. A security dilemma exists when a state seeing another state increase its
arms, and being unsure of the other state’s intentions, feels insecure and acts to increase
its own arms in response. Each state then sees the other arming and has no choice but to
continue to arm itself. A vicious cycle is created that leads to the paradoxical result that
each state ends up feeling less secure because of the very actions it took to feel secure in the
first place. See, (Herz 1950, p157); see also, (Waltz 2010, p186).
It is important to understand the genesis of this vicious cycle is the insecurity a state
feels at seeing another state build up its arms. This leads to the conclusion that power is
merely a means to an end, not an end in itself. “In anarchy, security is the highest end of the
state” (Waltz 2010, p126). Consequently, while power is good, too much power can be bad
if it provokes insecurity in other states, causing them to build up their arms. If a state is truly
seeking security, it will not engage in arms buildups that provoke other states to respond in
kind. Instead, it will offer reassurance and seek to cooperate with other states to prevent a
security dilemma from arising (Tang 2008, p459). This means under Waltz’s theory states
can pursue security by accumulating power, as well as through cooperation and reassurance.
The end objective of these things deployed in coordination with each other is security, which
is tantamount to a reduction in fear. Importantly, on this basis, how can one reasonably
avoid a second image analysis if the intent is to understand international political outcomes?
To rescue Waltz’s realism, a more robust theorization of power is needed and one will
be offered infra. Such a theorization of power must account for cooperation and reassurance
between and among states. That these activities sound suspiciously like unit level activities
15
will be dealt with.
2.2.2 Offensive Structural Realism
In The Tragedy of Great Power Politics John Mearsheimer puts forward his structural
theory of international politics (Mearsheimer 2001, loc495). Like Waltz, Mearsheimer
believes great powers dominate and shape international politics and it is the structure of
the international system that shapes the behavior of states (Mearsheimer 2001, loc440).
However, unlike Waltz, Mearsheimer believes “the international system creates powerful
incentives for states to look for opportunities to gain power at the expense of rivals, and to
take advantage of those situations when the benefits outweigh the costs. A state’s ultimate
goal is to be the hegemon in the system” (Mearsheimer 2001, loc504-06). Consequently,
states must relentlessly pursue power; the more the better. This relentless pursuit of power,
however, forecloses on the opportunity for states to cooperate, thus preventing their escape
from the security dilemma. See (Tang 2008); see also (Mearsheimer 2001, loc970-74).
Mearsheimer’s theory rests on five assumptions that when married together create
“powerful incentives for great powers to think and act offensively with regard to each other”
(Mearsheimer 2001, loc663). For a complete discussion of Mearsheimer’s five assumptions,
see (Mearsheimer 2001, loc635-63). To satisfy the purpose intended here, a brief discussion
follows.
First, great powers exist in an anarchic environment. No central authority exists over
the state, so each state is independent, sovereign, and must, therefore, be self-regarding.
Because there is no central authority to receive a “911” call, states very quickly learn that
self-help is the only reliable help. Consequently, self-help, according to Mearsheimer, is a
common pattern of behavior for states (Mearsheimer 2001, loc663).
Second, all great powers have offensive capability and are capable of harming one
another. This, coupled with the third assumption that states can never be certain about the
intentions of another, is enough to provoke fear in them. Fear, according to Mearsheimer,
represents a common pattern of behavior for states (Mearsheimer 2001, loc663).
Fourth, all great powers have survival as their primary goal. This means that feelings
of insecurity, created by uncertainty about the intentions of another state, can produce fear
and signal a risk to the survival of the state itself. Because the state exists in an anarchic
environment, with no central authority to receive a “911” call, the state is forced to be ready
at all times to act in its own defense. This leads the state to constantly engage in power
maximizing behavior. According to Mearsheimer, power maximization is a common pattern
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of behavior for states (Mearsheimer 2001, loc663).
Finally, fifth, great powers are rational actors. They are aware of their external environ-
ment and think strategically about how to survive in it. They consider the impact of their
actions on other states and the actions of other states on themself. They adjust their strategy
for survival accordingly. Their perspective is not limited to the short term, but contemplates
the long term too. Consequently, they will make short term sacrifices to achieve a long term
gain.
Mearsheimer believes each of the assumptions above is “a reasonably accurate repre-
sentation of an important aspect of life in the international system” (Mearsheimer 2001,
loc635-36). Moreover, the assumptions, as indicated above, induce states to exhibit specific
patterns (self-help, fear, and power maximization) of behavior. As states exhibit these
patterns of behavior, a system structure emerges as a result of the coaction of the states
exhibiting the behaviors. The emergent structure is seized with its own distinct attributes
that act upon the states and, therefore, influence state behavior. This explains Mearsheimer’s
assertion of realists second core belief “that the behavior of great powers is influenced
mainly by their external environment, not by their internal characteristics. The structure
of the international system, which all states must deal with, largely shapes their foreign
policies” (Mearsheimer 2001, loc442-43). Consequently, it is important to understand that it
is these three behaviors that generate the system structure. These behaviors, however, do not
define the system structure.
This distinction was not lost on Waltz. We know from Waltz that a structural theory
of international politics is one that omits the attributes and the relations of the interacting
states and focuses only on the structure of the system (Waltz 2010, p39). This explains
precisely why Waltz went to great lengths to abstract away from the attributes of the state.
He accomplished this by placing the state in the system according to its power and then
describing the structure of the system and, indeed, the relative position of the state in the
system, with reference only to distribution of capabilities which is a system level attribute. If
Mearsheimer is to have a structural theory of international politics, as he purports to propose
in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, he too must abstract away from the attributes of
the interacting states. As it turns out, he endeavors to do this by deploying a concept quite
similar to Waltz’s distribution of capabilities. But as we will see, he ultimately fails because
he relies on state level attributes where structural attributes are required.
According to Mearsheimer, “[s]tructural factors such as anarchy and the distribution of
power . . . are what matter most for explaining international politics” (Mearsheimer 2001,
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loc328-29). Anarchy is a constant, so it can be ignored because it cannot explain variation in
outcome (Mearsheimer 2001, loc5134). Consequently, changes in the distribution of power
are what is left to explain international political outcomes.
Mearsheimer’s definition of distribution of power seems to amount to nothing more
than counting the number of great powers in the system and assessing the power of each in
relation to the power of each of the others (Mearsheimer 2001, loc868-82). The result of
this assessment is a characterization of system structure.
Mearsheimer defines a great power as a state with “sufficient military assets to put up
a serious fight in an all-out conventional war against the most powerful state in the world”
(Mearsheimer 2001, loc245-46). The state need not win, it just must be capable of fighting “a
war of attrition that leaves the dominant state seriously weakened . . .” (Mearsheimer 2001,
loc247). With this definition of a great power, the distribution of power under Mearsheimer’s
theory is quite easy to determine.
Identify the dominant state in the world. Identify all states that are capable of fighting
a war of attrition against the dominant state. Each member of this group of states, along
with the dominant state, is a great power. Assess how power is distributed among the great
powers. If there are only two great powers, then the distribution of power is bipolar. If
there are more than two great powers, then the distribution of power is multipolar and one
additional step is required. The distribution of power is multipolar and unbalanced if there
are power asymmetries among the great powers. The distribution of power is multipolar
and balanced if power is distributed more or less evenly among the great powers. See
(Mearsheimer 2001, loc5139).
Mearsheimer characterizes system structure in accordance with this assessment (bipolar,
balanced vs unbalanced multipolar) and it is system structure that explains international
political outcomes. Nevertheless, Mearsheimer admits structure is only a “crude predictor”
because sometimes nonstructural factors play a role in determining international political
outcomes (Mearsheimer 2001, loc5139-45). This seems to clearly recognize the interde-
pendence of system structure and state behavior. Much more will be said later regarding
this.
From the above discussion, however, it is clear Mearsheimer is defining system structure
in terms of the number of great powers and their relation to each other. The relation of each
great power, each to another, is determined solely by the assessment and comparison of a
single state-level attribute: power. If distribution of power is to be a structural attribute, it
cannot be determined exclusively and directly by a state level attribute; the two cannot be one
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in the same. To be a structural attribute, distribution of power must emerge from the coaction
of states. That is simply not the case here. Hence, Waltz would scream reductionism and he
would be correct. It is not even a close call.
Waltz escapes this trap through the fiction of placing each state in the system according
to an assessment of its power and then defining its place in the system by reference to
distribution of capabilities; Waltz dropped all references to power once the state was placed
in the system. This was illustrated through the thought experiment above. The state attribute
of power determined the position of the state on the Gaussian curve, but the state’s relation
to any other state was specified in terms of units of standard deviation from the mean, which
was a system level attribute that (along with the mean) uniquely described the distribution
of capabilities - that is to say, it described the system structure itself. Waltz’s theorization
of the system was sound. Waltz failed because his conception of power was inadequate in
support of his theorization of the system of international politics.
We need not even reach Mearsheimer’s conception of power (which is more robust than
Waltz’s) because his theorization of the system of international of politics fails for lack of a
structural attribute that purports to explain international political outcomes. The structural
attribute Mearsheimer puts forward to explain international political outcomes is actually
a state level attribute. Consequently, Mearsheimer has no structural theory because his
theorization of distribution of power in the context of a structural theory of international
politics is not tenable.
There is one final issue regarding Mearsheimer’s theory of offensive realism that requires
discussion: the security dilemma. We know a state’s capacity for self-help is a function
of its power. As states pursue power for the sake of security, other states respond in kind
setting off an action-reaction cycle of power maximizing behavior (Levy and Thompson
2010, p30). This action-reaction cycle contributes to constant security competition and lies
at the heart of the security dilemma “which reflects the basic logic of offensive realism”
(Mearsheimer 2001, loc724). The international environment, according to Mearsheimer, is
characterized by “constant security competition, where states are willing to lie, cheat, and
use brute force if it helps them gain advantage over their rivals. Peace, if one defines that
concept as a state of tranquility or mutual concord, is not likely to break out in this world”
(Mearsheimer 2001, loc723-25). Nevertheless, and oddly, Mearsheimer elsewhere asserts
that “[t]he pursuit of power stops only when hegemony is achieved” (Mearsheimer 2001,
loc704-05). Does this mean that after achieving hegemony a great power stops accumulating
power because they are secure? If they do, will not the other great powers who feel insecure
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continue to accumulate power and eventually surpass them? Perhaps it is only a temporary
pause? One is left to wonder.
The practical effect of the security dilemma is theorized differently by Waltz and
Mearsheimer. We know from Waltz that too much power can be bad if it leads to a security
dilemma that results in less security for each state. However, as Shiping Tang points out,
because Waltz accepts the possibility that a state may have benign intentions, he leaves
room for mutual trust to develop between states, thus allowing them to take actions to
escape the constant power competition of the security dilemma. Mearsheimer accepts the
possibility that a state’s intentions may be benign, but then renders the possibility moot with
the assertion that “intentions can change quickly, so a state’s intentions can be benign one
day and hostile the next. Uncertainty about intentions is unavoidable, which means that
states can never be sure that other states do not have offensive intentions to go along with
their offensive capabilities” (Mearsheimer 2001, loc650-52).
As already stated, supra, under Waltz’s theory states can pursue security by accumu-
lating power, as well as through cooperation and reassurance. This is not the case under
Mearsheimer’s theory. Under Mearsheimer’s theory, states can pursue security only by
accumulating power. Cooperation, which could suspend power competition and allow each
state to exit the security dilemma, is foreclosed because a state will always assign a hostile
intention to another state. A state can never trust that another state has benign intent. For
offensive realists, security competition is a way of life. A state in an offensive realist’s world
can not achieve security. Fear wins!
2.3 Power
Power, directly or indirectly, is what determines outcomes in international politics, or so
we are told by Waltz and Mearsheimer. For Waltz, power is what positions states in the
international system and it is the basis for his concept of distribution of capabilities which
he theorizes as a system level attribute. Mearsheimer speaks of a distribution of power
which he intends to be a system level attribute, but in reality he is simply counting and
comparing the great powers by the amount of power they possess. If power is so central
to international politics, then clearly no understanding of international politics is possible
without first having an understanding of power. If power is so central to a structural theory
of international politics, then it must be theorized in the context of what a systems theory
requires generally, before it can be properly expressed more specifically in a particular
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systems theory such as offensive or defensive realism.
We know from above that a system is composed of interacting units and it is the coaction
of the interacting units that establishes and gives life to the system itself. The system that
emerges in this way is defined by a structure which itself is described by attributes that
are different in character from, and cannot be described in terms of, the attributes of the
interacting units. System structure affects unit behavior even as it is affected by the nonlinear
effect of the behavior of the system’s units considered all together. The system evolves over
time through the interplay of system structure and unit behavior manifest in state expressions
of power. It is often, if not always, impossible to distinguish horse from cart. This explains
why system behavior cannot be explained by system structure or by unit behavior, one
independent of the other. To try to explain one outside the context of the other is to engage
in reductionism.
If power is to be a dominant explanatory phenomenon in a system of international
politics, it must be theorized at both the unit and the system level since each affects the
other. Waltz and Mearsheimer both purported to theorize power at the system level, but
neither did so at the unit level. Consequently, their theorization can not be complete. Power
at the system and unit level must be considered together to produce a coherent explanation
of outcomes in a system of international politics.
What follows next is a theorization of power at the unit and then at the system level. The
interplay of the two is what will explain outcomes in international politics.
2.3.1 National Capabilities as Unit Level Power
For Waltz power is measured in terms of capabilities and “in a self-help system . . .
[states] have to use their combined capabilities in order to serve their interests” (Waltz 2010,
p131). A state’s power is based “on all of the following items : size of population and
territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability and
competence” (Waltz 2010, p131). It is the combined effect of these items that determines the
power of the state as well as the position of the state in the system of international politics.
Waltz’s definition of power is not objectionable, so far as it goes. But it goes not far enough
because it is not actionable. It needs to be operationalized.
Waltz’s theorization of defensive realism is robust. Nevertheless, we are left uncertain as
to whether it adequately explains the reality of what we observe in the system of international
politics. If we are to build a model of the system of international politics, explanatory
variables must be quantified, otherwise we are left with subjective evaluations to inform and
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drive conceptual arguments, with cause and effect left to hang in a limbo of abstractness.
How should power at the state level be quantified? To this task we now turn.
Mearsheimer argues that power is based on material capabilities and he distinguishes
between military power and latent power (Mearsheimer 2001, loc1034-37). Mearsheimer’s
two categories of power contemplate all of Waltz’s items, but his theory favors military
power as the primus inter pares “because offensive realism emphasizes that force is the
ultima ratio of international politics” (Mearsheimer 2001, loc1047-48). Moreover, “effective
power,” is a function of military capability (Mearsheimer 2001, loc1042). “Latent power[, on
the other hand,] refers to the socio-economic ingredients that go into building military power;
it is largely based on a state’s wealth and the overall size of its population” (Mearsheimer
2001, loc1039-41). Consequently, latent power cannot be ignored and it requires special
attention in two particular respects.
First, the nature and quality of a state’s latent power is important. A state’s ability to
invest in military power requires a surplus of wealth. If the population of the state consumes
all it produces, nothing is left over to invest in building up the military. This, according
to Mearsheimer, largely described Russia in relation to the United Kingdom during the
period 1815 - 1914. Russia was saddled with a large, agrarian, peasant-based economy
that produced little, if any, surplus. Consequently, even though Russia’s overall level of
wealth was comparable to the United Kingdom’s (because of its greater population), it was
clearly less powerful than the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom during this period was
industrialized and significantly more productive than Russia. This difference in productivity
resulted in the United Kingdom having a comparatively much greater surplus than Russia.
The United Kingdom used this surplus to build up its military power. See (Mearsheimer
2001, loc1161-75). Consequently, for Mearsheimer, the nature and quality of latent power
clearly contemplate the economic development of the state (Mearsheimer 2001, loc1161).
Second, even if a surplus of wealth exists, the state must have the ability and the political
courage to extract the wealth from its population and direct it toward the production of
military capability and not other things like, for example, social services. This is not always
a given. Germany is a productive and rich state, but invests comparatively little in military
capability.
Mearsheimer explicitly recognizes the nature and quality of latent power is important,
but he does not directly address the fact that the resources necessary to build military power,
which is the ultima ratio of international politics, must be taken from the population of the
state. In order to take the resources from the the population of the state, the state must have
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the institutional capacity and the political will to do so, and the people of the state must not
resist the taking.
Before Mearsheimer wrote The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, A.F.K Organski and
Jacek Kugler addressed exactly these issues in The War Ledger. They framed it this way:
“Do elites have the tools to extract human and material resources from their societies,
aggregate the many contributions each citizen makes into national pools, and use them
for national purposes” (Organski and Kugler 1980, loc1146-47)? If elites have the tools,
then the state will be able to produce some measure of military capability. The measure
of capability will depend on the amount of resources that can be extracted and directed
toward its production, as well as the level of political mobilization that the state can direct
and sustain over time. Unlike Mearsheimer, Organski and Kugler do not directly address
military power. Instead they proxy state power with a measure of national capabilities.
According to Organski and Kugler, “as far as a measure of national capabilities was
concerned, the three principal determinants are the number of people who can work and/or
fight, their productivity, and the effectiveness of the political system in extracting, pooling,
and allocating individual contributions for use in the pursuit of national goals” (Organski
and Kugler 1980, loc1366-69). The number of people who can work or fight is proxied in a
“rough way” by total population and GDP per capita proxies for their productivity (Organski
and Kugler 1980, loc1369). The product of the two is simply GDP.
Organski and Kugler developed a metric for the state’s ability to extract, pool, and
allocate resources from the population. It is calculated by taking the taxes actually collected
by the state as a percentage of the taxes theoretically able to be collected. The taxes that are
theoretically able to be collected is a value calculated in consideration of how the state’s
economy produces its GDP. Hence, Organski and Kugler specifically apprehend the nature
and the quality of the state’s economy with their method of calculating state extractive
capacity; and, it bears mention that their discussion of the state economy in this regard is
not remarkably different than Mearsheimer’s. This measure, once calculated, will represent
the effectiveness of the state in mobilizing its human and material resources for national
purposes (Organski and Kugler 1980, loc1142-63).
In assessing the amount of taxes theoretically able to be collected Organski and Kugler
looked at the openness of a state’s economy as a function of the portion of its GDP accounted
for by exports; the development of the state’s economy as a function of the portion of its
GDP accounted for by agriculture; and, the composition of the state economy’s total product
as a function of the portion of its GDP accounted for by mining activities (Organski and
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Kugler 1980, loc1252-62). “The next step was to use multiple regression that allows controls
for the above differences among all members of the sample and produces estimates of how
much each factor added to or subtracted from tax totals in each country for every year.
The regression yielded predicted values that are estimates of capacity” - the amount of
taxes that could theoretically be collected based on the attributes and level of economic
development of the state’s economy (Organski and Kugler 1980, loc1270-72). The value
of taxes actually collected divided by the amount theoretically available for collection
represents the extractive capacity of the state and is what Organiski and Kugler refer to as
Relative Political Extraction, or RPE. The product of RPE and GDP results in a national
capabilities score. This score represents state power. In effect, it is nothing more than a
multiplier applied to GDP. The multiplier simply gauges the states ability to mobilize the
wealth (human and material) of the state for national purposes.
As examples, see Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 for national capabilities for the years 1980
and 2010 (Tammen and Kugler 2000). In Figure 2.1, the United States is positioned at the
far end of the curve and from the x-axis we see the United States sits at the 100th percentile
of national capabilities. China sits at the 80th percentile. Figure 2.2 shows that in thirty
years China significantly increased its national capabilities. China’s increase in national
capabilities may be the most significant event in international politics over this period.
Figure 2.1: National Capabilities 1980
Interpretation of RPE can be informative. A state with an RPE score of less than 1.0
is deemed to be under performing since it is not extracting or mobilizing the human and
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Figure 2.2: National Capabilities 2010
material resources it should given the performance and attributes of its economy. This under
performance, however, may be the result of a lack of (coercive) state capacity, or it may be
the result of the population’s lack of support for the state’s policy agenda. The latter suggests
that if the state has the extractive capacity, then under the right political conditions the state
will be able to surge its extraction, increasing significantly its mobilization of human and
material resources. This is important.
Consider a state with an RPE of 0.50 and a GDP of 1.0. This state has a power score of
0.5, which is simply the product of the two. However, because the state has the capacity to
extract more from its population, if it chooses to do so, and if the population cooperates, it
can increase its power score from 0.5 to 1.0 simply by intensifying its efforts at extraction.
Presumably, in time of national emergency a state’s population will support this effort for the
national good. Note, however, a state without extractive capacity will not be able to surge
its power, since the government lacks the tools to extract resources from the population.
Similarly, a state with an RPE greater than 1.0 presumably will not be able to extract much
more from its population since it is already over performing relative to what is predicted by
RPE.
Let’s now return to the concept of latent power. Mearsheimer described latent power
in terms of population and wealth, with industrialized, developed economies having an
advantage because their greater productivity made for a larger surplus of wealth that could
be extracted and used to produce military power. RPE tells us how the state is performing
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in terms of extracting wealth, or mobilizing human and material resources for national
purposes. For states extracting less than what is theoretically extractable (RPE < 1.0), the
amount less than what is theoretically possible represents latent power. For states performing
at high levels (RPE > 1.0), it is unclear how much, if any, latent power they have. See
Table 2.1 for the RPE, GDP, and corresponding power calculations for the top ten countries
in 2010 (Tammen and Kugler 2000).
Country RPE GDP $T Power
1. United States 0.502 13.623 6.84
2. China 1.128 3.877 4.37
3. Japan 0.489 4.621 2.26
4. United Kingdom 0.804 2.476 1.99
5. Germany 0.636 2.988 1.90
6. Brazil 1.539 1.128 1.74
7. France 0.756 2.217 1.68
8. Italy 0.877 1.835 1.61
9. India 0.988 1.270 1.25
10. Russia 1.264 0.911 1.15
Table 2.1: National Power 2010
Organiski and Kugler’s measure of national capabilities, or what is simply here being
called power, is a quantification of the power of the state. The inputs to the measure are
objective and the measure is susceptible to repeated calculation over time; the result of the
calculation is repeatable, which means it is verifiable. If a systems theory of international
politics is to be constructed with power as the explanatory variable, then a measure of power
must exist at the level of the state and at the level of the system of states. The system level
measure will be a nonlinear expression of power produced from the coaction of states that
creates the international system. The system will be manifest in its structure. The structure
will exert power on the states. The interplay of state power and system power thus drive
outcomes in international politics. What is left is to theorize power at the level of the system
of states.
2.3.2 Globalization as System Level Power
Globalization has been a much ballyhooed phenomenon for quite some time. Yet global-
ization does not appear to have a commonly accepted definition (Kacowicz and Mitrani
2016, p196). Indeed, Pankaj Ghemawat finds at least forty-two definitions of globalization
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(Ghemawat 2017, p13)! Richard Baldwin, on the other hand, has a view of globalization as
simply the geographic separation of production from consumption (Baldwin 2016, loc93-
102). Accepting this definition, globalization has existed since at least the origin of the Silk
Road, but most probably longer. Notwithstanding its ancient origins, globalization’s modern
evolution is driven by two discontinuous advances in technology, with a third advance
currently an incipient stage of development.
Baldwin asserts that globalization has evolved in response to three phenomena, with each
phenomenon corresponding to a specific “unbundling” of production from consumption.
Each unbundling was made possible by the loosening of a specific cost constraint. The first
unbundling occurred in the early 1800s when steam power decreased the cost of moving
goods enough to promote economical trade at greater and greater distances (Baldwin 2016,
loc58). As it became economical to produce and ship goods to distant markets, production
patterns changed to reinforce comparative advantage and trade volumes grew accordingly.
Greater productivity in the North “sparked a cycle of industrialization, agglomeration, and
innovation” (Baldwin 2016, loc313) that produced a knowledge gap in its favor. According
to Baldwin, this led to an “unprecedented divergence” in wealth between North and South,
the impact of which can still be seen today.
The second unbundling occurred as corporations were able to functionally decompose
and disaggregate their supply chains, geographically repositioning elements to locations
of greatest cost advantage (Baldwin 2016, loc3124). It occurred “when the ICT [informa-
tion, communications, technology] revolution radically lowered the cost of moving ideas”
(Baldwin 2016, loc129). See also (Grewal 2008, loc200). This revolution made it possible
to coordinate complex activities that were geographically separated. This is what enabled
the offshoring revolution from the 1990s onward and created “[t]he contours of industrial
competitiveness[,] . . . now increasingly defined by the outlines of international produc-
tion networks rather than the boundaries of nations” (Baldwin 2016, loc136-38). See also
(Khanna 2016).
The third unbundling is underway now. New technologies are making it increasingly
feasible to separate people from the object of their work, or to separate work from people
all together through automation. An example of this would be an engineer in one location
operating a robot in another location to perform maintenance on a piece of machinery; or
driverless cars. Robotics, artificial intelligence, virtual reality, and augmented reality are
all rich domains of technology innovation that promise to reshape labor markets as they
compress time and space.
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Moving goods, ideas, and people, was enabled by advances in technology. In each case
technology lowered cost opening up economic opportunity, even if it was manifest in more
complex forms of socio-economic organization. When transportation cost decreased, new,
distant markets became available; when communications cost decreased, supply chains were
decomposed, disaggregated, and distributed to low cost locations; and, as new technology
allows workers to be separated from the object of their work, the market for their labor
becomes global, putting downward pressure on wages. Technology, in each instance, is
bending the cost curve downward. To the extent globalization is an economic phenomenon,
its forward momentum is driven by advances in technology, even if its inspiration is cost
reduction. The question that remains is, as an economic phenomenon, how extensive is
globalization and how will it impact the political organization of the international system of
states?
“In 1500 CE, the world’s export-to-GDP ratio was estimated to have been only about 0.1
percent, and international trade mostly occurred within geographic regions: the costs and
hazards of interregional transportation by land, for example, along the Silk Road between
Europe and China, were extremely high” (Ghemawat 2017, p56). According to the World
Bank, in 1960 the world’s export-to-GDP ratio was 12 percent and it was 29 percent in
2015. The world’s export-to-GDP ratio has never exceeded 30 percent (which it achieved
in consecutive years 2011 - 2014). Globalization has clearly advanced, though the data
suggests it may have hit a ceiling (for the time being) at 30 percent export-to-GDP ratio.
This may support Ghemawat’s conclusion that the world is merely “semi-globalized,” with
local activity still by far the most important. See (Ghemawat 2017). However, it may also
indicate the advantages from the second unbundling have largely been realized, with little
left to accrue before the next discontinuous change takes hold fully.
For the moment, Ghemawat may be correct in his conclusion that the world is semi-
globalized and that local activity is still what matters most. But the evidence suggests this
will not last. Globalization leapt forward with the advent of steam power and again with
the ICT revolution (export-to-GDP ratio up 50 percent since 1990). Robotics, AI, and other
advanced technologies are only beginning to take hold now, but it is clear that they will
reduce cost leading to a further reconfiguration of global supply chains. As supply chains
are reconfigured, globalization will advance even further. The picture that is coming into
focus is one of a world of “perfect capitalism” (quoting Michio Kaku, Khanna 2016, p92).
A world of perfect capitalism can be viewed as nothing more than an aggregation of supply
chains, or what Parag Khanna calls a supply chain world (Khanna 2016).
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Figure 2.3: World Export-to-GDP Percentage 1960 - 2015
According to Khanna, in a supply chain world the operative logic is one of supply
and demand. Factors of production are organized to maximize supply and minimize cost.
Productivity is the reserve currency. Geographic boundaries are meaningless, unless they
obstruct, in which case they become an obstacle to be overcome. Friction, which must
be ruthlessly eliminated, results from the (transaction) cost of continuously coordinating,
constructing, and deconstructing supply chains for fickle purposes. To the extent government
aligns itself with the interests of its people, it becomes an enabler of the supply chains
that provide its people with a quality of life. To the extent that government resists supply
chains, it impoverishes its people and separates them from the globalizing world. As
globalization advances, the world will be divided between a globalizing Core embedded
into an increasingly meshed network of supply chains, and an impoverished Gap (Barnett
2005). It will be easy to distinguish winners from losers.
According to Khanna, supply chains are the organizing principle for “humanity in the
21st century,” representing an even “deeper organizing force in the world than states them-
selves” (Khanna 2016, p94). For Khanna to be correct, supply chains, however configured,
must present an economic, or cost advantage over the best alternative configuration available.
This means two things must occur. First, government must act to reduce friction, so that the
portion of the supply chain within its borders is unfettered to the maximum extent possible.
Governments that fail to do this will see supply chains rerouted around them, relegating
their people to the impoverished Gap. Second, there must be a means of social coordination
and cooperation to facilitate transactions between and along supply chains. Since supply
chains are global by definition, any means of social coordination and cooperation must be
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global. How might this occur?
The foregoing discussion of globalization has been from an economic perspective. It
equated globalization with the global distribution of supply chains, with “perfect capitalism”
eventually resulting from a pareto optimal distribution. Nevertheless, it is clear there are
two other dimensions of globalization: Social and Political. A consideration of the social
dimension will lead us to an important conclusion regarding the political.
According to David Grewal, “globalization is . . . the uneven process by which
. . . conventions are determined, the way in which we construct (or, in many cases,
simply receive) the settled terms of access to each other that make international cooperation
possible” (Grewal 2008, loc54-6). Globalization, “perfect capitalism,” a supply chain
world, all require coordinated actions and cooperation on a global scale. This is the
social dimension of globalization and it raises several important questions. How does
the mechanism that coordinates these actions, thus reducing friction, come into existence,
evolve, adapt and sustain itself on a global scale? In other words, what is the basis for
international cooperation in an international system not seized with a central authority? How
are conventions developed outside the authority of government? These questions are key
and the answers are shaping the modern international system under a condition of increasing
globalization.
Grewal’s thesis is that international cooperation emerges not from the action of govern-
ment exercising its sovereign power, but from and through relations of sociability. According
to Grewal, sociability is “the accumulation of decentralized, individual decisions that, taken
together, nonetheless conduce to a circumstance that affects the entire group” (Grewal 2008,
loc141). The “circumstance” that affects the entire group is a standard of coordination that
emerges from “the accumulation of decentralized, individual decisions.” It is important to
understand, however, that a standard is not born dominant. A standard becomes dominant by
virtue of its attractiveness to those who want access to what it controls: standards not only
facilitate coordination among group members, but they effectively control access to group
members; standards delineate insiders from outsiders. Standards, thus, exert real power.
This concept is straightforward. When you coordinate with a friend a time and location
to meet for lunch, you do so in a common language, perhaps English. English is what
facilitates and allows the lunch date to be scheduled. Without English, another standard
would have to be chosen. So assuming you and your friend can only speak English, English
has real power as a standard as relates to you. If you want to have lunch with an English
speaking person, you must adhere to the standard. From this fact it is also obvious that
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English delineates the group you are a member of. You are a member of a group of people
that speak English and, as a result, you can coordinate lunch with any other member of the
group, but not members of another group that do not speak English.
If group membership is deemed particularly valuable or attractive, then the standard
obtains greater power, perhaps to the point of compelling compliance. For example, many
United States’ multinational corporations make English a requirement of employment for
employees in countries outside the United States. If potential foreign employees adhere
to a different standard exclusively, say by speaking Mandarin, they will be excluded from
employment by a United States’ multinational. The power of English as a standard can
be even greater if scholarship, cinema, and other arts are produced in English, yet desired
by non English speakers. Non English speakers will be excluded from their enjoyment,
unless they learn English. But English speakers will likewise be excluded from Chinese
scholarship and cinema. Setting aside the ability to translate, or for subtitles, does this mean
there is room for multiple standards?
Metcalf’s law addresses this. Metcalf’s law asserts the value of a network increases
exponentially with the number of its users (Grewal 2008, loc369). As a standard attracts
more and more adherents its value increases exponentially and the value of alternative
standards decrease comparatively. Staying with English as an example, one would find
it difficult to go to any hotel in the world that attracts international clients and be unable
to communicate in English with the hotel’s client-facing staff. This is true not just of
American international hotels, but of Chinese and other nationals hotels too. Maintaining
multiple standards is expensive and difficult. Imagine the client-facing staff at a Chinese
hotel speak only Mandarin. This is sure to limit patronage from non-Mandarin speaking
people, costing the hotel wanted revenue. Conversely, asking the hotel staff to speak multiple
languages beyond their native language also seems unrealistic as it would increase the skills
and, therefore, the wage demands of employees. Speaking English as a second language,
however, is quite valuable if all of the visitors to the hotel also speak English as a second (or
first) language. In this situation, only two languages are ever necessary, a native language
and English. But this raises the question, how does English (or any language) become the
standard for a second language? Or, leaving English aside, more generally, how do standards
develop?
Grewal suggests a standard gets an initial push from “reason, force, or chance” (Grewal
2008, loc534). “[W]e can say that whenever we enter into cooperative arrangements, we will
either be pursuing our interests or values (using reason), acting under duress (being subject
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to force), or doing so by accident (being subject to chance)” (Grewal 2008, loc-442-44). For
a transaction to take place, there needs to be a standard that allows for coordination and
cooperation. In the lunch date example above it was English. But the larger point is that for
any coordination or cooperation to take place, across any domain, there must be an accepted
standard that allows for the exchange of information and for expectations to be understood.
As Grewal asserts, a standard will arise by reason, force, or chance for the purpose
of allowing cooperation. But for such a standard to persevere, it must be perceived as
necessary and valuable because of its “inherent properties and not because it happens to
unite an already large network” (Grewal 2008, loc447). When this is the case, the standard
will attract adherents that want access to the members of the network established by it.
As more and more adherents abide by the standard the standard achieves a “threshold of
visibility” and starts to exhibit Network Power (Grewal 2008, 541). Network Power exists
when non-users become aware of a standard and are attracted to it for “extrinsic reasons”
(Grewal 2008, 538). “A standard is adopted for extrinsic reasons when it is selected not for
its internal characteristics, but because of the size of the network it unites” (Grewal 2008,
loc452-53). It is at this point that Metcalf’s law begins to take hold and the value of the
standard becomes irresistible. A threshold of inevitability is reached as all non-users start to
adopt the standard (Grewal 2008, loc555). Other competing standards eventually expire.
The foregoing logic suggests two standards cannot exist to fulfill the same purpose
for the same network. Eventually one standard will win. This was exactly the case in
the war between Betamax and VHS. VHS eventually eliminated Betamax from contention
because it won the battle for the hardware device that played the cassette tapes containing
the encoded media that induced the consumer to buy the device in the first place. As more
and more consumers were attracted to the VHS device, primarily because of its price relative
to the more expensive Betamax, more and more media content was encoded using the VHS
standard. This outcome probably represented the threshold of visibility for the network
of consumers of home video players. Once it occurred, more consumers were attracted to
VHS which caused more media content to be produced according to its standard. The cycle
accelerated and Betamax died as a commercial offering.
An important implication arising from this, however, is that two networks that fulfill the
same purpose can be supported by two distinct standards, if the networks are isolated from
each other. It is only when the networks compete in the same space that a winner is likely to
eventually emerge. The reason for this, which is hopefully obvious, is cost. Globalization,
since its inception, has always ruthlessly followed the scent that led to lowest cost, unless
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obstructed by a greater power. This is the exact point that Baldwin made when he described
how each “unbundling” had removed a specific cost constraint that had prevented the
advance of globalization. As each cost constraint was removed, globalization advanced and
the necessary social structure, which has heretofore been referred to as standards, evolved
apace. Consequently, networks maintained in isolation and regulated by government fiat,
as an example, cannot evolve in response to an “accumulation of decentralized, individual
decisions.” This puts them at a disadvantage versus “open” networks that evolve and self-
optimize based on experience. This leads us to the point Thomas Barnett makes in the The
Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century.
Speaking in the context of national security, Barnett’s thesis is that states that are
connected into the system of globalization (part of the “Functioning Core”) will not be a
security threat to others because they are invested and fully participatory in the advantages
the system generates. It is the states in the “Gap” which are disconnected from globalization
that represent the threat. Disconnectedness defines danger because it “allows bad actors to
flourish by keeping entire societies detached from the global community and under their
control” (Barnett 2005, p7). According to Barnett, the difference between Core and Gap is
as distinct as that between a Hobbesian state of nature and a Kantian peace (Barnett 2005,
p166). The Core is richer, suffers less poverty and crime, and its citizens have a greater life
expectancy and quality of life. So its no wonder that global crises or, according to Barnett,
“system perturbations,” are likely to emanate outward from the Gap and impact an otherwise
satisfied and tranquil Core. This is all well and good, but what is missing from Barnett’s
account is a theorization of how power operates in a globalizing international system of
states to suppress conflict in the Core. Absent such a theorization, its not at all clear that
integrating Gap states into the Core will reduce conflict. In fact, it may simply import
conflict into the Core. Consequently, the question thus presented is, does globalization
reduce conflict and, if so, how?
Figure 2.3 clearly shows the consistent advance of globalization as represented by in-
ternational trade flows. Figure 2.4 (Dreher, Gaston, and Martens 2008), which offers a
index of globalization broader than trade flows, supports the same conclusion, even sug-
gesting that globalization accelerated in 1990, coincidentally(!) about the time Baldwin
suggested the ICT revolution was taking hold. As supply chains continue to be decomposed,
disaggregated, and distributed around the world commensurate with the advance of glob-
alization, the need for more cooperation is clear and it seems likely that it will occur as
standards are established, evolve and take hold. Grewal tells us “[g]lobalization works to
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extend and deepen relations of sociability at a global level, but without the concomitant
construction of a global sovereignty - however much some national sovereigns may be able
to influence particular aspects of this process” (Grewal 2008, loc678-79). Consequently,
“the accumulation of decentralized, individual decisions” that have the effect of constructing
“the transnational networks that constitute what we commonly call globalization” (Grewal
2008, loc596) represent a source of power intrinsic to the system of globalization so created.
Put plainly, the proliferation of a plethora of standards arising from relations of sociability,
which become manifest in social structures, is a potent source of non-sovereign power that
constrains human agency, both individual and collective (Grewal 2008, loc703-04). This
means that any explanation of how globalization reduces conflict must be rooted in an
understanding of the power that results from globalization itself.
Figure 2.4: Globalization’s Trend 1970 - 2014
“The problem, pitched at the highest level of generality, is how to understand the rela-
tionship between human agency and the social structures in which people find themselves”
(Grewal 2008, loc703). If human agency is the focus, then an emphasis is placed on freedom
of individual choice, thus ignoring the impact of social structures and other constraints
because they are assumed to be fixed or subject to individual will (Grewal 2008, loc713).
Context, and the meaning it provides, is lost in the process. On the other hand, a focus on
social structures leaves no place for individual agency, eschewing an indispensable source
of understanding. Consequently, it will not be adequate to theorize power exclusively in
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the context of either individual agency or social structure. Individual agency and social
structure are interdependent. An approach that understands each as constitutive of the other
is required. Hence, what is required “is a theory of structuration, an integrated account of
agency and structure,” with specific attention paid to how power impacts human agency
(Grewal 2008, loc743-44).
The foregoing has made clear that individual choices accumulate to produce standards.
Standards structure ongoing coordination and cooperation, thus giving rise to social struc-
tures that in turn affect individual choices, delineate group membership, control access, and
communicate norms. How is power manifest in these things? It manifests itself through
coercion that regulates the attractiveness and availability of choices.
The accumulation of free and independent choices by many individuals leads to a
standard. As the standard reaches visibility and then inevitability, increasingly it forecloses
on alternative means of coordination and cooperation for the domain its germane to. The
costs of non-adherence escalate accordingly. As a standard reaches universality, it merges
with the population and no alternative standards remain. See (Grewal 2008, loc1415). The
cost of non-adherence is total exclusion from the domain. The social structures that rise
concurrent with the standard transmit norms of behavior that reinforce the standard, allow
for its continued evolution, and discipline deviants as they present themselves. Individuals
no longer adopt the standard because of “reason” or “chance,” but because of “force.” Under
such a set of circumstances, free choice is eliminated. Power is manifest.
As globalization creates a plethora of standards, with their concomitant social structures,
the range of choice and, therefore, behavior narrows as standards emerge and march from
visibility to universality. Consequently, “the central tension in contemporary globalization . .
. is that everything except politics [is being globalized]. We live in a world in which our
relations of sociability - our commerce, culture, ideas, manners - are increasingly shared,
coordinated by newly global conventions in these domains, but in which our politics remains
inescapably national, centered in the nation-states that are the only loci of sovereign decision-
making” (Grewal 2008, loc672-4). Globalization, thus, has given rise to a non-sovereign
power that answers to “the herd.” It affects individuals even as individuals affect it. No one
is in control, yet it cannot be fairly described as anarchy. Paradoxically, globalization when
viewed as network power destroys hierarchy without creating anarchy. See (Ferguson 2018).
If globalization reduces conflict, it is because it touches so much, thus taking control
of the range of behavior that is permissible. As global supply chains continue to prolifer-
ate, linking together more people, inspiring common purpose and interests among them,
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globalization will spread and social structures will arise and transmit norms of behavior
that operate to perpetuate the system of globalization itself. Social and biologic systems
always operate to perpetuate them self. Globalization reduces conflict because conflict
would destroy globalization.
To get a sense for the spread and intensification of globalization since 1980, see Fig-
ure 2.5 and Figure 2.6 (Dreher, Gaston, and Martens 2008).
Figure 2.5: Globalization 1980
Figure 2.6: Globalization 2010
* * *
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Man is biologically engineered to survive. For better or worse, fear inexorably directs
man to purpose. Survival, or fear of death, is the genesis of his violent behavior. If we want
to understand why violent conflicts occur, we need to understand what produces fear.
Hobbes and Gat tell us man fights to secure resources for his survival; he fights to
eliminate the fear that comes with the uncertainty and insecurity he feels for his life. A
secure man is a non violent man; a man not wanting for the resources he needs to survive is
a secure man. From this logic we conclude states, like men, fight to ensure their survival.
Like men, states want to eliminate the fear that comes with the uncertainty and insecurity
they feel for their survival. Like men, a state that does not fear does not fight. States with
adequate resources do not fear.
Power is the indispensable element for states. That is what Waltz and Mearsheimer tell
us in one way or another. Waltz tells us power positions a state in the international system
and as all states are positioned according to their power a system structure emerges. It is this
structure that determines international political outcomes. Waltz’s thinking is relational, but
Mearsheimer’s is not. For Mearsheimer, international political outcomes are the direct result
of state power. Power is the ultima ratio. For Waltz, states cooperate to escape the power
competition of the security dilemma. For Mearsheimer, cooperation is transient at best,
because trust among states is not possible. Consequently, under Mearsheimer’s theoretical
conception the blind pursuit of power makes escape from the security dilemma impossible.
If power is so important to the understanding of international political outcomes, a
theorization more robust than that offered by either Waltz or Mearsheimer is necessary. Both
Waltz and Mearsheimer fall short because they are unable to rigorously quantify power.
Organski and Kugler, however, are able to do so. Organski and Kugler’s conception of
power is straightforward. Multiply GDP by a factor that represents the ability of the state to
extract resources from its people. A measure of National Capability, or simply power, is
the result. With this measure of power, can outcomes in international politics be explained?
As part of a systems theory, no. More is needed because this is an actor-level attribute that,
according to Waltz, is to be ignored in a systems theory.
For a systems theory to stand, a conception of power that operates at both the state level
and the system level must be articulated. In a system, the coaction of the actors produces
system structure which then exerts power, impacting actor behavior. Actor behavior and
system structure coveolve. What is missing from both Waltz and Mearsheimer’s theories is a
conception of power at the system level. Absent this, they do not have true systems theories.
Globalization here is theorized as power at the system level. The coaction of states
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and non-state actors alike results in the disaggregation and dispersion of supply chains
globally. Standards and conventions arise to support the (inter)operation of these supply
chains and those actors who fail to conform are simply excluded - whether they be state
or non-state actor. This power to exclude, which is not the power of a sovereign, is very
real. In an increasingly real sense it is the hand of Leviathan acting to bring order to an
international system characterized by anarchy. It is for this reason it is hypothesized herein
that globalization represents power. Because it is controlled by no sovereign, it is an attribute
of the system and not of any particular actor.
The remainder of this paper will aim to present a systems theory of international politics.
State level power as theorized by Organski and Kugler, and system level power proxied by
globalization, will be variables of interest in explaining international political outcomes,




Models are simplified descriptions of reality that strip away all of its complexity
except for a few features thought to be critical to the understanding of the
phenomenon under study. Mathematical models are such descriptions translated
into a very precise language that, unlike natural human languages, does not
allow for any double (or triple) meanings. The great strength of mathematics is
that, after we have framed a problem in mathematical language, we can deduce
precisely what are the consequences of the assumptions we made—no more,
no less. Mathematics, thus, is an indispensable tool in true science; a branch
of science can lay a claim to theoretical maturity only after it has developed a
body of mathematical theory, which typically consists of an interrelated set of
specific, narrowly focused models (Turchin 2006, p277).
This paper introduces a systems theory of international politics that is different than that
of Waltz or Mearsheimer whose work provoked this effort. Waltz and Mearsheimer’s work
has been recounted and analyzed in pertinent part above and additional analysis of it will be
held for the penultimate chapter of this paper. The purpose of this antepenultimate chapter
is to articulate a systems view of international politics from the perspective of realism.
This chapter proceeds as follows.
In section 3.1 a definition of systems theory, generally, is offered. It is not enough to
claim that a theory is a systems theory. It must first be established what a systems theory
actually is so that any theory claiming to be a systems theory can be measured against the
standard established by the definition. Beyond defining what a systems theory is, it will
be established that a system is composed of interdependent parts, making the interrogation
of any particular part outside the context of the entire system not meaningful. This has
implications for the choice of techniques chosen to model a system of international politics.
In section 3.2 it is made clear that typical techniques like OLS regression or logistic
regression are wholly inappropriate for modeling systems where outcomes are interdepen-
dent. Generally, it can be expected that in a system actors affect system outcomes and
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system outcomes in turn affect the future behavior of actors. Consequently, the analysis
of actor behavior is not analytically straightforward. A technique to model the system of
international politics that addresses these concerns is needed.
In section 3.3 the Stochastic Actor-Oriented Model (SAOM) is introduced to address
the concerns highlighted in section 3.2. SAOM provides for the isolation and interroga-
tion of actor and system attributes so that behavioral outcomes can be understood in the
context of the purpose of the system itself. SAOM will be used to model the system of
international politics with the hope of understanding the impact of power and globalization
on international political outcomes.
In section 3.4 a systems view of international politics is finally articulated. This articula-
tion conforms to the requirements of a system as defined in section 3.1. This is important
because unless the purpose of a system is defined, along with the mechanisms that allow
the system to sustain itself, then observed outcomes, or behavior, cannot be explained. The
purpose of a system is what gives meaning to outcomes; the explanatory power of a systems
theory derives from an understanding of the purpose of the system. Specific hypotheses are
presented.
In section 3.5 the data used to construct the SAOM are identified. Because a high
level of parsimony was maintained in model specification, only three datasets were needed.
One dataset for each of power, globalization, and conflict. These datasets were left largely
un-manipulated and integrated so that each state had a power and globalization score for
each period contemplated by the model. As called out in this section, each time period
corresponds to a wave and 228 waves of data were modeled.
Finally, in section 3.6 the results of the SAOM are presented. As we will see, glob-
alization operates to reduce the odds of conflict initiation by offsetting the influence of
power.
3.1 Systems Theory
What is a systems theory? The answer must be prefaced by understanding what a system is.
A system is a “set of elements or parts that is coherently organized and interconnected in a
pattern or structure that produces a characteristic set of behaviors” that serve to fulfill the
purpose of the system itself (Meadows 2008, loc3398). The behaviors of a system do not
derive from the properties of any particular element of the system, rather they derive from
system properties that emerge from the interaction of the system’s elements. Consequently,
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a system cannot be understood by examining its elements or their properties. Moreover,
a system’s properties “are destroyed when the system is dissected, either physically or
theoretically, into isolated elements” (Capra and Luisi 2014, p65). This makes obvious the
implication that a system must be viewed holistically and that the nature of a system is
always more than the sum of its parts (Capra and Luisi 2014, p65).
Systems have stocks and flows. “A stock is the foundation of any system. Stocks are the .
. . [parts] of the system that you can see, feel, count, or measure at any given time” (Meadows
2008, loc460-61). A flow represents an increase or decrease to the stock of a system. If the
balance of dollars in your checking account is a stock, deposits and withdraws represent
flows that increase or decrease the stock. Flows are regulated by feedback. Feedback is
information that allows for, or induces action to be taken to control flow; in other words,
feedback influences the behavior of system elements that in turn impact system behavior.
See Figure 3.1. Using the checking account example, the balance in your checking account
regulates the flow of interest deposits to the account. More specifically, the bank (element)
pays interests (flow) in consideration (feedback) of the balance (stock) in the account.
Figure 3.1: System Structure
The purpose of any system can be deduced from its exhibited behavior (Meadows 2008,
loc391). A “function of almost every system is to ensure its perpetuation” (Meadows 2008,
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loc398). This means every system acts upon feedback to regulate its stock so as to maintain
it at a level desired in relation to its purpose. Consequently, “[s]ystems thinkers see the
world as a collection of stocks along with the mechanisms for regulating the levels in the
stocks by manipulating flows” (Meadows 2008, loc580-82). When an event is recurrent,
or the range of possible outcomes is constrained or predictable, this is a strong sign that
feedback is operating to cause the regulation of the system. Predictable outcomes are the
result. As a corollary, outcomes that are not a cognizable product of system feedback are not
systemic outcomes in the sense contemplated here. They may best be described as errors,
outliers, or anomalies.
System structure, importantly, is not the position or arrangement, relative or otherwise,
of elements in the system. System structure is characterized simply by the system’s “in-
terlocking stocks, flows, and feedback loops” (Meadows 2008, loc1571-78). In a social
system, therefore, this implies quite directly that an actor’s behavior, to the extent it transmits
information, is part and parcel of system structure. Consequently, system structure can never
be adequately discerned by taking inventory of elements (or actors), or of their placement
in the system. This returns us quite nicely to the proposition that a system must be viewed
holistically and never as the sum of its parts, or separate from any of its parts. This also
presents the implication that a system’s purpose cannot necessarily be discerned from its
structure.
So what is a systems theory? Waltz suggests that theories explain laws (Waltz 2010, p6).
Laws, according to Waltz, describe a relationship between variables. The relationship can be
probabilistic or absolute (Waltz 2010, p5). Accepting this, and as described above, a system
will exhibit recurrent or probabilistic behaviors intended to produce outcomes that fulfill
the purpose for which the system exists. These behaviors are the result of laws that operate
within the scope of the system and are discovered by studying the operation of the system.
This means, as Waltz correctly points out, that the “realm,” or the boundaries of the system,
must be delineated prior to the development of theory (Waltz 2010, p8). That being said,
detailed analysis lends to making predictions about when and possibly how a system’s laws
operate. It does not explain why they operate, other than to say they operate to fulfill the
purpose of the system, or to perpetuate the system, which is not of much help given nothing
more. Consequently, a systems theory must assert with specificity what the purpose of the
system is and in so doing identify the system’s elements, stock(s), and feedback mechanisms,
and how they interact to produce the behavior that fulfills the purpose of the system.
Finally, a theory cannot be inferred from laws. A theory is the product of a creative
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exercise whose purpose is to explain the regularities resulting from the operation of laws
in a delineated domain. A theory is neither proved nor disproved, but rather supported or
not supported by how well it explains observed laws. See generally, (Waltz 2010, Ch.1).
Consequently, and in light of what is asserted above, the theorized purpose of a system,
particularly a social system, is less the product of an empirical investigation and more the
product of an epiphany that if sufficiently bold, but not “whimsical,” will give meaning to
the behaviors exhibited and explain the outcomes produced by the system. Ultimately, if
properly theorized, the purpose of a system is what allows us to interpret and make sense of
all else that is perceived when observing the operation of the system.
3.2 Modeling Technique
Typically, traditional quantitative techniques like OLS regression or logistic regression are
used to build models in the social sciences, and in conflict studies in particular. These
techniques are appropriate when the assumption of independence of events is valid. But,
as will be shown below, this is rarely the case. It is easy to understand why by comparing
perfect competition to oligopolistic competition in a simple thought experiment.
The market system known as perfect competition is in pertinent part characterized by
many buyers, many sellers, perfect information among market participants (buyers and
sellers), and a fungible product. In perfect competition each buyer and each seller is a price
taker; no participant has market power. Each of these attributes is an attribute of the system
that emerges as the result of the collective action of the system’s participants (or elements).
Hence, each attribute is considered endogenous to the system because it is attributable to the
system and not to any one participant. Indeed, if the system were dissected, or broken into
pieces, the attributes would not be observable. To interrogate the attributes, the system itself
must be interrogated.
To continue the thought experiment consider the effect of a seller raising the price of his
product. In this instance he sells no units of his product because all buyers will fulfill their
demand from the many other sellers whom they will be aware of because of their perfect
information. Likewise, if a seller lowers the price of her product, buyers will flock to this
seller to fulfill their demand. However, since other sellers will have knowledge of this, they
will lower their price making any advantage to the first-moving seller short lived. In this
instance the market price will stabilize at the lower level making all firms worse off since
ultimately they will be selling the same volume as before the price decrease, but now at a
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lower price. Since this outcome can be anticipated, no firm will lower its price.
Under perfect competition buyers and sellers have no discretion or power; they have no
volition. Their behavior is dictated predictably by the market system; they need not even
consider or even be aware of the actions of others. It is enough to understand the attributes
of the market system they operate in. The behavior of buyers and sellers in the market
cannot be expected to change unless the market system, which so effectively controls their
behavior, changes first.
Under perfect competition the attributes of market participants are exogenous to the
system and have zero impact, and confer zero advantage, on any particular participant. It is
not necessary to understand participant attributes in order to make meaningful predictions
about market outcomes. The system is omnipotent; it is controlled by no participant, yet it
effectively controls all participants. Perfect competition is a highly deterministic market
system.
Compare perfect competition to another market system known as oligopolistic competi-
tion. Oligopolistic competition is in pertinent part characterized by a few sellers and many
buyers. The product sold may or may not be differentiated, the requirement of perfect infor-
mation may or may not adhere, and barriers to entry into the market for sellers do exist. Like
perfect competition, these attributes are attributes of the market system, which emerge as
the result of the collective action of the market’s participants and, therefore, are endogenous
to the system. The existence (or not) of these attributes influence the behavior of market
participants. But unlike perfect competition, the behavior of market participants is not solely
determined by the effect of the market system as defined by its attributes. Oligopolistic
competition is not a highly deterministic market system like perfect competition.
Under oligopolistic competition sellers need to consider the actions of their competitors
because each seller has market power and through their action can change the dynamics of
the market thereby affecting the revenue of other firms as well as the entire industry. Conse-
quently, in a market characterized by oligopolistic competition, sellers are interdependent.
This interdependence is perhaps most famously demonstrated by the prisoner’s dilemma
that shows the (dis)benefits of cooperation. See Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2 depicts a simple scenario involving two firms where each firm has the option
of choosing a high or a low price. Neither firm knows in advance what the other firm will
do. If both firms select a high price, then the synergy created by their actions and the effect
of market structure, or what will simply here be called market dynamics, will allow each
to generate $100B in revenue, with the industry generating $200B in revenue. But if the
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Figure 3.2: Prisoner’s Dilemma
firms select different pricing strategies, one selecting high while the other selects low, the
resulting market dynamic will reduce total industry revenue by $10B, with the firm selecting
a low price substantially increasing their revenue at the expense of the other firm that chose
a high price. This is the worst case for the firm that chose a high price (while the other chose
a low price), because their revenue declines to $40B, the lowest of all the scenarios.
The worst case scenario for the industry occurs if both firms select a low price. In this
case the resulting market dynamic will cause a substantial reduction in overall industry
revenue from $200B to $100B, with each firm generating only $50B in revenue. The
best case from an industry perspective, and a scenario that often requires collusion to be
established and to endure, is for both firms to choose a high price. In early iterations of the
game this outcome is generally not achieved because one firm or the other defects from this
arrangement in order to achieve a windfall (quadrants II or IV).
It is clear that the dilemma for each firm is whether to risk selecting a low price, betting
that the other firm will chose a high price. If this strategy works, the firm will benefit
substantially. But if not, the firm will be much worse off.
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It is also clear from the above that each firm has substantial power over the market.
Moreover, the interdependence of the firms in the market is also established. What is less
clear, however, and most important, is that there are two separate forces at work. Under
perfect competition no seller had market power, so their actions were irrelevant and could
be ignored. Consequently, perfect competition is a one force model because actor attributes
are safely ignored. On the other hand, Oligopolistic competition is a two force model
because the attributes of the actors cannot be ignored; they affect market outcomes. Under
oligopolistic competition a synergy is created as the behavior of the actors impacts the
system and the system in turn impacts the behavior of the actors, with the result being that
the product of the two contributes to the market dynamic that is asserted above.
But unlike perfect competition, the system of oligopolistic competition is not determin-
istic. The attributes, or behaviors, of the actors must be accounted for along with system
behaviors to adequately explain outcomes. Any model of oligopolistic competition must
take account of system level (endogenous) variables and actor level (exogenous) variables
in order to adequately explain or predict outcomes. In other words, an oligopolistic market
is dynamic because of the synergy between endogenous and exogenous attributes.
If two sellers with identical attributes behave identically, one operating in a system of
perfect competition and one operating in a system of oligopolistic competition, the outcomes
will be different for the reasons articulated above. This illustrates the point that “[t]he de-
contextualization of individuals that is characteristic of standard methodologies can severely
limit the hypotheses that are tested and the knowledge that is accumulated; isolating . . .
[actors] from their . . . [environments] may remove them from the source of the very behavior
or characteristic we seek to understand” (Harris 2014, loc364-67). The relationship between
an actor and their environment is important, yet “traditional quantitative approaches used
in the social sciences are not equipped to incorporate relational information” (Harris 2014,
loc330). This is because the incorporation of “relational,” “contextual,” or “environmental,”
information violates one of the most fundamental assumptions of regression models that
observations must be independent. From the example above we know that identical firms
making identical decisions will get different results depending on their social context; which
is to say depending on the market structure they operate under. A firm’s action is not
independent of its environment, it is in fact dependent on it and must be explained in the
context of it.
The United States went to war against Iraq in 1990 because of Saddam Hussein’s
invasion and occupation of Kuwait. The United Kingdom joined the United States against
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Iraq. If Iraq behaved exactly as it did, but the United States had not gone to war against
Iraq, would the United Kingdom have gone to war against Iraq? Most would agree that the
United Kingdom would not have done so. This means that the United Kingdom’s action
was not independent, but in fact was conditioned on a decision made by the United States
that in effect created the social context for joint, or collaborative, action. In other words, if
the United Kingdom had a probability of “x” for going to war against Iraq, the probability
of the United Kingdom going to war against Iraq given that the United States had done
so would be something greater than “x”, say “x” multiplied by some value “c,” where c
>1. In this example, the relation of the United States vis-a-vis the United Kingdom in the
international system is just as important as any actor-level, exogenous attribute. In this
particular example, the relation of the United States vis-a-vis the United Kingdom may have
been disproportionately impactful on the United Kingdom’s decision to go to war against
Iraq. This further illustrates the need to understand the pressures exerted on an actor by their
social context. In other words, their social system matters.
All said, it is clear that the United Kingdom’s decision to go to war against Iraq was not
an independent “event” in a statistical sense. Katharine Barbieri recognized the dynamic
of such a situation when she said, “[a]s with ordinary least squares models, logit models
assume independence of events, an assumption that is likely violated when analyzing
disputes, since the occurrence of one dispute might affect the outbreak of another one”
(emphasis added)(Barbieri 2005, p66). Nevertheless, and as alarming as it may be, this
admission did not deter Barbieri from using a logit model to predict incidents of conflict.
That said, examining Barbieri’s method, she goes to great lengths to account for system
level effects. One can only wonder how effective she was, given the inappropriateness of
her tool.
Any quantitative model that purports to predict a social outcome must take into account
the endogenous attributes of the social system the actor participates in as well as the
exogenous attributes of the actor themself. The synergy of each with the other culminates in
the production of a dynamic that is descriptive of the behavior of the entire system. See also
(Snijders, Bunt, and Steglich 2010). This means, notwithstanding the ridicule of Waltz, that
a reductionist analysis, one that combines system-level variables with actor-level variables,
is required. (See Waltz’s discussion of reductionism) (Waltz 2010). Further, the quantitative
method chosen should delineate the effect of endogenous and exogenous variables so that
the analyst can examine and assess the effect caused by the actor’s behavior as distinct from
the influence on the actor generated by the system (a task Barbieri avoids by her choice of
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method). Waltz may at least find some solace in this.
Quantitative techniques that assume the independence of events, or fail to account for the
synergy between actor behavior and system are ipso facto inadequate for explaining social
outcomes in international politics. Consequently, a systems theory of international politics
that purports to explain international outcomes must account for actor behavior influencing
the system of international politics as well as the system of international politics influencing
actor behavior. The resulting synergy between system and actor is the dynamic that must
be understood and analyzed because it is what produces international political outcomes.
(But see contra Waltz, “[w]ars, hot and cold, originate in the structure of the international
political system”) (Waltz 1988, p627).
With this as prologue, the question presented is straightforward. If traditional tools like
OLS regression and logistic regression are not appropriate, what tool is appropriate? To that
question we now turn.
3.3 Quantitative Method
A quantitative technique that can be used to model social processes constitutive of a social
system, and thus help explain recurrent outcomes, is the Exponential Random Graph Model,
or ERGM, and its progeny. An ERGM is a tie-based model where a tie represents a relation
of interest between two actors. Visually, a relation is depicted as an edge, or a connection,
between two nodes that are actors in the model. “The essence of ERGM theory is the
formation of social structure through the accumulation of small local substructures and,
ultimately, through the formation of individual ties into the patterns of those substructures”
(Lusher 2013, loc720-22). “Social networks are often seen as emerging from various social
processes or mechanisms, in which case the patterns of network ties can be revealing about
the processes that give rise to them” (Lusher 2013, loc764-66). By examining network
topology, hypotheses can be tested statistically and inferences can be made about the social
processes giving rise to the observed network structure.
Importantly, ERGMs assume interdependence between network ties (Lusher 2013,
loc587). This means that a particular network tie may be more or less likely based on the
existence of another tie in the network. Taking the concept further, this means that if a
network tie represents a conflict between two actors, for example the United States and Iraq,
the presence of another tie, such as between the United Kingdom and Iraq, is made more or
less likely because of the existence of the tie between the United States and Iraq, in light of
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the relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom, as well as any attributes
of the United Kingdom or the United States, which are all held constant. Being able to
quantitatively assess the probability of a tie given the existence of another tie, holding all
else constant, is one strength of ERGMs and it represents the impact of the system on the
actors situated in it. This is the social context Harris refers to above.
Another strength of ERGMs is the ability to quantitatively model the effect of actor-level
(exogenous) attributes on tie formation. The United Kingdom’s decision to join the United
States in the war against Iraq was driven not only by its relation to the United States in the
international political system, but also by its own capabilities. If the United Kingdom was
not capable of contributing, surely it would not have joined the conflict. But because it was
capable, and in light of its relation to the other actors in the conflict (Harris’s social context),
particularly the United States, it did join. The United Kingdom’s capabilities are represented
as actor-specific, or exogenous, variables in an ERGM model. The strength of an ERGM
model is that it accounts for both endogenous and exogenous variables at the same time,
allowing the effect of each to be understood and examined while holding all else constant.
All of this said, ERGMs are not appropriate for longitudinal data. Consequently, two
choices emerge: the Temporal Exponential Random Graph Model (TERGM) or the Stochas-
tic Actor-Oriented Model (SAOM)(Leifeld and Cranmer 2016, p1). “The mathematical
hearts of the TERGM and SAOM are very similar and are both related to the (non- temporal)
exponential random graph model (ERGM)” (Leifeld and Cranmer 2016, p3). Indeed, it
is fair to say that the TERGM is a simple extension of the ERGM to a series of networks
(Leifeld and Cranmer 2016, p4). Hence, the discussion of ERGMs above is wholly on
point. Because SAOM and TERGM are fairly “characterized as very similar models[,]” the
distinction between the two is the salient issue that requires attention (Leifeld and Cranmer
2016, p5).
As with an ERGM, outcomes of interest for both the TERGM and the SAOM are the
edges (ties between actors) in the network, as well as the corresponding network topology
that is theorized as the product of social processes. Likewise, network attributes (endogenous
variables) and actor or dyad attributes (exogenous variables) are relevant too. However,
while SAOM is “explicitly actor-centric[,]” TERGM “has little to say by virtue of its basic
mathematics about the primacy of actors or their agency” (Leifeld and Cranmer 2016, p7).
This difference is expressed in the “mini-step updating process of the SAOM that is absent
in the TERGM” (Leifeld and Cranmer 2016, p8).
A longitudinal network analysis models the ties that form and lapse over time between
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actors. As a practical matter, a snapshot of a network is taken at some time t0, with a second
snapshot taken at time t1. A tie between two nodes at t0 may exist, or it may not exist,
at t1. Importantly, unobserved between t0 and t1, a tie may form and then lapse, or lapse
and then reform. Herein lies the primary distinction between a TERGM and a SAOM. A
TERGM does not account for unobserved changes in network edges between times t0 and t1.
Consequently, the only input it considers when it calculates the probability for the network
state at t1 is the observed network state at t0. SAOM, on the other hand, considers the
network state at t0 as well as the unobserved ministeps that are probabilistically taken by the
actors to effect the transition of the network from t0 to t1.
A network transition from an observed state at t0 to a different observed state at t1 will
typically require “a large number of ministeps” (Ripley et al. 2017, p10). These ministeps
represent the creation or lapse of ties that go unobserved between snapshots. Ministeps
are determined probabilistically and are made sequentially (Ripley et al. 2017, p10). The
cumulative effect of the ministeps taken is the evolution of the network from t0 to t1. Because
ministeps are taken sequentially, with a new unobserved network state resulting after each
ministep, actors are able to respond to the (unobserved) network and, in essence, become
each others “ever changing context. This allows the model to represent the feedback process
that is typical for network dynamics.” (Ripley et al. 2017, p8).
Finally, the shorter the length of time between snapshots of observed networks the more
dependent the latter network state is on the former network state (Leifeld and Cranmer 2016,
p8). This dependence emanates from there being fewer ministeps taken between snapshots
and, hence, less opportunity for (unobserved) change between observed networks.
SAOM and TERGM may produce different results using the same model specification
largely as a result of how each method accounts for change between observed network states.
It is not possible to state which method is better apriori. Ideally each method will be used
with the same specification. The results can then be evaluated and a judgement rendered.
For the purposes of this paper, however, that is not feasible. Consequently, SAOM will be
used because it is more actor-centric. The same analysis conducted with a TERGM will be
postponed to a future date.
3.4 A System’s View of International Politics
As stated above, regression techniques are not appropriate for modeling social processes
where outcomes are not independent events. SAOM is an appropriate choice because it pro-
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vides for the outcome of social processes, manifest in the topology of the observed network,
as described by endogenous variables. Individual actor behavior is not left unaccounted for
because actor attributes are included in the model as covariates (exogenous variables). Actor
behavior is explained significantly, but not exclusively, by individual actor attributes and
it is the synergy of the behavior among all actors that causes specific network topologies
to emerge. Hence, the aggregate effect of actors’ behavior is the emergence of a specific
network topology. In turn, the extant network topology influences actor behavior (Harris’s
context). This impact of topology on actor and actor on topology is the feedback mechanism
that allows, or causes, the network to evolve over time. Hence, the network, or the system,
is reflexive and self-aware; it is dynamic. To say there is change in the system is tantamount
to saying that the system is evolving, or that it continues to evolve. It is never accurate to
assert that there is a change of the system, unless it is asserted that the purpose of the system
itself has changed. When this is the case, however, two distinct systems are evident and not
a change from one to another. Systems do not change. They evolve and/or expire. Compare
(Gilpin 1981).
Figure 3.3: A System’s View of International Politics
States are the elements or the actors in the international political system. Because each
state is concerned exclusively with its own survival, each state is primarily concerned with
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having the resources it needs to survive. Consequently, resource scarcity is an existential
concern for all states. States that are endowed with plentiful resources fear only the loss
of their resources and will, therefore, act to protect them. States that are not endowed with
plentiful resources fear for their survival because of a lack of resources and, therefore, will
act to acquire the resources they require. In either case, fear animates the behavior of states.
The purpose of the international political system is the allocation of resources among
states. Hence, resources are the stock of the system that is regulated by the behavior of
states. States will exercise power to protect the resources they have or acquire the resources
they require. States will engage in globalizing behavior to acquire the resources they require.
The distinction made between the state behaviors of power and of globalization is one of
coercion versus collaboration. Globalization requires states to behave interdependently;
coordination and, hence, collaboration is required. When states exercise power, they seek to
achieve their ends by diktat. The result of a state’s exercise of power is conflict.
Fear induced by resource scarcity, or the threat of resource scarcity, animates the state
behaviors of power and globalization. States exhibit these behaviors to secure the resources
they need for their survival. When states feel secure with their resource endowments, or
their access to resources, their behavior reflects this. There are several implications here:
• States acquire, sustain, and exercise power for the express purpose of protecting or
acquiring resources to secure their survival. Hence, some level of power is always
necessary and the amount of power a state seeks or sustains is commensurate with its
sense of fear.
• States that feel secure and believe that they will continue to be secure into the fore-
seeable future are not power maximizing states. The converse, however, is also
true.
• To the extent globalization provides states with needed resources, or ensures a state’s
access to needed resources, it mitigates the need for states to acquire, sustain, and
exercise power. Consequently, globalization operates to mitigate fear and obviate the
need for power.
This leads to two very simple hypotheses. First, does globalization reduce the probability
of conflict? If globalization is significant and has a negative coefficient, as is expected, then
there will be support for this proposition. Second, does power increase the probability of
conflict? If power is significant and has a positive coefficient, as is expected, then there
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will be support for this proposition. Stated more formally in terms of null and alternative
hypotheses:
Globalization
H0: Globalization has no impact on the odds of conflict initiation.
H1: Globalization has an impact on the odds of conflict initiation.
Power
H0: Power has no impact on the odds of conflict initiation.
H1: Power has an impact on the odds of conflict initiation.
If the result of globalization is the reasonable allocation of required resources, or the
making available of needed resources to states, then it acts to reduce the fear a state will
have for its survival and, thus, the incentive a state has to increase its power. If a state has
less power, or is not power maximizing, less conflict should be the result; indeed, this is an
inference that flows logically from the security dilemma. Consequently, we should see less
conflict because of globalization among states that participate adequately in globalization.
For states that do not participate in globalization, or at least not adequately so, we should
see more conflict relative to what we see among globalized, or globalizing, states. Compare
(Turchin 2006); (Turchin 2017).
Globalization and power sit at either end of a seesaw. As the seesaw tips toward the end
where power rests, conflict becomes more likely. As the seesaw tips toward the end where
globalization rests, conflict becomes less likely. Fear is what tips the balance. To determine
whether this interpretation is correct, and to evaluate the hypotheses above, a SAOM model
will be constructed where ties between actors represent conflict and globalization and
power are included in the model as actor covariates. If the above interpretation is correct,
globalization will have a negative coefficient and tend to offset the effect of power which
should have a positive coefficient. The strength of globalization relative to power will
determine which way the seesaw tips and in so doing suggest whether conflict is more or
less likely. The purpose of this paper is to assert that globalization does, or does not, reduce
conflict. If it does reduce conflict, what is the theoretical basis for such a claim? This latter
point is the subject of the penultimate chapter of this paper.
Much remains to be said about the concepts abstractly presented here. Globalization
and power are probably more comfortable terms than “resource scarcity” and “fear” as used
herein. Moreover, the implicit assumption here, alluded to in chapter 2, is that man seized
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Figure 3.4: Globalization vs. Power as a Conflict Determinant
with adequate resources will avoid conflict because he fears death. Man is not naturally
violent. Consequently, more color needs to be applied to these concepts, and it will be done
in the penultimate chapter of this paper. Globalization and power will be defined with more
specificity in the following section on Data.
3.5 Data
A SAOM model with globalization and power as exogenous covariates will be constructed
from a dataset that derives from three data sources.
1. Power as a covariate. Power will be quantified using the data set produced by Kugler
and Tammen (Kugler and Tammen 2012). The calculation of power is performed in
accordance with the logic outlined supra at section 2.3.1. Power is simply the product
of RPE and GNP. However, the power covariate used in the model is a scaled power
score. This is done to align with Waltz’s concept of distribution of capabilities. See
the discussion supra at section 2.2.1.
2. Globalization as a covariate. Globalization will be quantified as per the KOF Index of
Globalization (KOF) (Dreher, Gaston, and Martens 2008). KOF provides an overall
globalization score as well as scores for political, cultural, and social globalization
for each state in the international system. Globalization, as a covariate, is simply the
value of the overall globalization score as reported by KOF.
3. Conflict as the dependent variable. Data sets from the Correlates of War Project
(COW) provide conflict events used to build the network structures for analysis
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(“Correlates of War Project”). COW presents an inventory of conflict events between
countries. For the purposes of this paper, conflict events from 1992 - 2010 are used.
SAOM requires longitudinal data. Consequently, conflict data from COW is parsed into
waves, with each wave representing a snapshot of the international political system at a
particular point in time. The first wave is January, 1992, with subsequent waves each month
through 2010.
Each wave represents a network of 174 nodes. Each network node is a state in the
international political system. The same 174 nodes are present in each wave. A state that
exists in the international political system but has never been party to a conflict as defined
by COW is not represented anywhere in the data.
If a state is party to a conflict then a tie, or an edge, exists between that state and the
state that it is in conflict with while the conflict is ongoing. Ties represent the dependent
variable for the model. In light of the chosen covariates, the purpose of the model is to
assess whether an increase or decrease in the odds of a conflict result from the power and
globalization behavior of states.
As for the model’s endogenous variables, these variables are descriptive of the topology
of the network, or the system, at a particular point in time. These variables are identified
from a visual inspection of the network. “Network ties can organize themselves into patterns
because the presence of some ties encourages others to come into existence. We often
refer to these as ‘purely structural’ effects because they do not involve actor attributes or
other exogenous factors. They are ‘endogenous’ effects in that the network patterns arise
solely from the internal processes of the system of network ties” (Lusher 2013, loc872-75).
By examining network structure, hypotheses about the internal (social) processes of the
system can be discovered mathematically leading to statistical inferences of how the system
drives the behavior of actors. This is accomplished by selecting appropriate endogenous
variables for the model after a visual inspection of the network. Importantly, this is not an
exercise in putting the cart before the horse. There should be some expectation beforehand
about what will be found. For example, in the system of international politics, it would be
consistent with the hypotheses above that globalizing states have less conflict with other
globalizing states. Consequently, we should expect to see fewer ties (incidents of conflict)
between globalizing states; somewhat more ties between globalizing and non globalizing
states; and even more ties between non globalizing states. Stated differently, there will be a
greater degree of homophily between non globalizing states as compared to that between
globalizing states.
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It is important to note that the primary purpose of identifying the endogenous network
variables is to control for the impact of the system on the behavior of the actors. This
addresses the main objection to the method used by others, including Barbieri.
3.6 Results
It is hypothesized that globalization operates to decrease the odds of conflict and power
operates to increases the odds of conflict. Because each works to oppose the influence of the
other, the net impact of the two will be of interest. Does globalization fully or only partially
offset the influence of power in relation to conflict initiation? Or, perhaps it has no impact at
all?
To illustrate the issue at bar, it will help to consider two countries: China and the United
States. The United States has been a dominant power for some time and China, certainly
during the period of interest, 1992 to present, is a rapidly emerging, increasingly dominant
power. See Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6.
Figure 3.5: United States Capabilities Dashboard 2010
The top panel presents the distribution of National Capabilities for 2010. The x-axis
represents the percentile ranking and the y-axis represents the probability. It is clear that
China and the USA are the two dominant powers, with Japan (not depicted) a distant
third. For example, the USA is in the 100th percentile, and China slightly behind in the
99th percentile. The unit of measure is National Capabilities (power) as contemplated
by Kugler & Organski. However, the data is transformed into a probability distribution,
or what might be called a “Waltzian” distribution (of capabilities). It is fair, therefore,
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Figure 3.6: China Capabilities Dashboard 2010
to look at this as any of: National Capabilities as contemplated by Kugler & Organski,
a Distribution of Capabilities as contemplated by Waltz, or a Distribution of Power as
contemplated by Mearsheimer. While there may be a technical distinction between the
three at some level of pedantic detail, there is not a practical difference. The top panel of
Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6 is the same. For the National Capabilities score of the top ten
countries of 2010, as well as the country’s corresponding (scaled) power score, see Table 3.1.
Country National Capabilities Power (scaled)
1. United States 1.000 9.678
2. China 0.995 6.093
3. Japan 0.989 3.005
4. United Kingdom 0.984 2.612
5. Germany 0.978 2.474
6. Brazil 0.973 2.238
7. France 0.968 2.151
8. Italy 0.962 2.054
9. India 0.957 1.537
10. Russia 0.952 1.387
Table 3.1: National Capabilities 2010
The bottom left panel is a plot of globalization versus power on a log scale. For the United
States the data seems to reflect a negative correlation between power and globalization, with
the exception of the 1990s where the correlation was positive. It was during this period that
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the United States became embroiled in conflicts in the Middle East and Southern Europe.
Since 2000, the United States remains engaged in conflicts in the Middle East and South
Asia, but has been unable to increase its relative power beyond its peak in the year 2000
(see Figure 3.9). In both cases the power of the United States was clearly impacted by the
willingness of its government to extract resources from its people. This is clearly shown in
Figure 3.7. In Figure 3.7 the United States’ RPE has been on a clear trajectory of decline
since 1970 and this is one significant factor for the decline in relative power for the United
States. The other significant factor is China.
Because power is a relative measure (the United States’ absolute power continues to
increase), even if the United States were to increase its absolute power it could lose ground
in terms of relative power if there was another large country that was significantly and
quickly increasing its power. This is exactly what has happened. The rise of China on the
world stage has been remarkable. It is clear from Figure 3.6 that China has been rapidly
globalizing and increasing in relative power since 1983. That this is a purposeful strategy
on China’s part cannot be in doubt. Figure 3.8 clearly shows that China’s policy has been
to extract more and more resources from its people. This level of extraction, along with a
rapidly growing GDP, explains China’s rapid increase in relative power.
Figure 3.7: United States RPE 1970 - 2010
The bottom right panel should be read in conjunction with the bottom left panel. Power is
largely a function of economic performance. Economic performance is primarily a function
of the number and productivity of the economically active population. Because China has a
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Figure 3.8: China RPE 1970 - 2010
huge advantage over the United States in population, China can match the United States
economically simply by increasing the number of its economically active population (all
else held constant). Because the United States will never come close to matching China’s
population, the United States will maintain its economic advantage over China only through
much higher productivity. Said differently, the United States must continue to innovate
and exploit technology if it is to maintain its lead over China. This being said, the lower
right panel should give the United States a strong sense of foreboding. The squiggly line
characterizes the velocity of the economy, while the straight line (trend line) characterizes
the acceleration of the economy. China is clearly winning the battle against the United
States. China’s economy is clearly accelerating (upward slope of trend line), while the
United States’ economy is clearly decelerating. Importantly, China’s increased economic
performance is not the result of an increase in population. It is the result of a combination of
a larger economically active population and greater productivity generally. If this trajectory
is maintained, it is simply a matter of time before China over takes the United States in
terms of economic output and, therefore, power.
Examining this dashboard for a large number of countries would reveal how unique
China’s performance actually is. China clearly has a strong positive correlation between
power and globalization. Almost all major countries, however, show a performance more
like that of the United States, meaning a reduction of relative power under a condition of
increasing globalization. This again suggests that China is engaging in a purposeful strategy
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of power maximization.
To further explore the assertion that China is engaged in a purposeful strategy of power
maximization, consider Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.10. Figure 3.9 is consistent with the lower
panels of Figure 3.5. It is clear that the relative power of the United States goes on a
precipitous decline starting in about the year 2000 while globalization remains relatively
constant. China, as can be seen from Figure 3.10, does the exact opposite. China’s relative
power arcs up substantially, with globalization continuing to increase. China and the United
States appear to be moving in different directions.
Figure 3.9: United States Globalization versus Power
Figure 3.10: China Globalization versus Power
For our purposes here, therefore, the question raised is this: What is the net effect of
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globalization and relative power on the odds of conflict initiation? Because the United States
and China are large, globalizing, powerful countries, and appear to be moving in different
directions, using them in comparison may be particularly illustrative.
To answer this question we proceed as follows.
In subsection 3.61 we look specifically at the question of how a country’s level of power
and level of globalization increase or decrease the odds of it initiating a conflict with another
country. In other words, is the United States or China more or less likely to initiate a
conflict with another country as a result of the influence of its level of power and its level of
globalization when the two are considered together?
In subsection 3.62 we look specifically at the question how the odds of a country
initiating a conflict with another country are influenced by the other country’s level of power
and level of globalization. In other words, is the United States or China more or less likely to
initiate a conflict with another country as a result of the net influence of the other country’s
level of power and level of globalization when the two are considered together?
3.6.1 The Effect of Ego’s Power and Globalization on Conflict Initiation
As described earlier in section 3.5, a SAOM model was built with power and globalization
as exogenous covariates. The output of the model is found in Table 3.2.
Parameters: Estimate Error t-ratio
1. eval Outdegree (density) -10.2403 ( 0.0759 ) 0.0494
2. eval Reciprocity 13.3463 ( 0.1435 ) 0.0806
3. eval GWESP 1.2990 ( 0.3273 ) -0.0046
4. eval Globalization Ego -0.0254 ( 0.0022 ) -0.0004
5. eval Power (scaled) Ego 0.1616 ( 0.0278 ) -0.0528
Overall Maximum Convergence Ratio: 0.1448
Table 3.2: Effect of Ego’s Power and Globalization on Ego’s Conflict Initiation
Three metrics are of immediate concern. First, the overall maximum convergence ratio
of the model represents the deviations of the values of the statistics simulated by the model
relative to observed values. Convergence is considered excellent when the overall maximum
convergence ratio is less than 0.2 (Ripley et al. 2017, p60). Here, the overall maximum
convergence ratio is 0.1448, so convergence is excellent. Second, the t-ratio for convergence
of the individual parameters should be less than 0.1 (Ripley et al. 2017, p60). Here, each
parameter has a t-ratio less than 0.1. Finally, the significance of each parameter can be
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tested by calculating t-values, where the t-value is the estimate divided by the error and
is significant at the 0.05 level if it is greater in absolute value than 2.0 (Ripley et al. 2017,
p70). Here, the relevant t-values are -0.0254/0.0022 = -11.6, and 0.1616/0.0278 = 5.8.
Consequently, the t-values are significant. Overall, the model is good. With respect to Ego,
the null hypotheses that globalization and power, respectively, have no impact on conflict
initiation are rejected.
In terms of interpreting the model, first, it is worthy to mention that as anticipated,
globalization has a dampening effect on conflict initiation. This is evident from the negative
coefficient for globalization. The model reports that a one unit increase in a country’s
globalization score decreases the odds that the country will initiate a conflict by 2.5%.
However, the model also reports that a one unit increase in a country’s power score will
increase the odds that the country will initiate a conflict by 17.5%. The ratio of the two
is approximately 7:1, meaning that if a country’s globalization score increases at least 7
units for every one unit increase in its power score, the odds that the country will initiate
a conflict will not increase and will decrease if the ratio exceeds 7:1. This may look like
a high hurdle, but it is not except in unusual cases, because on a per unit basis, countries
change their power scores significantly more slowly than they change their globalization
scores. See Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.10 above.
Figure 3.11: United States: Velocity of Change in Odds of Conflict Initiation
With regard to odds for conflict initiation, see Figure 3.11. The squiggly line in Fig-
ure 3.11 represents the velocity of the odds of conflict initiation attributed to the contribution
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of power and globalization for the United States. Over the time period reported, 1992 - 2010,
changes in velocity due to the contribution of power and globalization caused the line to
bounce about the downward sloping trend line. The salient point is that the trend line is
sharply downward sloping. This means that the net impact of the contribution of power and
globalization to the odds of conflict initiation for the United States during this period was
negative. The odds that the United States would initiate a conflict reduced over the period
1992 - 2010.
China, however, presents the opposite case. Consider Figure 3.12. Again, the squiggly
line represents the velocity of the odds of conflict initiation attributed to the contribution of
power and globalization. The trend line, unlike that of the United States, however, is clearly
sloped up and to the right. This means that the odds of China initiating a conflict have been
increasing over the reported period. In other words, in the specific case of China, increases
in power have more than offset the dampening impact of increases in globalization. This
suggests that China has become a more assertive country over the reported period. This
particular outcome is not unanticipated. See (Zakaria 1998).
Figure 3.12: China: Velocity of Change in Odds of Conflict Initiation
If these two claims are correct we should see an increase in the number of conflicts
initiated by China and a reduction in the number of conflicts initiated by the United States
during the reporting period as compared to previous periods. Refer to Figure 3.13 and
Figure 3.14.
In Figure 3.13 the mean number of conflicts per year that the United States initiated
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Figure 3.13: United States: Number of Initiated Conflicts
Figure 3.14: China: Number of Initiated Conflicts
during the period 1992 - 2010 is approximately 3. During the period before 1992, the
mean number of conflicts per year that the United States initiated is approximately 3.3. The
reduction in conflicts supports the assertion above.
In Figure 3.14 the mean number of conflicts per year that China initiated during the
period 1992 - 2010 is approximately 2.7. During the period before 1992, the mean number
of conflicts per year that the China initiated is approximately 1.9. The increase in conflicts
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support the assertion above.
Globalization and power as theorized here (as Ego covariates) impact the odds of conflict
initiation. Whether the effect of globalization is strong enough to offset the effect of power
depends on the country examined. China is an unusual case. From 1992 onward (see
Figure 3.10) China’s power increases dramatically. No other country in the world posted
this type of performance over the same period. Indeed, the United States, at least from 2000,
posted the exact opposite performance (see Figure 3.9). Consequently, we cannot say the
effect of globalization offsets the effect of power for the United States during the reporting
period because the power of the United States declined during this period in relative terms.
However, as will be shown infra at Table 3.4, globalization has more than offset the impact
of power for some countries. Further, there is not an example of a globalizing country, other
than China, where the effect of globalization has not offset the effect of power.
Next, we look specifically at the question how the odds of a country initiating a conflict
with another country are influenced by the other country’s level (Alt covariates) of power
and level of globalization.
3.6.2 The Effect of Alt’s Power and Globalization on Conflict Initiation
As described earlier in section 3.5, a SAOM model was built with power and globalization
as exogenous covariates. The output of the model is found in Table 3.3.
Parameters: Estimate Error t-ratio
1. eval Outdegree (density) -10.2196 ( 0.0749 ) 0.0252
2. eval Reciprocity 13.3231 ( 0.1417 ) 0.0195
3. eval GWESP 0.9203 ( 0.2559 ) -0.0005
4. eval Globalization Alt -0.0009 ( 0.0022 ) -0.0224
5. eval Power (scaled) Alt 0.2660 ( 0.0155 ) -0.0082
Overall Maximum Convergence Ratio: 0.0386
Table 3.3: Effect of Alt’s Power and Globalization on Ego’s Conflict Initiation
Paralleling the analysis from the previous section, the same three metrics are evaluated
for significance. First, the overall maximum convergence ratio of the model represents the
deviations of the values of the statistics simulated by the model relative to observed values.
Convergence is considered excellent when the overall maximum convergence ratio is less
than 0.2 (Ripley et al. 2017, p60). Here, the overall maximum convergence ratio is 0.0386,
so convergence is excellent. Second, the t-ratio for convergence of the individual parameters
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should be less than 0.1 (Ripley et al. 2017, p60). Here, each parameter has a t-ratio less
than 0.1. Finally, the significance of each parameter can be tested by calculating t-values,
where the t-value is the estimate divided by the error and is significant at the 0.05 level if it
is greater in absolute value than 2.0 (Ripley et al. 2017, p70). Here, the relevant t-values are
-0.0009/0.0022 = -0.41, and 0.2660/0.0155 = 17.16. Overall, the model is good. However,
while power is significant, globalization is not. With respect to Alt, the null hypotheses that
power has no impact on conflict initiation is rejected, but there is not sufficient evidence to
reject the null hypothesis with respect to globalization.
In terms of interpreting the model, the level of globalization of a country has no impact
on whether it will be the target of a conflict initiation. It is different with respect to power.
A country’s level of power is significant in terms of whether it will become the target of a
conflict initiation. Specifically, a one unit increase in a country’s power increases the odds
that the country will be the target of a conflict initiation by 30.5%. This particular outcome,
that an increase in a country’s power precipitates the operation of the security dilemma,
and eventually leads to conflict, has long been theorized in the literature. See (Waltz 2010,
p186); (Organski and Kugler 1980); (Tammen and Kugler 2000). This model, therefore, is
consistent with theory and previous empirical findings.
Why is globalization not significant in this context? More will be said on this in the
penultimate chapter of this paper. However, it may simply be that countries act out of fear.
When it is evaluated that another country is increasing its power “too” much, regardless of
its globalizing behavior, it is perceived as a threat and treated as such. In this sense, China’s
high level of globalization is of no consequence. It is China’s rapid increase in power that is
of concern. Capabilities, here proxied by power, are salient.
* * *
A systems theory of international politics requires the purpose of the system be artic-
ulated. It is through this prism that all else is made sense of. It is theorized here that the
purpose of the system of international politics is to allocate resources among states. States
apprehend a level of fear based on not having, or not having access to, resources they require;
or they apprehend fear from a risk of loss to resources they have, or have access to. This fear
animates them to modulate their power and globalizing behavior for the purpose of ensuring
their own survival. It is through some combination of power and globalization that countries
secure the resources they require for their survival. Survival, as it has always been, is about
access to resources. Fear of death makes unnecessary conflict (adventurism) ill advised.
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Like man, states are not inherently violent or predisposed toward conflict. Though,
like man, they are inherently fearful. This means that, just like man, as states interact
more, because they are in ever closer contact, there is more opportunity for conflict over
resources. Globalization operates to mitigate this conflict over resources by establishing
rules or conventions for the allocation of resources. As globalization takes hold, as resources
are made available through trade, fear is mitigated, power need not be maximized, and
conflict between countries reduces.
The SAOM model introduced here supports this conclusion. A unit increase in global-
ization reduces the odds of conflict initiation by 2.5% and a unit increase in power increases
the odds of conflict initiation by 17.5%. With the exception of China, globalizing countries
are increasing their level of globalization much faster than they are increasing their power.
The net effect is a reduction in the odds of conflict initiation. See Table 3.4.
Country Power Globalization Odds
Change Change Change
1. United States -0.236 3.86 -13.8%
2. China 5.834 21.26 49.0%
3. Japan -1.537 13.22 -59.9%
4. United Kingdom 0.018 6.40 -15.7%
5. Germany -0.818 11.75 -43.7%
6. Brazil 1.217 9.90 - 3.5%
7. France -0.018 6.95 -17.7%
8. Italy -0.512 11.78 -38.4%
9. India 0.962 17.25 -26.3%
10. Russia -0.128 22.16 -57.6%
Table 3.4: Odds Change in Conflict Initiation: 1992 - 2010
Brazil and India, most remarkably, have sharp increases in power. But for each, an
increase in globalization more than offsets the increase in power. So for each, the odds
of conflict initiation reduce. The United Kingdom is similarly situated, but its increase
in power is not as pronounced. Notwithstanding, China is the only example of a country
with an increase in power that more than offsets the impact of its corresponding increase
in globalization. This cannot occur by happenstance; it must be the product of a conscious
policy and it suggests that China is seized with a fear that heretofore has not been mitigated
by its participation in the globalizing international system.
The results of the SAOM model presented here have given good support to the propo-
sition that globalization operates to offset the effect of power in international politics. A
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systems theory of international politics has been presented in terse form. What remains,
therefore, is to re-present this systems theory in full color, with due attention paid to its
operation. To accomplish this we consider the behavior of the United States, China, and
Japan through the prism of this theory. Do we find the behavior we anticipate? Does this
theory help us explain and understand what we observe? To that task we now turn.
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Chapter 4
A Systems Theory of International Politics in Operation
Chapter 3 reported globalization works to reduce the odds of conflict initiation while power
works to increase the odds of conflict initiation. Fear and scarcity were explicitly left to be
addressed here as part of an overall exposition of the theory of material realism. Material
realism theorizes fear, induced by scarcity, causes conflict. Absent scarcity, there is no fear
and, therefore, no reason for conflict. Man, if given a choice, will eschew conflict because
of his fear of death. Consequently, states globalize and acquire and sustain power for the
purpose of securing resources or access to resources in order to redress scarcity and mitigate
their fear. Ultimately, fear drives the behavior of states in international politics.
This chapter proceeds as follows.
In section 4.1 material realism is fully articulated as a theory. A theory cannot be proved
or disproved. A theory is useful, or not, because it helps explain the reality that is observed.
A systems theory, therefore, explains why a system, composed of elements, stocks, and
flows, operates the way it is observed to operate. Chapter 3 reported that globalization and
power operate to affect the odds of conflict initiation. Section 4.1 explains why and in so
doing synthesizes all of the concepts discussed in this paper: man and the state of nature,
fear, scarcity, globalization and power. All of these concepts must be synthesized in the
context of an overarching purpose that the system of international politics operates to fulfill.
If this cannot be done, there can be no systems theory of international politics. Hence,
this chapter addresses the obvious weakness of Waltz and Mearsheimer: neither Waltz nor
Mearsheimer offered a theory that synthesized, in Waltz’s nomenclature, the first, second,
and third images. Indeed, Waltz explicitly eschewed first and second image analysis (Waltz
2001). Material realism avoids that fatal defect.
With material realism fully articulated as a theory of international politics, section 4.2
analyses the behavior of the major powers in East Asia. Does material realism explain
the behavior of the United States, China, and Japan? Material realism asserts states will
engage in globalizing or power-maximizing behavior in order to mitigate scarcity and,
therefore, the fear that emanates from it. So the question that arises is, what behavior is
the state exhibiting? How can we know? James Fearon’s work on costly signals is useful
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here. Fearon’s work is leveraged to elucidate analytically whether a state is engaging in
globalizing or power-maximizing behavior. After assessing analytically the behavior of
the United States, China, and Japan, each is then assessed empirically and appropriate
conclusions are reached about the explanatory power of material realism.
4.1 A Systems Theory of International Politics
Man, like all creatures, is engineered to survive. Survival in this context means more than
just “living.” It also means reproduction and the establishment and survival of a line of
progeny. Because man is engineered to survive, he is also engineered to fear death. It is this
fear of death that seizes his passions and directs him to action, often severe action, intended
to secure his survival. When man does not fear, his actions are often benign. But when he
fears, his actions can be quite malignant. To understand man’s disposition toward violence,
it is necessary to understand that which causes him to fear.
Man is materialistic. Not having that which he requires to survive is a source of great
fear for man. When man is seized with ample resources he does not fear for his survival so
long as his resources are secure. This makes man territorial. Man will fight to protect and
control the resources he requires to survive. Territory, resources, and security travel together
as peas in a pod.
As man prospers, he reproduces creating larger groups. As man lives in larger and larger
groups, more resources are required for the group to survive. More resources require man to
hold dominion over more territory. Thus it is inevitable that man will come into conflict with
man over territory. The conflict will be violent because control over territory is necessary
for control over the resources that man needs to survive. It is a zero sum game driven by a
fear of death.
Thus is the state of nature for man. Man reproduces to the limit of the resources he
controls. But because resources are limitless, man need only take the additional resources
he requires from others as his group grows larger and larger. Conflict is endemic. Fear is
mitigated through material acquisition that often, if not always, comes from martial success.
In a state of nature, man is self-reliant because he cannot trust. The stakes are too high.
When success means survival and failure means death, and there is no middle ground, man
will always choose first to rely solely on himself because of his fear of the unknown; and
because of the uncertainty and the risk it entails to him. Man can never be sure that another
will come to his aid, so he must always be prepared to act aggressively in his own interest.
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Self-help is man’s only reliable help. So man must be strong.
When man cannot control a particular outcome of consequence, he becomes seized with
fear. The only way to mitigate the fear is through knowledge or dominion. As man becomes
more knowledgeable, he becomes more certain of the outcome and he can take conscious
steps to mitigate its effect on him; his required action becomes clear and he understands what
to do. Thus he has a semblance of control. However, lacking an adequate understanding, all
man can do is dominate. In such a case, risk is mitigated, if at all, only through domination.
What man cannot dominate he cannot control. Man fears what he cannot control. Fear is the
genesis of all conflict.
In a state of nature man fights for control over the resources he needs to survive and
he fights to reduce the uncertainty that seizes him with fear for his survival. These are the
only reasons he fights: to secure resources and to reduce fear. To reduce man’s fear, give
him resources and give him knowledge. To remove man from a state of nature, give him
resources and give him knowledge. A state of nature is synonymous with the ubiquitous
fear that dominates all men under conditions of scarcity and ignorance.
States (or government, or ruling elites) operate to remove man from the state of nature.
States provide public goods that mitigate man’s fear. When each man is recognized as
owning or having legitimate dominion over what is “his,” including that which he creates,
uncertainty and, therefore, fear is reduced. Conflict reduces accordingly. When man is
secure in his possessions, trust becomes possible because he is free to exchange what he
possesses for that which is possessed by another, with each believing with certainty that
what they possess after the exchange is recognized by all as legitimately theirs. Through
exchange or barter, supported by property rights guaranteed by a sovereign, man no longer
needs to fight to acquire what he requires to survive. He need only produce for others so
that others produce for him and all get what they require for the life they live.
When each man produces for another he specializes in producing that which he is most
capable of producing well. Moreover, because man desires to consume more so he may
increase the quality of his life, he is motivated to produce more. Specialization advances
productivity. Productivity ameliorates scarcity. Abundance ameliorates fear. When man
does not fear he does not fight. Material man does not fight for non-material reasons.
Property rights are the sine qua non. A sovereign that does not provide property rights
provides nothing; and man remains in the state of nature.
States exist to provide property rights or what may simply be called public goods. It
is not necessary to define exhaustively, or with specificity, what public goods are. It will
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suffice to understand that public goods are those things a state must provide to enable man
to create, hold, and alienate his property for his benefit; or, in other words, for man to live
well. When a state does more than this it oppresses. When a state does less than this, it sows
insecurity and uncertainty and in so doing creates the most noxious fear. Conflict follows.
When a state succeeds, however, it establishes the conditions for the self-organization of the
economy. Specialization, productivity, and wealth creation proceed apace. The economy,
the state itself, scales and, like man in the state of nature, it must acquire new sources of
resources to secure its survival. But here, in the context of a state, what does survival mean?
A state, of course, is an abstraction; it is an artifice that obscures the countless indepen-
dent activities that give rise to and sustain its existence. Therefore, to say a state fails is to
say the state is not able to provide the public goods necessary to enable man to create, hold,
and alienate his property for his benefit. In such a situation the independent activities giving
rise to the state cease and the state in every operative and practical sense vanishes as the
primacy of nature is restored. To say a state succeeds, or survives, is to say the opposite.
In other words, the state exists to enable man to create, hold, and alienate his property so
he may accumulate wealth and live the life he wants. At first the state accomplishes this
by establishing the conditions necessary to enable intra-state trade and commerce. But
ultimately this is not wealth maximizing. As the Pareto optimal distribution of resources
within the state is approached, man’s choices are increasingly constrained. Something more
is needed. Consequently, the state must enable inter-state trade and commerce. Man is now
not resource constrained in any practical way. The resources of the world are available for
exchange. It is a long way to the Pareto frontier. Scarcity is more theoretical than practical.
Fear abates and the potential for conflict reduces accordingly.
States fear only two things. States fear their people. States are a manifestation of the
popular will of their people. It is the popular will that sustains them or not. No state long
endures that does not have the support, or at least the acquiescence, of its people. The
demise of the Soviet Union, the mightiest of all states, is adequate testimony to this assertion.
Consequently, states fear their people and seek to satisfy or, in the alternative, suppress them.
Suppression, however, is costly and in the long run always fails. So states (or governments,
or ruling elites) are always better off finding a way to advance the interests of their people.
States that are not responsive to their people ultimately fail.
States fear other states. The logical conclusion of a state scaling internally is that its
interests, which is to say the interests of its people, evolve and inevitably extend beyond its
borders. This is because no state can maximize its well-being through autarky. States must
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engage in trade and commerce if they are to prosper. China over the last forty years provides
ample evidence in support of this assertion. If man maximizes his well-being through his
freedom to create, hold, and alienate his property, the artificiality of a state border seems an
unreasonable impediment to his fulfillment. Thus the concept of public goods has come also
to mean the reliable and reasonable access to resources and markets worldwide. As states act
to provide this access they are brought into direct conflict with each other, with the strong
imposing their terms on the weak. States are materialistic because man in materialistic.
Conflict in the system of states is endemic, just as it was in the state of nature for man. As
strength matters for man, so too it matters for states.
The parallel between man and state is exact. States receive an inadequate measure of
security from the resources they control directly. Controlling extraterritorial resources is
an experiment that failed with colonialism. Fear accompanies autarky, so autarky must fail.
For man to prosper the state he constitutes must enable his material well-being through
the supply of “global” public goods. But in the absence of a worldwide hegemon, what
is the nature and definition of these goods and who provides them on what terms? The
end of history has not arrived and the last man is not yet on station. So on behalf of their
citizens states will continue to contest access to markets and resources. Strength, or power,
matters because it greatly influences outcomes. Competition among states is a zero sum
affair. Trust can not endure when one side must loose; the gravity of the outcome makes
it so. Consequently, self-help is the only reliable help. Among states the state of nature
prevails.
Like man, in a state of nature states act only to survive. States fear death just as man
does. So they do not fight for trivial causes, especially when the outcome is not certain. Like
man, states have only one strategy for survival: eliminate fear, which is tantamount to the
amelioration of scarcity and ignorance. To this end, states have three tactics available to
them.
As a hegemon, a state has the power to take what it wants. Scarcity is not an issue
because all of the resources of the world are available to a hegemon. There is no example
in history of a hegemon, so this tactic is theoretical, not practical. The United States at the
height of its power, alternatively after World War II or after the collapse of the Soviet Union,
was never able to unilaterally, with impunity, determine outcomes throughout the world.
Moreover, recent history has shown that enemies, even weak ones, that refuse to surrender
or behave as directed can frustrate even the mightiest state. Effective hegemony has never
been witnessed in practice. Hegemony may deter physical attack for a time, but it does not
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lead to security.
Weak states often collaborate to balance the power of a strong state. The aim is deterrence
in pursuit of security. In the early 1800s Britain formed various coalitions against Napoleon
out of fear that France would interfere with Britain’s markets and overseas possessions (a
vital source of resources). Napoleon was ultimately defeated, but Britain’s fear would not
dissipate so long as its markets and resources remained exposed to risk. This would be
the case if, among other possibilities, there existed a continental hegemon. Consequently,
Britain’s consistent policy was to join with those opposing such an outcome. Different
coalitions were required at different moments. Britain’s loyalties were fickle, but Britain’s
interests were not. Trust was always operationalized for the moment and the moment never
lasted. In the final analysis balances of power do not prevent conflict, but merely delay or
postpone it. Balances of power are effective at organizing the belligerents. The root cause is
always left unaddressed.
States organize and align for collective security. Collective security often has legal
characteristics. After World War II the United States promoted an international regime
characterized by a political, economic, and social order. The United Nations, Bretton Woods,
the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and other treaties and conventions, when
considered all together represented an attempt to provide collective security. The attempt
was holistic and comprehensive in that it sought to define rules for the political, the social,
and the economic relations among all the states of the world. It clearly contemplated security
as more than freedom from physical infraction or domination. Yet it is hard to imagine how
it could be successful. If resource scarcity and ignorance is the cause of fear, and fear is the
genesis of conflict, then no collective security scheme that fails to meet the material needs
of man can succeed. These organizations established rules for resolving the public behavior
of states. They were silent on the distribution of resources. This can not be a surprise since
resources are private goods, not public goods. The United States has legal jurisdiction over
the Standard Oil company, yet it does not tell it how, or to whom, or for what price to
distribute its product. The prevailing economic organization of the world is more liberal and
decentralized than centralized and state controlled. Unless the world moves dramatically
away from private property rights and toward central planning, collective security cannot
work. Of course, it is already established that central planning does not work. So there must
be another answer. If conflict is to be reduced, something other than state action is required
and it must result in man’s satiation. A satiated man does not fear.
This will be no easy task. In a state of nature man’s needs were simple: survival meant
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simply that man needed to eat and reproduce. But society complicated things. With society
came increasing specialization, productivity, and, therefore, wealth creation. The benefits
were distributed to each according to his skill and his effort. But since all men were not
equally skilled or equally hard working, the benefits were not evenly distributed. Social
cleavages resulted and hard comparisons, man against man, could not be avoided. What
satiated man in the state of nature became inadequate in a society of increasing riches. Man’s
analytical ability to compare, evaluate, and judge is as disruptive as it is powerful. It is not a
surprise that the regimes that oppress most effectively invest substantially to insulate their
people from the outside world. If North Koreans understood how their lot compared to that
of their brothers in the south, how long would they tolerate the North Korean regime? China
wants the benefits of international society and openness. Yet China works aggressively to
prevent its citizens from comparing themselves to others. How else is one to explain the
great firewall and the ubiquitous controls on the free flow of information?
What man requires so that he does not fear is fixed neither in time nor place; it is ever
changing. Fear is a function of scarcity, but scarcity is a relative measure arrived at through
the comparison of one against another. Society makes comparison of man against man
inevitable; international society makes comparison of state against state inevitable. Fear
driven by scarcity remains the genesis of conflict. Inequality defines scarcity. All boats must
rise with the tide.
The genie is out of the bottle and it will not be put back in, except after the most
catastrophic of outcomes. As man creates and alienates his property, as states trade, as
wealth is distributed, as the international system continues to evolve, integrate, and globalize
along its current trajectory, man will improve his condition; his quality of life will advance
inexorably. Significant reduction in levels of world poverty over the last fifty years as states
have more fully participated in the world economy is clear evidence of this. Notwithstanding,
not all of man will benefit equally. Some will lag and those that lag especially far behind
are likely to be found in failed or failing states because that is where public goods are most
often found lacking; autarkic states that eschew participation in the world economy are more
likely to be involved in conflict whether it be internal or external.
The foregoing takes us to consideration of Figure 4.1 which is an enhancement of
Figure 3.3. In the beginning, in a state of nature man requires only enough resources to
survive and reproduce. Man lives in small groups, with each isolated from the other. There
is no specialization or accumulation of wealth. Man lives and survives day to day. In the
state of nature when man compares himself to another he sees himself. Fear does not result
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from inequality; it results from absolute scarcity and not from comparative scarcity. In a
state of nature fear of death drives man to action.
Figure 4.1: A System’s View of International Politics: Resource Allocation
As man enters society, as social organization advances and becomes more complex, as
public goods are provided and property rights are established, wealth in excess of what
any man needs to survive is created. This is the genesis of inequality, since inevitably
some will hold more wealth than others because of their skill and effort. While some will
continue to fear for their physical survival, increasingly large numbers of others will come
to equate scarcity with their quality of life when it compares unfavorably to that of others.
In society a fear of not living “well enough” is what drives man to purpose. It is a source of
dissatisfaction, of unrest, and eventually of conflict.
In an international society of states, states are likewise driven to purpose. As an example,
for China to endure, which is to say that the communist party endures, the Chinese people
must have a quality of life not egregiously incomparable to others of whom they are aware.
This means that the Chinese economy must produce and equitably distribute enough wealth
to the Chinese people such that when the people compare their quality of life to that of others,
the comparison is acceptable to them. This means that the Chinese economy must grow to
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produce the wealth that is required. For the Chinese economy to grow, it requires inputs of
raw materials, many of which are not indigenous to China. The Chinese can acquire these
raw materials in one of two ways: they can acquire them freely through collaboration, or
they can opt for conflict and simply take them. Either way, what the Chinese demand is an
allocation of resources that allows the Chinese people to be satisfied with their quality of
life. So long as the Chinese people evaluate unfavorably the comparison of their quality of
life to others, they will perceive scarcity and this fear will move them to action.
Globalization collapses time and space. It makes each aware of the other; intimacy is
unavoidable. Thus, comparison of one against another is unavoidable. States that evaluate
their condition relative to another unfavorably will perceive scarcity and fear and it will
drive them to seek a more equitable allocation of resources. Until its fear is mitigated, a state
will continue to seek more optimal allocations of resources. If the resources are available
through collaboration, a state is likely to acquire them collaboratively because the risk of
taking them by force is often too great. This is an insight that Japan did not have prior
to World War II as it sought to dominate Asia. If, however, the availability of required
resources is put at risk, it should be expected that a state will exercise its power to ensure its
access to them. This explains the United States’ behavior when it promulgated the Carter
Doctrine.
Until the Pareto frontier is reached, there is no reason for conflict, because the game is
not zero sum. States can take more and more of what they require without making another
worse off. As each state does what is required to improve its lot, others will take notice,
compare, and evaluate. As one state acts to improve its lot, it engenders fear in others that
moves them to take the action required to improve their own. Until the Pareto frontier is
reached, the cycle does not end and all will rise, even if some rise more slowly than others.
Moreover, it is not clear that the Pareto frontier in the sense used here is anything other
than theoretical. Technology continues to solve scarcity. Peak oil, once thought to have
arrived, is now unmistakably absent; technology-enabled alternatives continue to emerge.
See generally (Harari 2017, Ch.1). As long as resources are made available to be matched
against need, as long as globalization continues to advance, conflict will reduce among those
that participate in it. It is only the selfish harboring of resources, the closing of markets, or
the pernicious interference of states in the operation of markets, that gives rise to conflict.
Globalization operates with the enlightened self-interest of states to reduce the initiation of
conflict.
Chapter 3 provided firm evidence that globalization decreases the odds of conflict
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initiation. Thus far in chapter 4 a theory of how and why globalization reduces conflict
initiation has been expressed. The question now at bar is whether the operation of the theory
can explain the behavior of states. To that task we now turn.
4.2 The Explanatory Power of the Theory: East Asia
States fear two things: a state fears its people and it fears other states, because each can
cause its demise. For a state to survive, its people must support it, or at least not resist it.
This is unlikely under conditions of scarcity. Consequently, a state must act to mitigate
scarcity so that its people can thrive; and, a state must not obstruct the self-interested, benign
behavior of other states acting similarly for fear of becoming the target of that state’s ireful
behavior. Scarcity is the problem that must be solved for. As scarcity is solved, conflict is
reduced.
A state can mitigate scarcity through collaboration or diktat. If a state chooses collabora-
tion, it provides public goods and respects the autonomy of all economic actors (intra and
extra territorial). Scarcity is mitigated by the cumulative effect of the behavior of unfettered,
self-interested economic actors. The potential for conflict reduces as scarcity is mitigated. If
a state chooses diktat, however, it accumulates and wields the power necessary to facilitate
the taking of resources under circumstances of unequal exchange. The potential for conflict
is increased because the states that are subject to the prospect of an unequal exchange resist
the exchange. Consequently, using power to effect an allocation of resources may mitigate
scarcity in the short term, but it will always fail as a long term solution. This is a lesson that
Japan learned as a result of World War II. Japan’s access to markets and resources achieved
by diktat were indeed short lived. Since World War II, however, Japan has achieved much
more reliable access to all the resources it requires through collaboration. As we will see, it
is only Japan’s fear of losing access to resources that inspires its power-seeking behavior (if
such behavior indeed exists).
Notwithstanding, all states act to accumulate power, so it is worthwhile to understand
the purposes for which a state will accumulate power. First, a state will accumulate power
to defend against or deter the exploitative behavior of another state. In this instance a state
need only have enough power to make its exploitation by another state too costly to be
undertaken. Accumulating more power than is needed for this is economically wasteful and
certain to induce fear in other states. See (Waltz 2010). Second, as already stated above, a
state that accumulates more power than is needed to defend against or deter another state
78
will use its power to exploit and effect an unequal exchange of resources. Third, a state that
accumulates more power than is needed to defend against or deter another state will use
its power to repress its people. This is most likely when the state accumulates power but
fails to use it effectively to mitigate scarcity. In this instance, the state has no choice but
to repress its people since the scarcity its people are subject to will cause them to fear and,
therefore, resist the behavior of the state that prevents them from living the life they want.
This, as we will see, may in part explain China’s behavior under Xi Jin Ping.
To reduce the probability of conflict, and for states (or the ruling elite) to survive, scarcity
must be mitigated. States can mitigate scarcity by collaboration or, at least in the short
term, states can mitigate scarcity by diktat. States can also choose to repress their people.
When states solve scarcity by collaboration, they are engaging in globalization and willingly
subscribing to the rules and conventions of globalization that provide for the free and liberal
allocation of resources globally. We know from chapter three that globalizing behavior
reduces the probability of conflict. When states act to solve scarcity by diktat they eschew
the rules and conventions of globalization and seek to impose their will on others. We know
from chapter three that increases in power, which logically precede the operation of a strategy
premised on the exercise of power, increase the probability of conflict. Consequently, to
understand a state’s behavior and whether its behavior is biased in favor of collaboration
or diktat and, therefore, whether the behavior is more or less likely to lead to conflict, it is
helpful to evaluate the “costly signals” the behavior of the state sends in regard to power
and globalization. The objective is to classify states either as benign and status quo, or as
malignant and revisionist. The later is a source of instability and conflict in the international
system.
James Fearon’s work on “costly signals” is helpful here. According to Fearon, states
are loathe to fight because “military operations are typically expensive and risky, obviously
so for the soldiers who must be coerced or otherwise convinced to fight, but also for the
leaders who order war” (Fearon 1997, p68). Since all states commonly understand war, or
conflict more generally, is an undesirable outcome to be avoided, the dilemma, according
to Fearon, is how to make the threat of force credible such that the behavior of the state
subject to the threat can be affected (Fearon 1997, p69). To affect another state’s behavior
Fearon suggests that a state will send costly signals. A costly signal is a signal a state sends
at some significant cost to itself, which because of the cost it would not send unless it was
determined to act. In sending the signal, the state intends to convince the other state that
it will follow through on its threatened action. If the signal does not convince the other
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state, the cost in sending the signal is wasted and the other state’s behavior is not positively
affected. Indeed, the other state may be emboldened to act more egregiously because it
perceives weakness, or a lack of resolve, from the state sending the signal. This may explain
in part North Korea’s current actions, since North Korea may perceive a lack of resolve
from the United States given the ineffectual actions taken by the Clinton, Bush, and Obama
administrations heretofore to stop North Korea’s nuclear arms program.
Fearon specifies two types of costly signals: those intended to delineate and buttress
the vital interests of a state (where vital interests are those interests that are the imperatives
of a state’s grand strategy and, therefore, that the state will fight to protect) and those
intended to affect the behavior of another state during a crisis (Fearon 1997, p69). Signals
sent to delineate and buttress the objectives of a state’s grand strategy typically involve
large sunk costs over time. Signals sent during crisis diplomacy incur no costs, if they
are effective. Signals sent during crisis diplomacy, however, can be quite expensive when
they are ineffective. Moreover, costly signals sent during crisis diplomacy are made more
effective if they are supported by costly signals already sent through sunk costs prior to the
crisis.
The United States made substantial investments consistently over many years to build
and maintain a large military capable of fighting two major conflicts in two separate theaters
simultaneously. However, as Fearon suggests, quoting Clausewitz, “[t]he aggressor is always
peace-loving; he would prefer to take over our country unopposed” (Fearon 1997, p68). So
building and sustaining a large military does not suggest a desire to employ it. States build
large and capable militaries to deter aggression or to compel acquiescence in the case of
their aggression against another. Hence, in either case the desire is not to employ military
force because it is too costly and the result is never certain. Nevertheless, a substantial
military investment does represent a large sunk cost. Such a sunk cost is made effective
in deterring or compelling acquiescence when it is focused on the support of objectives
clearly, publicly articulated. In other words, building a large military without articulating
what would cause it to be employed diminishes the return on the investment and makes it
more likely that it will have to be employed. Finally, when sunk costs in support of a clearly,
publicly articulated objective fail to deter, or compel acquiescence, then crisis diplomacy
ensues and a fresh costly signal must be sent.
President Jimmy Carter promulgated what became known as the Carter Doctrine in
1980. The Carter Doctrine stated the United States would use military force to protect its
national interests in the Persian Gulf. It was understood that the interests of the United States
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in the Persian Gulf included ensuring that no state achieve hegemony in the region and,
therefore, dominant control over the regions resources. This doctrine, considered along with
the United States sinking of significant costs, consistently over many years, into military
buildup and readiness, was a costly signal that should have alerted (absent contradictory
signals) Saddam Hussein that the United States would act against Iraq militarily if Iraq
invaded Kuwait. When this costly signal failed to deter Iraq from invading Kuwait, crisis
diplomacy ensued and fresh costly signals were needed.
Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. The United States did not engage Iraq militarily
until January of 1991. In the intervening period any number of costly signals were sent by
the United States and, indeed, by most of the world to Iraq. President George HW Bush
clearly stated that Iraq’s aggression would not stand; the United States deployed significant
military force to the Persian Gulf region; and, the United Nations Security Council sided
with the United States, passing United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 which
issued a deadline of January 15th for Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait and authorizing all
necessary means to implement the resolution if Iraq did not comply. Despite a plethora of
costly signals that perhaps every state in the world would recognize and heed, Iraq did not
withdraw and was ultimately expelled by force of arms.
The circumstances surrounding and leading to the first Gulf War illustrate clearly how
costly signals correlate with state behavior. Since at least 1980 the United States was
absolutely clear that it would fight to defend its interests in the Persian Gulf. This signal
should have been made particularly credible by the United States’ consistent and significant
investment over many years in its military, including investments in its forward deployment.
When this particular costly signal failed to deter Iraq’s behavior, the costly signals sent
by the United States and the rest of the world to Iraq after its invasion and occupation
of Kuwait, during the ensuing period of crisis diplomacy, should have been sufficient to
convince Iraq that its occupation of Kuwait could not last. The rational action for Iraq to
take, therefore, was to withdraw from Kuwait. The fact that Iraq did not get the signal, or did
not act rationally is a topic others have taken up. For our purposes here it is enough to claim,
hopefully in a convincing fashion, that every state in the world that was paying attention to
the events as they unfolded in 1990 knew the United States would employ military force
to expel Iraq from Kuwait; and that it would succeed. President Carter was clear as to the
interests of the United States in the region, and President Bush and the world were clear as
to what would be done if Iraq did not exit Kuwait. So in this instance while costly signals
failed to deter Iraq, they did not fail to inform any state (probably even including Iraq) what
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action would be taken. In this sense, costly signals are valuable.
Material realism hypothesizes that power increases the probability of conflict initiation
and globalization decreases the probability of conflict initiation. Power is a function of state
GDP and state extractive capability. States increase their power by growing their GDP. But
this in and of itself sends no signal. What state does not want to grow its GDP? A state sends
a costly signal when it chooses to extract wealth from its people, invest it in military power,
and tie the application of that power to the pursuit of specific strategic imperatives. This was
illustrated by the circumstances surrounding and leading up to the Gulf War. Consequently,
examining a state’s military expenditures can be informative.
Figure 2.4 shows a clear trend of increasing globalization since 1970. With the exception
of an extreme example and outlier like North Korea, every country in the world is touched
and affected by globalization. Consequently, this makes globalization a poor signal. What
is needed is a signal that shows whether a country is becoming more or less vulnerable to
globalization. Waltz points out that Japan prior to 1941 had such a high value of oil trade
with the East Indies that it had to attack the United States in the Philippines and at Pearl
Harbor in order to reduce its vulnerability to a trade disruption (the same logic that was
behind the Carter Doctrine) (Waltz 2010, p142). States that feel insecure with their access
to resources perceive fear and, as Japan did, take action to decrease their vulnerability to
resource disruption. States can take action to reduce their vulnerability to resource disruption
by withdrawing from international trade, if they can substitute with domestic resources, or
by accumulating and exerting power to secure needed resources as Japan did prior to World
War II. Consequently, looking at a states imports plus exports as a percentage of its GDP is
a good measure of its vulnerability to trade.
Military expenditures and trade vulnerability correspond to material realism’s explana-
tory variables of power and globalization. We know from chapter 3 that an increase in
power increases the probability of conflict initiation and that an increase in globalization
decreases the probability of conflict initiation. What we want to know is how to discern that
a state is pursuing a conscious strategy of power maximization or a conscious strategy of
globalization (or both, or neither). If we can discern this by “reading the signals,” we can
classify a state as revisionist and malignant and a threat to international stability; or, we can
classify a state as status quo and benign and not a threat to international stability. Such a
classification result, informed at first impression analytically but then buttressed empirically,
would be valuable and it would offer support to material realism as a systems theory of
international politics.
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In the next three subsections the behavior of the United States, China, and Japan, is
examined first analytically. With regard to military expenditures, it is not the level of
military expenditure that is paramount. Rather it is the change in military expenditure
because that is what is most informative and descriptive of a state’s policy and intention. If
China consistently spends 1.9% of GDP on its military, its military spending will ebb and
flow as its GDP does and no new information is presented. But if China is biased toward
increasing the percentage of its GDP spent on the military, this is informative. Consequently,
looking at the changes in the percentage of GDP China spends on its military each year and
plotting a trend line against these changes will tell us whether China is engaging in power
maximization or not. Put simply, if the trend line has a positive slope this means that the
investment China is making in its military is accelerating. It is difficult to understand how
this would happen except as the result of a conscious policy of power maximization.
Trade vulnerability is treated similarly. If, as an example, China’s imports and exports
represent a value equal to 50% of its GDP year after year, then the value of Chinese imports
and exports will ebb and flow as China’s GDP does and no new information is presented.
But if China is decreasing the value of its imports and exports as a percentage of its GDP,
this is informative. Consequently, looking at the changes in the value of imports and exports
as a percentage of GDP and plotting a trend line against these changes will tell us whether
China is increasing or decreasing its vulnerability to trade. Put simply, if the trend line has a
negative slope this means that China is making itself less vulnerable to trade disruption. It is
difficult to understand how this would happen except as the result of a conscious policy.
Judgements about whether the United States, China, and Japan, are acting to maximize
power and mitigate trade vulnerability are purely data driven; the judgments are analytical.
The data will provide an answer to the question, “is this state malignant and revisionist, or is
it something else?" The answer provided by the data needs to be confirmed by empirical
analysis. In brief, if a state has an upward sloping trend line for military expenditures and a
downward sloping trend line for trade vulnerability, the analytics suggest that the state is
malignant and revisionist; it is power maximizing. In an era of globalization when states can
achieve virtually any allocation of resources they want freely through market mechanisms,
there is not a cognizable need to invest in power maximizing behavior. Consequently, if a
state is doing so its reason for doing so must be rooted in a fear that can be diagnosed from
a consideration of its history and the behavior of other states acting in its proximity. An
empirical analysis will reveal the cause. Of course, the converse is also true. If a state has a
flat or negatively sloped trend line for military expenditure and a flat or positively sloped
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trend line for trade vulnerability, there is little reason to fear the behavior of the state. To the
extent the state blusters, it is theatre.
The United States, China, and Japan, will be considered seriatim. First, the data will
be presented and interpreted. Then an empirical analysis will confirm or not the data. If an
empirical analysis confirms the data then the explanatory power of material realism will
grow accordingly. Fear, resulting from scarcity, inspires states to seek more satisfactory
allocations of resources. States will seek satisfactory allocations through collaboration, or
by diktat. The acceleration of a state’s military spending and the acceleration of the value
of a state’s imports and exports as a percentage of its GDP are the signals that considered
together will tell us the policy and the intention of the state.
4.2.1 The United States in East Asia
For the United States, the signals are clear. Figure 4.2 clearly shows that through 2016
military expenditures for the United States are accelerating as evidenced by the upward
sloping trend line (“World Bank Open Data” 2018). This trend, however, is under current
pressure as a result of the sequestration (Budget Control Act of 2011). Consequently, it is
important to understand that the trend line is not the product of a single year’s expenditures
or even a few year’s expenditures. The trend line represents the bias of United States military
spending policy since 1992. Generally, since 1992 the behavior of the United States has
been biased toward increasing military spending. Moreover, if the Trump administration can
be taken at its word, it is almost certain that the sequestration will end and military spending
will increase substantially. Consequently, it seems safe to assert that the United States as a
matter of policy is biased toward increasing military spending into the foreseeable future.
Current United States overseas commitments also support this conclusion.
Likewise, Figure 4.2 clearly slows that the United States is becoming less dependent
on, or vulnerable to, international trade and, therefore, globalization (“World Bank Open
Data” 2018). This is evidenced by the downward sloping trend line. Interestingly, among all
industrialized economies, indeed among just about all economies in the world other than
disconnected and dysfunctional states like, North Korea and the Sudan, the United States
has the lowest value of trade (imports plus exports) as a percentage of GDP. Moreover, the
trade of the United States has ranged from 19.9% of GDP in 1992 to 30.9% in 2011, before
descending to 26.6% in 2016 (“World Bank Open Data” 2018). The United States has never
had a value of trade more than 30.9% of GDP. Relatively speaking, the United States is less
dependent on international trade than any state in the world.
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Figure 4.2: United States: Costly Signals
Figure 4.3 shows the source and destination of the imports and exports of the United
States for 2014 (“World Bank Open Data” 2018). The United States imports the largest
amount from China, followed by Canada, Mexico, and Japan. Combined, this volume of
imports is about 53% of the total imports of the United States, with 27% coming from
Canada and Mexico and 26% coming from China and Japan. In 1992 the comparable
numbers were 49% of imports from these countries, with Canada and Mexico accounting
for 37% and China and Japan accounting for 12%. See Figure 4.4 for regional trade for
1992. Total value of imports for the United Stated increased from $540B in 1992 to $2.34T
in 2014.
Looking at the percentages by region, the United States has had fairly stable trade with
East Asia. Imports remain at 31%, while exports at 21% in 2014 are not significantly
changed as compared to their share of 20% in 1992. However, the increase in the value of
imports from East Asia since 1992 is accounted for almost completely by China. In 1992
China was the fifth largest exporter to the United States, behind Canada, Mexico, Japan, and
Germany. In 1992 China exported $27B to the United States and Japan exported $100B
(“World Bank Open Data” 2018). In 2014 China exported $473B to the United States and
Japan exported $133B (“World Bank Open Data” 2018). According to the United States
Trade Representative, the top categories of exports from China to the United States are
machinery, bedding, toys, and sports equipment. These categories of imports do not fulfill a
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Figure 4.3: United States Regional Trade 2014
particularly critical need for the United States. The United States has the wherewithal to
produce these goods itself and would probably do so but for the cost advantages of offshoring
its production to China. Compare, however, this to the leading category of exports from the
United States to China (again, according to the United States Trade Representative): food.
A disruption in trade between the United States and China would clearly hurt China more
that it would hurt the United States.
Figure 4.4: United States Regional Trade 1992
United States’ trade with Japan since 1992 has been stable, perhaps even declining
slightly in real terms if inflation is accounted for ($100B growing at about 1.2% results in
about $133B in 25 years). The largest categories of trade between the United States and
Japan, and each with the other, are machinery, aircraft, and optical and medical instruments.
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Japan also exports cars to the United States. This trade is probably not all that significant for
either state since each is capable of producing these things. Unlike the United States trade
with China, this trade probably results more from specialization than cost arbitrage. Overall
the trade between the United States and Japan is more characteristic of trade between mature
industrialized countries that choose to specialize than is the trade that is between the United
States and China, though the latter is clearly evolving.
Put simply, the United States is generally not particularly vulnerable to trade in the sense
that it could not reasonably and quickly adjust to a disruption. This owes to the abundant
domestic resources, incredibly favorable topography and environment, current demographic
trend, and skilled resources the United States possesses (Zeihan 2016). The United States is
unlike any other state in the world in this regard and the result is that the United States has an
advantage over every other state in the world without exception (Zeihan 2016). The United
States does not and cannot suffer from scarcity. If something akin to scarcity presented
itself, an analysis would no doubt quickly reclassify the issue as not one of scarcity, but one
of distribution. See (Chandler 2017). The challenge the United States has, if it has one at all,
is to ensure the equitable distribution of resources. This is tantamount to the reduction of
inequality among its people.
With respect to East Asia, the United States is not at all vulnerable to trade disruption.
There is nothing that China or Japan (or South Korea) produces that the United States
requires and cannot locally produce or find an adequate substitute for. The fact is East Asia,
particularly China, needs access to the consumer market of the United States; indeed, the
world needs access to the consumer market of the United States. The United States is the
largest importer in the world and this is clear and sufficient evidence that the United States
has the largest consumer market in the world. The world needs the United States as an
export market far more that the United States needs anything from the rest of the world
(Zeihan 2016).
But these facts present a contradiction. If the United States is increasing its military
spending and reducing its exposure to trade, these costly signals suggest that the United
States is a malignant and revisionist state, especially in the face of surplus and not scarcity.
How does this reconcile with material realism’s assessment that states that do not suffer
from scarcity do not fear and, thus, are less likely to initiate conflicts? If the United States
benefits from surplus, it should not fear and, therefore, it should not be power maximizing.
Less conflict necessarily follows. This must be explained.
The questions that need to be answered are:
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1. How did the United States become the world’s largest export market and why is this
important?
2. How does material realism explain the fact that the United States is power maximizing,
though not a malignant and revisionist state?
The answer to each question is straightforward and will be found in an analysis of the
choices the United States made since World War II.
The compass and advances in ship design enabled voyages beyond the sight of land and
this was all that was needed to initiate the “Age of Discovery.” The Portuguese, the Spanish,
the British, the French, and ultimately most European states would venture out from the
European continent to discover new lands that offered vast resources for their taking. As one
state succeeded in enriching itself, others were compelled to act similarly or else fall behind.
For a state, falling behind meant being less wealthy and, therefore, less powerful and less able
to defend itself. What started as a scramble for wealth quickly became a scramble for national
power and primacy. Asia, the Americas, and Africa would all fall victim to European states
cum empires as they were carved up and their pieces distributed. Competitive economic
blocs emerged as mercantilism, colonialism, and “imperial preference” became the operative
policies of empires. Beggar-thy-neighbor policies were the norm with friction and conflict
often the result. The system would not be dealt its death blow until the conclusion of World
War II, with the last colony (Greenland) only recently (2009) achieving independence.
Even before the entry of the United States into World War II, Franklin Roosevelt was
of the opinion that trade barriers and economic blocs had undermined international peace
(Green 2017, p234). This belief no doubt informed United States policy as expressed in the
Atlantic Charter. “The Atlantic Charter had stated that all states ‘great or small, victor or
vanquished’ would have ‘access, on equal terms, to the trade and the raw materials of the
world which are needed for their economic prosperity”’ (Green 2017, p234). Thus, even
before the United States entry into World War II, the United States surmised that international
peace could only be achieved if competitive economic blocs were eliminated. According to
Michael Green, quoting Alfred Eckes, nothing less than “a new world economic order based
on the principles of an efficient distribution of international labor, convertible currencies,
and maximum utilization of human and physical resources” was needed (Green 2017, p234).
This new world economic order would be the foundation of an international security system
to prevent future wars (Green 2017, p234). This vision for a new world economic order was
brought to life at Bretton Woods.
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In 1944 forty-four nations met at the Mount Washington hotel in Bretton Woods, New
Hampshire. Ostensibly the agreements hammered out by the attendees established the
International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment (later becoming the World Bank). The practical effect, however, was to establish a
system of free trade underwritten and secured by the United States. The deal the United
States offered at Bretton Woods was straightforward. Allies could join the United States
led system and gain access to the largest consumer market in the world, indeed the only
meaningful market not devastated by the war, and they could also shelter under the security
umbrella provided by the United States. The advantage of this latter benefit was twofold.
First, the United States would secure maritime commerce. Second, and more generally,
allied nations would have their security provided by an alliance underwritten by the United
States. Without having to go it alone and make large investments in defense, particularly an
expensive navy to secure commerce, allied nations were free to focus almost completely on
economic reconstruction. See (Zeihan 2016, p83). This system would deliver the “greatest
boom in trade and investment the world had ever seen” (Green 2017, p237). It is probably
not unreasonable to say that this system effectively rebooted globalization after the ravages
of two world wars and a world wide depression.
Thus the answer to the first question. The United States became the world’s largest
export market because of its commitment to free trade as part of an international system
of security that it stood up, supported, and perpetuated. Trade disputes leading to outright
conflict could no longer be tolerated. Free trade was the answer, but to put its money where
its mouth was, the United States would have to open up its domestic market.
The United States did open its domestic market, and with great effect, thus lending
credibility to the system and paving the way for greater interdependence among states.
Increased trade led to increased wealth, increased specialization, and capital accumulation.
As capital controls fell during periods of increasing liberalization, advances in technology
allowed for the decomposition, disaggregation, and dispersal of supply chains throughout
the world. This was the ICT revolution that Baldwin referred to (Baldwin 2016). The
practical effect of this revolution was twofold. First, interdependence increased. A conflict
impacting one state could now interrupt multiple supply chains across multiple industries,
thus impacting many states. In earlier eras of globalization this outcome was not as likely
because trade consisted more generally of raw materials and finished goods flowing within a
particular trading bloc. Mercantilist and colonial policy, and “imperial preference,” often
aimed to insulate the bloc’s dominant state from trade disruption. But because of technology,
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trade now consisted of services and intermediate goods that served as inputs to the supply
chains of many industries. This made interdependence wholly different in character as
compared to prior eras of globalization. As a consequence, the second effect was that the
cost of disruption increased and would be more broadly felt among nations. Moreover, the
higher a percentage of GDP of a state’s trade (imports plus exports), the more dependent
(vulnerable) it would be on the system of international trade established by the United States
at Bretton Woods.
Nevertheless, the system of free trade established at Bretton Woods cannot be examined
in isolation from the security objectives of the United States. Removing trade as a point
of friction was an explicit objective of Roosevelt because he believed that trade conflicts
and competition for resources led to war. Roosevelt wanted to reduce the likelihood of war;
free trade was a reasoned means to that end. In August of 1941 when the Atlantic Charter
was promulgated the perceived need to contain the Soviet Union had not yet ripened, so
it can not be said that Roosevelt set out to establish a western alliance in opposition to
them. Indeed, the Soviet Union was invited to participate at Bretton Woods. Roosevelt
believed as Woodrow Wilson had believed before him that free trade was necessary to
secure international peace (Green 2017, p234). If states could acquire the resources they
required through access to free and open markets then sources of conflict would be reduced
accordingly. Roosevelt aspired for free trade to rid the world of conflict. That the world
organized east versus west after the Soviet Union opted out of the program turned out to be
of temporary importance since the Soviet Union would collapse only forty-six years after
the end of World War II.
The demise of the Soviet Union coincided with the ICT revolution. With ideology and
security competition sidelined, globalization fueled by advances in technology was un-
leashed with a vengeance. World trade and outflows of foreign direct investment accelerated
perceptibly (“World Bank Open Data” 2018). No great power competition presented itself
and apart from largely inconsequential regional conflicts, the world seemed to be heading
toward the idyllic state that Francis Fukuyama characterized in his book “The End of History
and the Last Man” (Fukuyama 2002). During this period, which corresponded exactly with
the Clinton Administration, United States military spending decreased every year while
United States trade vulnerability (change in imports plus exports as a percentage of GDP)
increased every year except one. The United States was clearly a benign and status quo state.
What changed?
States fear two things: they fear other states and they fear their own people. If the United
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States executed a change in policy as evidenced by an acceleration in military expenditures
and a deceleration in exposure to globalization, a source of fear should be present. However,
since World War II free trade, economic liberalization, and globalization have all increased
steadily and significantly and there has not been a single great power war. The wall between
east and west has fallen with the demise of the Soviet Union and China, by all impressions,
is joining the system. This last event alone has probably lifted hundreds of millions of
Chinese from poverty since 1992. So arguably there is clear reason for optimism and not
fear. This would certainly be true, unless the system itself is changing in such a way as to
produce fear. Two changes seem obvious.
There is plenty of instability in the Middle East. But instability in the region does not
threaten as it once did. The Carter Doctrine asserted the United States’ interest in not
having a hostile hegemon monopolize the energy resources of the region for fear that the
hegemon would control access to the resources to serve its parochial self-interest. This
fear no longer exists as a practical matter. The shale revolution has made the United States
energy independent, so it does not need the resources (Zeihan 2016). It is unlikely that other
states will be denied the resources since energy is the one thing that Middle East states have
that others need to buy. If Iran dominated the entire region, including Saudi Arabia, they
would need to sell oil to pay for the repression that would be required to hold their “empire”
together. It is just not imaginable that Middle East energy will be withheld from the market.
This particular threat went away with the demise of the Soviet Union. This means that for
the first time since World War II the Middle East is not a strategic region for the United
States, or for the world. Europe, Japan, and China, will continue to fulfill their energy needs
from the Middle East, as well as from others. Hence, investing in the stability of the region
needs to be reconciled to this new reality. This is one important way the system is changing,
but in this case for the better. To find a source of fear that would prompt the United States to
send costly signals, something else must be lurking that threatens to upend the system the
United States has perpetuated since World War II. The uncertainty surrounding the rise of
China, especially its recent behavior, may be the source of fear that is driving the behavior
of both the United States and Japan.
To answer the second question presented above, if the United States is power-maximizing
as it was during the Cold War to support, preserve, and extend the Bretton Woods’ interna-
tional system, it is not a malignant and revisionist state. It is a hegemon trying to maintain
the status quo in the face of an existential threat to the system. The question that needs to
be answered is this: is the rise of China changing the system in such a way as to drive the
91
fearful behavior of the United States and Japan? A discussion of China and then Japan may
reveal the answer.
4.2.2 China in East Asia
For China the signals are clear. Figure 4.5 clearly shows that through 2016 military expendi-
tures are accelerating as evidenced by the upward sloping trend line (“World Bank Open
Data” 2018). The acceleration in Chinese military spending is more pronounced than that of
the United States. This is easily discerned by comparing the steepness of the slope of the
trend lines for the United States and China. In absolute terms, China’s military spending is
far below that of the United States. However, this comparison does not tell the story. More
context is needed to properly interpret China’s military spending in comparison to that of
the United States.
Figure 4.5: China: Costly Signals
In 2016 China’s military spending was $215B, while the United States’ military spending
was $611B (“World Bank Open Data” 2018). Before comparing these numbers, several
issues should be accounted for.
• Purchasing power parity. According to the World Bank, China has the largest economy
in the world when measured in terms of purchasing power parity. Adjusting for this,
China’s military spending in 2016 was $412B, or approximately 67% of that of the
United States (“World Bank Open Data” 2018).
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• Research and development. According to Peter Navarro, China benefits from sig-
nificantly lower research and development costs because it has been able to steal
defense-related intellectual property, as well as reverse engineer licensed technology
(Navarro 2015, loc553-60).
• Scope of deployment and operation. While the United States deploys and operates
military forces globally, China’s concerns thus far are regional (Navarro 2015, loc545).
• Current operational expense. The United States is currently engaged in significant
conflicts in the Middle East and South Asia, as well as other active operations around
the world. The United States is incurring significant operational expense while China
is not.
Accounting for these issues, it is probably fair to say that China is spending more to build
its military capabilities than the United States is. Indeed, because China is not involved in
any active conflicts, this level of military spending seems high, especially for a “status quo”
power.
Figure 4.5 also clearly shows that China is reducing its vulnerability to trade and,
therefore, to globalization. Since 2006, imports plus exports as a percentage of GDP for
China has decreased every year except for 2010 and 2011. Imports plus exports as a
percentage of GDP peaked for China in 2006 at 65.6% of GDP. As of 2016, imports plus
exports as a percentage of GDP for China is 37%. During this period (2006 - 2016) Chinese
GDP increased from $2.75T to $11.2T, a fourfold increase (“World Bank Open Data” 2018).
Since the proportion of trade to GDP has decreased substantially, a reasonable inference
is that China has increased domestic consumption. This is consistent with what would be
expected from a developing country as it becomes wealthier. However, at 37%, China is
already less exposed to trade than most developed states. Consequently, it seems unlikely
that China will be able to reduce its exposure to trade too much more. The comparable
metric for the United States is 26.6%, but the United States has much richer local resource
endowments than China. (Zeihan 2016).
Figure 4.6 shows China’s regional trade for 2014. China’s largest export markets were
the United States, Japan, South Korea, and Germany, with the United States consuming
21.0%, Japan 8.1%, South Korea 4.1%, and Germany 3.6% respectively of China’s exports
(“World Bank Open Data” 2018).
Figure 4.7 shows China’s regional trade for 1992. China’s largest export markets were
the United States, Japan, South Korea, and Germany, with the United States consuming
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Figure 4.6: China Regional Trade 2014
30.3%, Japan 18.8%, South Korea 4.1%, and Germany 8.3% respectively of China’s exports
(“World Bank Open Data” 2018).
Figure 4.7: China Regional Trade 1992
The same trading partners, plus Taiwan, were the largest exporters to China in 2014. In
2014 the United States, Japan, South Korea, Germany, and Taiwan provided 8.9%, 9.7%,
10.3%, 5.4%, and 9.2% respectively of China’s imports (“World Bank Open Data” 2018).
For 1992 these states provided 15.0%, 23.0%, 4.4%, 6.8%, and 9.9% respectively of China’s
imports (“World Bank Open Data” 2018).
The character of China’s imports and exports is also revealing. In 1992 84% of China’s
exports were to North America, Europe, and East Asia. The largest categories of exports
were toys and games, footwear, knitted outerwear, and luggage (“Observatory of Economic
Complexity”). By 2014 these markets accounted for 64% of China’s exports, with the largest
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categories of exports being personal computers, TV and radio transmitters, and vehicle parts
and accessories. Between 1992 and 2014 China moved from exporting primarily low value
goods to exporting high value goods and in so doing became more dependent on the mature
markets it served. The market for sophisticated manufactured goods is East Asia, North
America, and Europe. China needs access to these markets to support its export industries
and its export led growth.
China’s imports tell a similar story. In 1992 84% of China’s imports came from North
America, Europe, and East Asia. By 2014 this number reduced to 60%. In 1992 the largest
categories of imports for China were machinery, cars, aircraft, and fertilizers. By 2014,
the categories were cars, microcircuits, vehicle parts and accessories, optical instruments,
and machinery for specialized industries. China can only source these items from mature
markets like North America, East Asia, and Europe.
The pattern depicted immediately above is straightforward and predictable. Mao Zedong
left China an impoverished country when he died in 1976. After Mao’s death, Deng Xiaoping
made the decision to open China to the world. When China opened its major, and perhaps
only, competitive advantage was a large quantity of inexpensive, unskilled labor. The result
was that low-skilled, labor intensive tasks moved to China. The product of these tasks was
low value-add, commodity exports - toys, luggage, outerwear. China advanced economically
on this basis, but this profile of exports could not create sufficient excess capital to modernize
the Chinese economy unless Chinese living standards were suppressed. In other words, if
Chinese workers consumed all of the wealth they created, there would be nothing left to
invest in the development of the Chinese economy. Mearsheimer made this exact point with
respect to Russia when he compared the nature of the Russian economy to that of the United
Kingdom during the period 1815 - 1914. See (Mearsheimer 2001, loc1161-75).
The Chinese government would suppress Chinese living standards while enticing compa-
nies from the major economies of North America, Europe and East Asia (especially Japan)
to invest in China. Low labor costs and a large Chinese market were ample reasons for
companies to invest. But investment came at a cost. The Chinese government required
companies to make technology transfers to local entities as they entered the Chinese market
(Navarro 2015, loc3704). As the Chinese economy consumed more and more of the technol-
ogy brought by foreign companies it was inevitable that Chinese productivity would rise.
As Chinese productivity increased, living standards did not rise commensurately and the
surplus capital was invested in the economy. As this process has played out since Mao’s
death the Chinese economy has advanced tremendously, recently surpassing the United
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States economy in size when measured in terms of purchasing power parity.
The Chinese have succeeded because they have been relentless in consuming technology
and climbing the value chain as evidenced by the change in their trade profile during the
period 1992 - 2014. The downside of this, however, is that the Chinese have built a modern
economy that is particularly reliant on trade (imports and exports) with a small handful of
countries that are capable of providing the imports they require and consuming the exports
they produce. China’s consumer market is not yet rich enough or sophisticated enough
to wean China from its export driven growth, though it is advancing and transforming.
Consequently, an interruption to trade would likely ripple through the Chinese economy.
Workers would be displaced and social unrest stoked; surplus capital would dry up and
China’s economic advancement would stall.
Material realism asserts that states fear two things: they fear their people and they fear
other states. China has ample reason to fear its people. According to the New York Times,
“As China’s economy slows after more than two decades of breakneck growth, strikes and
labor protests have erupted across the country. Factories, mines and other businesses are
withholding wages and benefits, laying off staff or shutting down altogether. Worried about
their prospects in a gloomy job market, workers are fighting back with unusual ferocity”
(Hernandez). But compare (Fisher). If the Chinese government cannot continue to advance
the economy and provide jobs, it risks losing the support of the Chinese people. If the
Chinese government cannot continue to increase the standard of living of the Chinese people,
which the people have come to expect, it risks losing the support of the Chinese people. The
objective of the communist party rulers in China is to stay in power. To stay in power they
know they need either the support or the acquiescence of the Chinese people.
For the Chinese communist party to stay in power it must increase the standard of living
of the Chinese people. Only this will earn the communist party leaders the support or the
acquiescence of the people. This is the expectation that has resulted from “two decades
of breakneck growth.” The Chinese people want more, not less. They will not be satisfied
with stasis if they perceive their lot in life compares unfavorably to others, especially others
among themselves which makes inequality in China a real problem too. This means that
the government must continue to grow the economy to provide jobs for the Chinese people.
In order to grow the economy, the government must have access to markets and resources,
which means greater connectivity, not less. China needs to import raw materials and other
inputs to support its consumption and export trade. China needs access to export markets.
The Chinese government’s fear is that access to markets and resources will be closed, or
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sufficiently constrained, resulting in a crisis of scarcity that diminishes the credibility of the
communist party and brings its ability to rule in to question.
Unreliable access to resources and markets is an existential threat to the Chinese com-
munist party. This is the source of all their fear. States that contribute to this fear are states
that have the ability to close Chinese access to resources and markets. Because these states
are a source of fear, China builds its power to deter these states or, if necessary, successfully
confront them. How is it that China fears a loss of access to resources and markets in an
era when globalization operates to guarantee such access? Is China’s fear rational? Three
sources of concern for China are readily apparent.
First, China’s maritime geography is especially precarious. China abuts the Western
Pacific Ocean, yet it does not have unfettered access to it. South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the
Philippines, and Indonesia run from China’s north east to its south and form a first island
chain that contains China to the East and the South China Seas. Forty percent of the world’s
commerce transit these seas gaining egress and ingress through the Straight of Malacca
(Reuters). Energy exports from the Middle East, including 80% of China’s crude oil imports,
travel through the Arabian Sea around the southern tip of India and across the Bay of Bengal
before entering the Straight of Malacca on their way to East Asia (Reuters). Chinese (and
Japanese) exports travel south through the South China Sea passing through the Straight
of Malacca before crossing the Indian Ocean and passing through the Red Sea and the
Suez Canal to access the Mediterranean and ultimately the Atlantic Ocean where European
markets are accessible. All of China’s trade with the Middle East and Europe can be choked
off by closing the Straight of Malacca, which at its narrowest point is only 1.7 miles wide
(Reuters). Beyond this, however, If China wants access to the Pacific, and assuming it can
break out of the first island chain, it will run squarely into United States military bases at
Guam and then Hawaii. China’s geography, unlike the Geography that the United States
enjoys, lends to its insecurity.
Second, China is an immature maritime power. China does not yet have the capability to
stop the United States from choking off its trade; China does not have a blue water navy.
South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines all have defense relationships with the
United States and each hosts a United States military presence. Singapore hosts a large
logistical base for the United States Navy. The United States is forward deployed in East
and South East Asia in a significant manner and it is hard to imagine how the United States
would not be able to stop the flow of commerce to China, including vital energy imports, if
the United States wanted to (Navarro 2015). Indeed, there is a vivid memory in East Asia
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of the United States doing exactly this. The United States executed an embargo against
Japan in 1941 that contributed to Japan’s decision to attack the United States at Pearl Harbor.
Also, and importantly, “President Harry Truman imposed a complete trade embargo on
China that would last for more than twenty years and inflict considerable damage before
President Richard Nixon’s ‘Ping-Pong diplomacy’ ended the embargo in 1971” (Navarro
2015, loc369-71). China is more dependent on trade now than it was in 1950, so the pain
of an embargo would no doubt be severe and an almost certain casus belli. Consequently,
China has good reason to fear this potentiality.
Finally, while China’s resource insecurity can be established objectively, it must be
evaluated subjectively in light of China’s peculiar historical experience. Only in this way
can China’s national behavior be understood. From 1839 until the founding of the People’s
Republic of China on October 1, 1949 (China’s century of humiliation), China was attacked,
invaded, and occupied at various times and for various purposes by European powers, the
United States, Japan, and Russia. China was the victim of unequal and onerous treaties that
resulted in the loss of territory. This history is not a distant memory for the Chinese. All
Chinese children are taught this history and it serves as a national rallying cry of “never
again.” China believes weakness made it susceptible to the depredations it suffered at the
hands of stronger, more industrially advanced states. For this reason, weakness is reviled.
China must be strong and strong means industrially advanced, independent, and self-reliant,
with a world class military. Consequently, “[i]n his report to the 19th CPC National Congress,
Xi, also general secretary of the CPC Central Committee and the nation’s president, pledged
to make sure that by 2020, the PLA will basically achieve its mechanization, make big
strides in informatization, and gain substantial improvement in strategic capabilities. He
also set a midterm goal for the Chinese military — to turn itself into a modernized power by
2035 — as well as a long-term one — to become a top-tier military by 2050” (Zhao).
All of this being said, China is committed to actions it believes will result in its indepen-
dence and prosperity. Toward this end, China’s overarching strategy may be found in the
“One Belt, One Road” (OBOR) initiative. One Belt, One Road is intended to subsidize and
construct the infrastructure necessary to more fruitfully connect China with Asia, the Middle
East, Europe, and Africa. It envisions over land routes and maritime routes. According to
Jacob Shapiro, “China’s main purpose in pushing for OBOR is . . . to alleviate . . . its
own domestic economic pressures. OBOR is one small part of Xi’s attempt to accomplish
what successive Chinese leaders have failed to do: distribute the wealth of the coast to the
impoverished parts of China’s interior without causing crippling levels of social instability.
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The most concrete part of the OBOR action plan is how Chinese provinces will profit from
infrastructure development and increases in trade that are supposed to accompany OBOR.
The goal is to enrich interior provinces, which despite preternatural growth rates China has
seen in the last three decades, remain woefully impoverished compared to the richer coastal
regions” (Shapiro).
Material realism suggests a state will increase its power to a level that is necessary to
secure (acquire and protect) the resources needed for its survival. China’s actions can be
construed in this light. China’s communist party must increase the quality of life of the
Chinese generally, but especially those living in the interior of the country, because they fear
the social instability that will be created if they fail. Chinese citizens living in the interior of
the country greatly outnumber those living in the coastal regions. Mao’s peasant army was
filled with recruits from the hinterland. Pacification of this population is an imperative for
the communist party’s survival. Consequently, the quality of life of the Chinese living in the
interior of the country must improve. Trade and economic development enabled through
OBOR-enabled connectivity is the answer.
As for China’s increasing military expenditures, this phenomenon makes sense in light
of China’s historical experience and should be construed in that light. China has been the
subject of great depredations in the recent past, including a trade embargo. Consequently,
China will invest to build military capability to confront all threats. The United States is the
only state capable of disrupting China’s access to markets and resources, so it makes sense
that the military capabilities of the United States inform China’s military designs. Until
China feels secure with its capability vis-a-vis the United States, it will continue to build its
military. This no doubt ensures the United States will respond by building its military to an
even greater capability. The resulting arms race does not necessarily lead to conflict. The
United States and the Soviet Union avoided direct military conflict despite a fully joined
arms race. The result can be the same as between China and the United States as long as
markets and resources are not used as weapons.
China is a malignant and revisionist state. History, geography, and weakness explain
the actions China is taking to secure access to markets and resources and in so doing reset
the rules of the system, especially in East Asia, if not worldwide. Can the same explain the
behavior of Japan? To that question we now turn.
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4.2.3 Japan in East Asia
For Japan the signals are clear. Figure 4.8 clearly shows that through 2016 Japanese military
spending is decelerating as evidenced by the downward sloping trend line. According to the
World Bank, Japanese military spending as a percentage of GDP has been below 1% since
1960. Since 1960 Japanese military spending reached its apex of 0.99% of GDP in 2011
(“World Bank Open Data” 2018), but has declined modestly since then as a percentage of
GDP. Japanese military spending has not needed to be high since World War II because there
has not been a threat to Japan in East Asia, Japan has been able to shelter under the security
umbrella provided by the United States, and Japanese access to markets and resources has
been secure. These circumstances allowed Japan to recover economically from the war so
quickly and effectively that Japan now has the world’s third largest economy (only recently
being overtaken by China).
Figure 4.8: Japan: Costly Signals
Nevertheless, public pronouncements coming from the Japanese government belie the
data.
• Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe led the effort to reinterpret Article 9 of the
Japanese constitution. Article 9 of the Japanese constitution asserted that Japan
renounced “war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force
as means of settling international disputes.” Under the reinterpretation of Article 9
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Japanese Self-Defense forces are now allowed to participate in collective self-defense,
meaning they can come to the aid of an ally that is attacked (Ford).
• It is widely believed that Prime Minister Abe wants to formally revise Article 9, not
merely reinterpret it, so that the Japanese Diet can make decisions about what military
policies to pursue. The “goal is to increase the focus of debates on the substance
of policies, as opposed to ‘abstract’ debates about ‘constitutionality’ insulated from
changes to Japan’s strategic environment over the past 70 years” (Liff).
• In December, 2017, CNN reported that Japan had agreed to purchase Long Range
Anti-Ship Missiles and Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles from Lockeed Martin
(Berlinger and Enjoji). Additionally, Japan launched what it calls a “Helicopter-
Destroyer” in 2015, which can easily support vertical take-off and landing fighter
aircraft such as the F35B, that Japan is rumored to be intending to purchase (Seidel).
These facts seem to support the proposition that Japan does not feel secure. Indeed, if the
circumstances that contributed to Japan’s security until only recently are critically examined,
the source of Japan’s insecurity can be found. So should we expect Japanese military
spending to increase? Yes, according to The Diplomat who reported that the Japanese
Ministry of Defense requested “a record 5,255 billion yen ($48.1 billion) for fiscal year
2018[,] . . . a 2.5 percent increase from the initial defense budget for fiscal 2017[,]” in
response to activities by the North Koreans and the Chinese in the East and South China
Seas (Pollmann). Consequently, perhaps we are seeing in current events the basis of an
incipient costly signal.
Japan’s exposure to trade has been stable. Imports plus exports as a percentage of GDP
peaked for Japan in 2014 at 37.6%, but have since reduced to 31.2% in 2016 (“World Bank
Open Data” 2018). The slope of the trend line in Figure 4.8 does not suggest a change in
Japanese behavior. Indeed, Japanese trade has been remarkably consistent, even in the face
of a contracting economy. The Japanese economy contracted from $6.2T in 2012 to $4.9T
in 2016 (“World Bank Open Data” 2018).
Japanese regional trade from 1992 to 2014 is also fairly stable. Japan received 70% of its
imports from North America, East Asia, South East Asia, and the Middle East in 1992, with
67% coming from these regions in 2014. Exports show similar stability. North America,
East Asia, South East Asia, and the Middle East accounted for 68% of Japanese exports in
1992 and 63% in 2014.
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Figure 4.9: Japan Regional Trade 2014
In 1992 Japan’s top import categories were crude petroleum, liquified petroleum gases,
lubricating petroleum oils, coal, and crustaceans and molluscs (“Observatory of Economic
Complexity”). In 2014 they were liquified petroleum gases, crude petroleum, electronic
microcircuits, coal, and medicaments (“Observatory of Economic Complexity”). Japan’s top
export categories in 1992 were cars, computer peripherals, vehicles parts and accessories,
electronic microcircuits, and video and sound recorders (“Observatory of Economic Com-
plexity”). Japan’s top export categories in 2014 were cars, unclassified transactions, vehicles
parts and accessories, machinery for specialized industries, and electronic microcircuits
(“Observatory of Economic Complexity”).
Figure 4.10: Japan Regional Trade 1992
Two things are striking about Japanese trade. First, China. China (including Hong Kong)
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has displaced the United States as Japan’s largest export market. In 1992 China received
10.25% of Japan’s exports compared to the 29% the United States received (“Observatory
of Economic Complexity”). In 2014 China received 25.2% of Japan’s exports compared to
the 20.5% the United States received (“Observatory of Economic Complexity”). Imports
tell a similar story. In 1992 Japan received 23.4% of its imports from the United States
compared to 8.5% from China (“Observatory of Economic Complexity”). By 2014 Japan
received 25.3% of its imports from China with only 11.3% coming from the United States
(“Observatory of Economic Complexity”). Second, a continuing reliance on the import of
energy. In 2014 Japanese energy imports are 16.7% of total imports, down from 23.3%
in 1992 (“Observatory of Economic Complexity”), but still significant. The net of this is
Japan remains reliant on energy imports and over recent years has developed a high level of
interdependence with China. China now accounts for 25% of Japanese imports and exports.
This is reflected in the growth of East Asia regional trade in Figure 4.10 and Figure 4.9.
The data suggests that Japan is a benign and status quo state. Military spending is
not accelerating as of 2016. With respect to trade, Japan’s level of engagement with the
international system has been fairly consistent. There is not yet a clear sign that Japan is
trying to limit its exposure to trade as China and the United States appear to be. Indeed,
Japan remains dependent on energy imports from the Middle East and South East Asia; and,
the size of Japan’s trading relationship with China no doubt increases the importance of
the relationship between them that appears to be under pressure for a variety of historical
reasons. Notwithstanding the above, there is evidence that Japan is pivoting to a more
offensive posture, suggesting that we will see costly signals coming from Japan in the near
future. The reasons specified above give us a roadmap to understand why.
In the 19th century Japan was keenly aware of China’s experience with the European
powers. Japan watched as China was defeated in the Opium wars, became the subject of an
onerous treaty port system, and had parts of its territory seized (Paine 2016). In 1854 Japan
suffered similarly at the hands of the United States as the United States imposed the treaty
port system on Japan, “establishing the principle of extraterritoriality for Americans residing
in Japan, foreign control of Japan’s tariffs, and most-favored-nation treatment” (Paine 2016,
p3). Observing China, and based on its own experience, Japan assessed that it was simply
too weak to stand up to an industrialized power. Unlike China who sought to protect and
preserve its traditional society, which had the effect of preventing her industrialization and
modernization, Japan made the decision to modernize and westernize. Before the turn of the
century Japan would implement the Meiji reforms that impacted every part of society. Social
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hierarchy was upended with feudal reform, education was made compulsory for children,
Tokyo University was founded, the Bank of Japan was founded, criminal and civil codes
were revamped and westernized, civil service exams instituted, the government organized
under a prime minister, the judicial system was reconstructed, and a new constitution was
promulgated (Paine 2016, p7-8). Importantly, as well, a process of military modernization
was started that would enable Japan to follow in what it perceived to be the footsteps of
Russia and the European powers.
Japan had “observed that the great powers of the late nineteenth century possessed
enormous wealth, strong militaries, and great territorial extent, usually in the form of
empires. [The Japanese] saw no reason why their country should depart from the established
model for economic development” (Paine 2016, p10). Moreover, Japan was not rich in
resources, so there seemed to be no alternative but to seek the fruits of empire exactly as the
Russians and the Europeans had done (Paine 2016). For Japan modernization was needed to
achieve national power and, therefore, security. Modernization required empire, because
Japan simply did not have the indigenous resources necessary to industrialize. Few states do.
All considered, at the time it was quite natural for Japan to look beyond its borders for the
resources required and, ultimately, to take them. This explains Japan’s actions dating from
the first Sino-Japanese War until its surrender that concluded World War II. Japan sought
resources in order to industrialize so that it could be secure.
Material realism asserts that a state fears only two things: its own people and other states.
Ultimately, all fear is rooted in scarcity. Solve scarcity, fear will wane, and the probability
of conflict will reduce. Despite the Meiji reforms, a lack of resources made Japan weak
and vulnerable to predation; Japan continued to fear. The treaty port system imposed by
the United States and the experience of China at the hands of the European powers was
ample evidence for the Japanese of what results from weakness. For Japan not to fear, Japan
needed access to resources. Prior to World War II Japan took by force what it required.
Since World War II Japan has been able to trade for the resources it requires. Since World
War II Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution has been of little importance because Japan
has been able to gain all she requires through collaboration, making coercion unnecessary.
So long as collaboration holds the promise of being effective, Article 9 is likely to rest
unchanged. But there are signs that collaboration may not be effective in the future.
The rise of China has changed everything in East and South East Asia. China’s GDP
has grown from $427B in 1992 to $11.2T in 2016, an increase of 2,600% (“World Bank
Open Data” 2018). Yet China still has a per capita GDP that is approximately 38% of
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Japan’s measured in terms of purchasing power parity (“World Bank Open Data” 2018).
As already stated, China must continue to economically advance and, importantly, China
must more equitably distribute wealth among its citizens. OBOR is an important part of
China’s strategy because it seeks to ameliorate the inequities felt by the Chinese living in
the interior of the country. But OBOR has the potential to do much more than this. “OBOR
will allow China to project power across several continents. OBOR’s promise to integrate
the countries of Eurasia reflects a vision in which the balance of geostrategic power shifts
to Asia” (Allison 2017, p125). Moreover, when the balance of power shifts to Asia, it will
shift to China, thus casting doubt on the economic relationships, access to markets, and the
“rules of the system” that Japan has enjoyed profitably since World War II.
According to Graham Allison, Xi Jin Ping’s “‘China Dream’ combines prosperity and
power. . . . It captures the intense yearning of a billion Chinese: to be rich, to be powerful,
and to be respected.” (Allison 2017, p108-9). China’s foreign policy, therefore, will consist
“of three key tenets: demand for regional ‘dominance,’ insistence that neighboring countries
recognize and respect China’s inherent ‘superiority,’ and willingness to use this dominance
and superiority to orchestrate ‘harmonious co-existence’ with its neighbors” (Allison 2017,
p110). In other words, China under Xi seeks to reinstate the tribute system that prevailed
until only about 200 years ago.
Under the tribute system China occupied the middle space between the heavens and the
earth, above all others. This position reflected China’s inherent dominance and superiority,
and, because of this position, other states were expected to defer to China in all things. Thus
the tribute system was an hierarchical system with China at the top calling the shots. In
exchange for their deference, states could expect China to confer benefits upon them. Not
surprisingly, the idea that China will seek harmonious coexistence with others, while sitting
comfortably perched above them, is, no doubt, not a source of great relief for Japan. As
China pursues OBOR and tries to reinstate a tribute system in Asia, it is inevitable that
Japan’s access to markets and resources will change. Consequently, Japan has ample reason
for fear.
The only state to truly threaten Japan in Asia in more than 100 years has been the United
States, with whom Japan now enjoys a close security and commercial relationship. The
rise of China, and China’s regional assertiveness, changes that. The recent history between
Japan and China, including on going territorial disputes, does little to help.
Adding to Japanese anxiety, however, is one additional circumstance. Since World War
II Japan has been able to shelter reliably under the security umbrella provided by the United
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States. This “safe place” allowed Japan to focus on economic development and eschew any
power-maximizing behavior. However, if the United States were deemed by Japan to be an
unreliable security provider, then in the face of a regional threat like China (or North Korea,
because its nuclear weapons program), Japan would have no choice but to work to obviate
the restrictions of Article 9 and rearm. Many, for good reason, believe that Prime Minister
Abe harbors this desire currently (Seig). Consequently, Japan’s relationship with the United
States is important because the quality of it will determine whether, or to what extent, Japan
seeks to modify (or continue to reinterpret) Article 9 and to rearm.
The fact that no costly signal can yet be discerned from Japan’s military expenditures is
explained completely by Article 9. Prime Minister Abe admitted the Japanese people are
not yet willing to accept a modification to Article 9, which is why he sought to reinterpret
it (Seig). See also (McGregor 2017). Until Article 9 is reinterpreted further, or modified
outright, it seems unlikely that Japan’s military expenditures will change too much. So
bluster will continue.
Japan’s vulnerability to trade is low relative to other advanced states. Japan’s trade
profile and indigenous resource endowments make a further reduction unlikely. So Japan is
not exhibiting the clear costly signals that the United States and China are exhibiting. Yet
Japan is a significant player in East and South East Asia. An open conflict in Asia between
Japan and China will almost certainly provoke the involvement of the United States. China’s
actions with respect to OBOR more directly provoke the fear of Japan over free and liberal
access to resources and markets, than they do the United States.
Japan’s evaluation of the security guarantee of the United States and China’s actions
with OBOR will determine whether, or when, we will see costly signals from Japan.
* * *
Material realism asserts that states fear two things: states fear their people and they fear
other states. A state will fear its people when its people suffer from a level of scarcity that
prevents them from living the life they want. No state can long endure absent the support or
at least the acquiescence of its people. States will fear other states when other states place
in jeopardy the resources they need to mitigate scarcity. Scarcity induces fear. Fear is the
cause of conflict. Mitigate scarcity and fear will wane and conflict will reduce.
The United States acted at the conclusion of World War II to establish an international
order that would provide for a liberal allocation of resources. Such an order was seen by
Roosevelt as a means to prevent future conflicts. Ultimately, with the demise of the Soviet
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Union the entire world would embrace the order created and largely sustained by the United
States. Consequently, the United States became the worldwide leader of the order it created
and was thus invested in its perpetuation (so that Roosevelt’s objective could be met). This
made the United States a status quo power, but it also provided ample incentive for the
United States to power-maximize to the extent necessary to support the established order.
The actions of the United States should be viewed in this context. The United States by
building or sustaining military power acts not out of fear, but rather to support the existing
order. In this sense the United States provides a public good that mitigates the fear that
others would experience in its absence. To the extent that the motivation of the United States
for building and sustaining power changes, it is because of a threat to the existing order that
it works to sustain. China may present such a threat.
The most significant event in international politics since the end of the Cold War has
been the rise of China. The rise of such a geographically large and populous state under
any circumstances is significant. But the rise of China is particularly significant because of
its suddenness and the assertiveness with which China now behaves. OBOR and military
spending both aim to secure access to markets and resources that China needs for further
economic development. Without further economic development, and particularly more
balanced economic development of the interior of China versus China’s coastal regions,
it is difficult to see how the government of China continues to earn the support or the
acquiescence of the Chinese people. China’s history and geography suggest that it should
fear both its own people and other states. China’s actions reflect this, even as they are
directed at mitigating scarcity as the root cause. Importantly, however, as China acts to
mitigate scarcity its actions provoke fear in others because they raise uncertainty about the
settled terms of access to markets and resources that others enjoy. The question that is not
answerable at this time is whether China can act to mitigate the scarcity it perceives without
stoking fear in others, particularly Japan.
Japan has been a status quo power since its defeat in World War II. This largely owes
to a combination of factors. Japan’s constitution prevented Japan’s remilitarization, which
allowed it to focus exclusively on its own economic recovery and development. Japan’s
security alliance with the United States also worked to allow and ensure this focus. But the
rise of China brings into question Japan’s future actions. As China acts to shape the terms
of access to markets and resources, it seems likely that China will do so in a self-regarding
way. This makes resource competition between Japan and China likely and is, therefore, a
significant point of friction.
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For the existing international order to endure the great powers of the day must support
it. It is the great powers that provide the public goods necessary for the international order
to survive. If the international order breaks down, East Asia seems the most likely place
where it will happen. The key to understanding East Asia is to understand what China will
do to mitigate the scarcity its citizens perceive. For China to endure, the scarcity its people
perceive must be redressed or they will not support the Chinese ruling elite. If this becomes
true, China will devolve into chaos and anarchy as it has done many times before in its
history.
As China acts Japan can be expected to respond. Japan does not fear its people as China
does. The Japanese people do not perceive scarcity, so the Japanese government is secure.
Only the threat of losing reasonable access to markets and resources can move Japan away
from being a status quo state. That this threat is real can be discerned from the statements of
Prime Minister Abe. But as of this time, Japan is not sending any costly signals.
The United States does not and cannot suffer from scarcity. This means that the United
States can chose to engage in East Asia against the action of China to maintain the status quo
or it can stay on the sidelines. If the United States does not act to maintain the international
order of its creation by acting to maintain the status quo in East Asia, it is unclear how this
will affect the interests of the United States or its allies elsewhere in the world. In other
words, can the United States accept the risk of the development of an international order not
of its making?
China will act to mitigate the scarcity that it perceives. The question is whether China’s
actions can be channeled to fruition within the construct of the existing international order
or whether the order needs to evolve or change to accommodate China. China will initiate
the action and the United States will largely determine the path that is taken to achieve a
new status quo. Whatever the result, the system of international politics will remain the




This paper set out to establish that globalization does or does not have an impact on the
odds of conflict initiation; and, if it does, then to present a theory that accounts for both
globalization and power in explaining international political outcomes. The system theories
of realism from Waltz and Mearsheimer are inadequate because they under theorize power as
an explanatory variable, ignore actor agency, and fail to state how the system itself evolves.
Most importantly, the purpose of the system of international politics is not clear under the
theory of either Waltz or Mearsheimer. Material realism addresses these concerns directly.
Theories of international politics that purport to be systems theories and explain outcomes
in international politics by exploiting power as the sole explanatory variable are under
theorized. This is because their conception of power is insufficiently theorized and cannot
support what a systems theory requires. A systems theory of international politics necessarily
presupposes that the attributes of a state affect the behavior of the state and that the coaction
of all states results in the emergence of a behavior that is exhibited by the system of states
that in turn affects the behavior of each individual state. Distinguishing the cart from the
horse is often impossible. Breaking the system into pieces so that each can be interrogated
is not fruitful because a system is always more than the sum of its parts. Systems must be
examined holistically. Waltz and Mearsheimer fail because they conceive of power only
at the system level or only at the unit level, but not both as is required for a realist system
theory of international politics.
Material realism addresses this shortcoming by theorizing power at the unit and at the
system level; and, offers a more robust conception of power. Power at the unit level is
straightforward. The work of Organksi, et al., on Power Transition Theory is quite helpful
because it supplies a robust theorization of power at the unit level. The work of Grewal on
Network Power operationalizes globalization as a system behavior (a manifestation of power
by the system of international politics) that acts to impose a conformity of behavior on states
as actors in international politics. What is borrowed and applied from Power Transition
Theory and Network Power provide a robust conception of power as a phenomenon writ
large in international politics.
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Material realism establishes that man in a state of nature is not violent unless his survival
is brought into question. When man is endowed with ample resources, he is not violent;
indeed, he is often quite peaceful. But when man is afflicted by a scarcity of resource,
he becomes seized with a fear for his survival and he acts, often violently, to acquire
the resources he needs to survive. Man does not engage in violence for trivial reasons
because he knows that violence often leads to what he fears more than anything else: death.
Consequently, man only fights in order to survive. This leads to the conclusion that when
man is amply endowed with resources he does not fear for his survival and, therefore, he
does not fight. As it is with man, it is with states. States fight only to ensure their survival.
As scarcity reduces, so does conflict among states. To reduce the instances of conflict solve
scarcity. Scarcity lies at the root of all conflict.
Material realism addresses actor agency explicitly by recognizing that states can mitigate
scarcity through collaboration or coercion. When states exhibit globalizing behavior they
are engaging in collaboration to obtain the resources they require. However, when states
take the resources they require through an unfair exchange, they are engaging in coercion.
The latter results in conflict. In either case, however, actor agency is made central to the
issue of reducing scarcity.
The SAOM model presented provides firm support for the proposition that globalization
operates to reduce incidents of conflict initiation. Material realism suggests this is because
states eschew violent conflict because they fear the uncertainty that always accompanies such
endeavors. As the United States knows all too well, victory in any conflict is never certain,
even when the combatants are mismatched. Consequently, states will opt to collaborate to
gain the resources they require. To the extent that collaboration is effective, states have no
need to exercise their power to coerce. The effect of globalization, therefore, is to obviate
the need to exercise power to obtain resources. The net effect of globalization and power
when considered together is to reduce conflict initiation. Indeed, in almost all cases the
effect of globalization has been strong enough to more than fully offset the effect of power,
thus explaining the reduction in odds for conflict initiation that has been witnessed. This
result is consistent with the reduction in instances of conflict observed by, among others,
Morris and Harari.
Material realism establishes the implication that the system of international politics
evolves as globalization takes deeper root. As more states become more enmeshed in global-
ization and, therefore, subject to the power that globalization imposes on them, incidents of
conflict initiation reduce. It can be said, therefore, that the system and globalization coe-
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volve. This means that any phenomenon that accelerates globalization will also accelerate
the evolution of the system of international politics. This is addressed further below.
Empirical support for material realism was found by examining the behavior of the
United States, China, and Japan in East Asia. The costly signals exhibited by the United
States suggest that the United States is a malignant and revisionist state, unless and until
the role of the United States in supporting the extant international system is considered
(see Figure 4.2). In light of such a consideration, the behavior of the United States should
be viewed as benign and supportive of the status quo (see also Figure 3.11). Moreover,
because, as Zeihan suggests, the United States does not suffer from scarcity, nor even the
possibility of scarcity, there is no reason for the United States to exhibit costly signals except
to fulfill the role of caretaker of the status quo. The costly signals exhibited by Japan clearly
suggest that Japan is a benign and status quo state, though there is reason to believe this
will change (see Figure 4.8). Finally, China is clearly a malignant and revisionist state (see
Figure 4.5). The costly signals exhibited by China are clear and the behavior of China, as
articulated above, is consistent with this interpretation. China perceives scarcity and will act
out until the scarcity it perceives is sufficiently mitigated. This result follows from the logic
of material realism.
Two important conclusions flow from material realism.
First, scarcity, as perceived, promotes a fear that moves states to strong, often violent
action. To reduce the odds of conflict initiation, scarcity must be mitigated. But as described
above, scarcity can be either absolute, as man experienced in the state of nature, or it can
be comparative as China, and other states, experience today. To say that a state suffers
from comparative scarcity is to say the state is not satisfied with how, and/or on what terms,
the international system allocates and distributes resources. Indeed, this may characterize
China’s belief today as to how the international system operates. Consequently, it is
important to understand whether scarcity as an extant phenomenon is best characterized
as an issue of allocation or distribution of resources, or as resulting from the state system
operating at or near the Pareto frontier where any allocation or distribution of resources to one
state has the potential to materially and negatively impact the well-being of another. Material
realism suggests that globalization operates to mitigate scarcity and, therefore, reduce the
odds of conflict initiation when the cause of scarcity is the allocation or distribution of
resources. Material realism also suggests that conflict becomes increasingly unavoidable
as states are afflicted by a condition of absolute scarcity that occurs as the Pareto frontier
is approached. So it is important to know what the root cause of scarcity is, since policy
111
prescriptions should necessarily derive from the particular cause.
Second, the avoidance of scarcity requires positive, thoughtful, and synergistic action
among government and non-government actors alike because scarcity is unavoidable absent
such action. Why is this so? To understand it is necessary to understand how man’s
consumption of resources scales with increases in population.
Data from the World Bank is quite illustrative. Figure 5.1 is a log-log plot of world
consumption against world population for the period 1960 - 2016 (“World Bank Open Data”
2018). The tightness of fit of the actual data to the trend line (R-squared = 0.9855) suggests
that world consumption scales as a power law. In this case, the slope of the trend line is 4.6
which means that consumption is scaling superlinearly. This presents a significant problem.
Figure 5.1: World Consumption 1960 - 2016
In Scale: The Universal Laws of Growth, Innovation, Sustainability, and the Pace of Life
in Organisms, Cities, Economies, and Companies Geoffrey West points out that phenomena
that scale superlinearly exhibit an “unexpectedly curious property technically known as a
finite time singularity” (West 2017, p413). “A finite time singularity simply means that the
mathematical solution to the growth equation . . . becomes infinitely large at some finite time.
. . .” (emphasis original) (West 2017, p413). Conceptually, this is illustrated in Figure 5.2.
In Figure 5.2 as the curve approaches the black dashed line it arcs up significantly and
approaches complete verticality. As the curve approaches the black dashed line this is where
according to West, “the mathematical solution to the growth equation . . . becomes infinitely
large.” Growth breaks down as an infinite amount of resource (measured along the y-axis) is
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Figure 5.2: Finite Time Singularity
correlated with a finite amount of resource (measured along the x-axis). Such a situation is
obviously nonsensical.
If world consumption scales superlinearly against population growth then this exact
situation will present itself in “finite time.” Using the scaling factor derived from Figure 5.1
we can discern what world consumption would look like relative to hypothetical world
population levels. Figure 5.3 shows how consumption scales as world population increases
from approximately 7.5B people today to 40B at “some point” in the future.
Figure 5.3: Extrapolated World Consumption: Finite Time Singularity
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“Some point” in the future needs further explanation. Today world population is approx-
imately 7.5B (“World Bank Open Data” 2018). Estimates on population growth vary, but
assuming arguendo that world population grows at 1% per year in to the future, then world
population will double approximately every 72 years. This means that a world population of
7.5B today will become 15B in 72 years and 30B in 144 years. Referring back to Figure 5.3,
the slope of the consumption curve clearly starts to arc upward at a population of 15B (in
72 years) and by 30B (in 144 years) the trend is quite pronounced. This means that for the
world to maintain its current consumption trajectory as population increases, ceteris paribus,
exponentially more resources will be required in finite time (certainly in the next 144 years).
Moreover, it is not at all speculative to say that growth will break down. As the slope of the
consumption curve accelerates toward complete verticality in “finite time” this outcome is
inevitable (if population continues to grow).
Nevertheless, it is not clear when exactly growth will break down, nor is it important for
our purposes here. It is enough to understand that as the slope of the consumption curve
increases scarcity approaches. At some point the issue becomes one of absolute scarcity
and not comparative scarcity. When this happens globalization will cease to operate as a
dampening force on conflict initiation; power, coercion, and diktat will operate wantonly.
Put simply, as population increases, ceteris paribus, it is inevitable that man’s standard
of living will come under increasing pressure as insufficient resources will be available
to support it. Moreover, it should also be noted that what is being stated here is not a
simple rehashing of Malthusian scarcity. Malthus assumed exponential scaling whereas here
superlinear (e.g., superexponential) scaling is taking place (West 2017, p413). (West reaches
a similar conclusion with respect to cities that is analogous to what is presented here).
Figure 5.3 suggests that the world will not become resource constrained relative to
population until the world population approaches at least 15B (probably at least 72 years
from now). Consequently, in the resource unconstrained world in which we live today we
can expect that globalization will operate to allocate and distribute resources and thereby
reduce scarcity for those states that participate in globalization. See (Barnett 2005). Conflict
will reduce accordingly. But the world of tomorrow promises a different outcome unless
action is taken to hold scarcity at a distance. There are only two options. First, population
growth can be limited and globalization allowed to operate to allocate and redistribute
resources to ameliorate existing scarcity. But it seems unlikely that population growth will
be controlled in any meaningful way by a sovereign power (even if it were desirable), so
this outcome is not likely. Second, as West suggests, the world can innovate (West 2017,
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p417). This, however, sounds strikingly similar to what we learned from Baldwin (supra
at ch. 2, s 3.2). See also (Kilcullen 2013). Consequently, in the final analysis further
“unbundlings” will be needed to lessen the burden that population growth necessarily places
on resources. Continuous advances in technology and continuous innovation are the only
answer to scarcity long term when population is unconstrained.
In Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla David Kilcullen, rely-
ing on data from the United Nations, reports that world population will level off somewhat
below 9.5 billion people in 2050 (Kilcullen 2013, p29). Referencing Figure 5.3 it is clear that
at a population of 9.5 billion world resources will not be under much more stress than is the
case today. The slope of the curve remains relatively the same. This suggests that scarcity in
the world will be characterized as comparative and not absolute. Consequently, the salient
issue will be the allocation and distribution of resources. This means that globalization,
which operates to allocate and distribute resources, can be expected to continue to reduce
conflict; perhaps even more so than today, as it continues to evolve and take even deeper
root. Therefore, any state action or policy that supports globalization will also serve to
support conflict reduction. See (Barnett 2005).
Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that heretofore the focus has been on inter state
conflict. In Out of the Mountains Kilcullen identifies four macro trends: population growth,
urbanization, littoralization, and connectedness (Kilcullen 2013, p28). These trends, ac-
cording to Kilcullen, will result in 75% of the world’s population living in cities by 2050
(Kilcullen 2013, p29). In Scale West makes a persuasive case for cities not being able to
scale to support increases in population. Kilcullen makes the same point in Out of the Moun-
tains and suggests that urban conflict is likely to increase as cities become overpopulated and
competition for resources escalates, particularly in the developing world (Kilcullen 2013,
p29). So while world population may not be an issue, the increasing population of cities
will be, especially since it can be expected that scarcity will be a collateral result. Moreover,
to the extent that urban conflict makes cities, which are nodes in the global supply chain
according to Khanna, unstable, globalization falters and the potential for conflict among
states increases. In the future, the stability of cities will likely determine the stability of the
international system. Politics will remain local.
* * *
Material realism holds that globalization, by allocating and distributing resources, re-
duces scarcity and, therefore, conflict. Material realism also holds that continuous advances
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in technology are needed to keep scarcity at a distance, assuming that population continues
to increase and consumption increases commensurately. But even if population does not
continue to increase, living standards are based on current consumption. If current con-
sumption world wide is held constant, then resources will have to be redistributed or else
inequality maintained. In this situation, scarcity again is at issue. Consequently, until the last
man arrives on station, technology and innovation is the only answer. Only technology and
innovation will allow us to solve scarcity and reduce the odds of conflict initiation. Policy
prescriptions should be issued accordingly. To this end, policies that promote technology
and innovation leading to an increase in energy and food production, along with a means of
broad distribution, are likely to pay the largest dividends in terms of reducing scarcity.
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